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Volume LXXIX *December 1964* *Number 4*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THUCYDIDES' *HISTORY:* A MANUAL OF STATECRAFT

I

THE writing of Thucydides hardly needs to be praised to those who study politics. Hobbes' endorsement is famous; Bertrand de Jouvenel has recently assured us that "this tragedy [that is, the Peloponnesian War, as Thucydides describes it] has served as a major item in the education of would-be statesmen for more than twenty-four centuries"; the standing of *The Peloponnesian War* as a great book, as a "classic," is secure. Yet the fact remains that the immense usefulness of the book is not appreciated often enough. At all times the problems of political life beg for lucid and general analysis; but the help which Thucydides' narration can give to the analyst is not usually acknowledged. The help it can give is abundant; so abundant, in fact, that one is entitled to say that the *History* of Thucydides almost constitutes a political education in itself.

It is not very difficult to see why Thucydides has not been much used by students of politics. To use his book requires a certain willingness to be unscrupulous. One must be ready not to make *too much* of the question whether the speeches in Thucydides are accurate; one must be ready not to insist on knowing what Thucydides himself thought about the matters he relates; one must be ready, at times, to formulate the generalities which Thucydides abstains from formulating; one, finally, must be ready to believe that a work of history can be read as a work of political theory. To be ready to do all this is a great deal; but it is worth the effort.

Why, then, make the effort? In what, exactly, consists the utility of Thucydides' *History?* In words that are fre-

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quently quoted, Thucydides himself says that he hopes his work will be judged useful "by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it. . . ." [1] These words are not exactly clear; and as John H. Finley has pointed out, they are open to two interpretations. Finley says:

> Does he mean that these events are future to himself but will be present to his readers—in other words, that when events unroll, his readers will recognize them as similar to those which he had described? Or does he mean that, by reading his book, people will be able to predict what is to come?

Finley concludes, surely correctly, that "the former alternative seems essentially what he had in mind." [2] In short, "readers at any like future period would consequently find his work useful as helping them to understand and even, in very general ways, to predict what was or would presently be happening then." Thucydides' *History* is thus "a manual of statecraft." [3] The purpose of this essay is, precisely, to

[1] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War,* I, 22, translated by R. Crawley (New York, 1951), 14. All subsequent references will be to both book and chapter of Thucydides and page of the Crawley edition.

[2] John H. Finley Jr., *Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), 292. Or as F. E. Adcock puts it: "The work will not tell him what is destined to happen, it will train him to use his judgment, and it may give him the courage to act by the knowledge how in like situations 'it actually happened.'" *Thucydides and His History* (Cambridge, 1963), 13.

[3] Finley, *Thucydides,* 104. In addition to Finley's book, the following writings are especially valuable aids to anyone who would exploit the political riches of Thucydides: R. C. Jebb, "The Speeches of Thucydides" in *Hellenica,* edited by Evelyn Abbott (London, 1898), 244–95; Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture,* Vol. I, translated from 2nd German ed. by Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1939), 379–408; Sir Richard Livingstone, Introduction to Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1943), xi–xxxi; Jacqueline de Romilly, *Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien* (Paris, 1947); David Grene, *Man in His Pride* (Chicago, 1950), 3–92; Eric Voegelin, *Order and History,* Vol. II: *The World of the Polis* (Baton Rouge, 1957), 349–73; Raymond Aron, "Thucydide et le récit des événements," *History and Theory,* I (1961), 103–28; Glenn Tinder, "Thucydides and the Twentieth Century," *The Texas Quarterly,* III (1960), 164–77; William T. Bluhm, "Causal Theory in Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*," *Political Studies,* X (1962), 15–35; Sir Ronald Syme, "Thucydides," *Proceedings of the British Academy,* XLVIII (1962), 39–56.

In a noteworthy paper, Jacqueline de Romilly has warned against victimizing Thucydides by a too crudely utilitarian approach. She shows that any

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show how Thucydides' *History* can be a manual of statecraft.

II

I should say that there are three main ways in which Thucydides' *History* rewards those who seek political knowledge. First, the book contains numerous observations made either by Thucydides or by the various speakers which are interesting in themselves, whatever the relevance they may have to the purposes of the narrative, or to the argument which a given speaker is trying to make persuasive. Second, the book contains several descriptions of extreme situations which may serve as models for anyone wishing to write on or think about comparable situations. Third, the book contains accounts of many of the typical predicaments in which men of state find themselves; at the same time, responses appropriate to these predicaments are articulated with a rare rationality and briefness. Let us examine these aspects in order.

III

Separate observations. The subject matter of these observations is quite diverse. They range from perceptions about human nature to the desirable qualities of statesmanship to the elements of national character. Some of them are famous and are often cited, and we need not rehearse all of them here. The fact that most of the memorable observations are made not by Thucydides but by speakers whose words Thucydides records does raise a problem. That problem is to decide in each case whether the observation has a general validity, or is either a convenient rationalization or a convenient exaggeration.

For example, at the First Congress at Sparta the Corinthians analyze the national character of Sparta and of Athens. It is clear that the Corinthians are trying to kindle the enthusiasm of Sparta for war. Their stratagem is to describe Sparta as a congenitally cautious—even pessimistic—city-state; and then to contrast Sparta with Athens, which the Corin-

effort to derive iron and eternal laws of history or human nature from his work would impute to him a simplicity of mind and intention he did not possess. See "L'utilité de l'histoire selon Thucydide," Fondation Hardt, *Entretiens,* IV (1956), 41–66. See also A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides,* Vol. I (Oxford, 1945), 149–50.

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thians describe as activist to the point of demonism. ("One might truly say that they [the Athenians] were born into the world to take no rest themselves and to give none to others" [I, 70; p. 40].) Obviously, Sparta is not as cautious as the Corinthians say: Sparta was not inactive during the period between the end of the Persian War and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Then, too, Thucydides tells us that it was not the admonitions of Corinth which drove Sparta into war, but rather a rational calculation on Sparta's part; namely, that the time had come to try to stop Athens before it became even stronger. Furthermore, though at times Athens seems to have behaved in a manner answering to the characterization made of it by the Corinthians, it had its periods of repose and relaxation. We can accuse the Corinthians, then, of convenient exaggeration. Are we nevertheless entitled to think that, despite the rhetorical exigencies felt by the Corinthians, their observations on Sparta and Athens have "a general validity"? The answer is that these observations can be taken as composing a pair of "ideal types." Whatever Corinth's intentions, and whatever simplifications it was willing to commit for the occasion, its words are valuable. That Sparta was more active, and Athens less active, than Corinth pretends does not vitiate its observations. We, as readers of Thucydides, can make allowance for the inaccuracies, and still see in these observations a description of Athens and of Sparta as each would be if it consistently acted according to its prevailing tendencies. Any political system exclusively devoted to order would behave as the Corinthians say the Spartans behave; any political system devoted to the liberation of human energies would behave as the Corinthians say the Athenians behave. If we want a concise description of the politics of order or of the politics of energy, we can consult the words of the Corinthians at the First Congress at Sparta—all the time remembering that no society is ever purely one thing rather than another, that an ideal type is, by definition, an abstraction.

Consider next Pericles' Funeral Oration. We must first acknowledge the element of convenient exaggeration in it; we must keep to mind the simple fact that the speech was meant to sustain the morale of the Athenian populace. To praise Athens was to improve its capacity for war: there

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would inevitably be excess on the part of him who praised. In addition, by pretending to tell the Athenians what they were, Pericles was trying to induce them to become what they should be. There was naturally a gap between the reality and the perfection of that reality. One way of approaching more closely to perfection would be to delineate it with eloquence, and assume, at the same time, that the Athenians were sophisticated enough to get the hint, to see the disparity between what they believed and what they practiced. Athens was much, but praising it for being what it not yet was would help it become more. But even if Pericles' oration were strictly accurate in its description of the peculiar virtues of life at Athens, the question of its usefulness to us would remain. That question, however, is easily answered. We take the Funeral Oration as a statement of the ideals of any democratic or open society. It is hard to find new ways to praise this speech. All we can say is that those in search of a loving discourse on the tendencies inherent in a democratic society, when carried to their conclusion, free from the admixture of competing tendencies, can do no better than refer to Pericles' words. We find there not only a defense of democratic government for its practical political consequences; we also find a defense of democratic government for its part in facilitating the development of a peculiar kind of culture. That is to receive a great deal from a few pages; and what we receive is only matched by Plato's not-so-loving discourse on democracy in Books 8 and 9 of *The Republic*.

Certain difficulties arise when we come to examine other observations made in Thucydides' *History*. The observations I have in mind are those made by various speakers in reference to human nature. These observations are marked throughout by a very deep pessimism. Twice in his Funeral Oration (II, 35 and 45; pp. 103 and 109), and once in his speech after the plague (II, 61; p. 117), Pericles comments on what he takes to be an ineffaceable inclination in men to be envious. In his exchange with Nicias, Alcibiades also touches on this theme, in order to blunt the attacks that had been made on his extravagance (VI, 16; p. 347). But envy is not the only side of human nature which the Athenians treat severely. The humane Diodotus, debating with Cleon on the fate of the rebellious Mitylenians, claims that no pun-

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ishment is adequate to deter men from the commission of transgressions, because human beings are under the "thraldom" of one or another "fatal and master passion." [4] Both misery and prosperity drive men to go beyond the prescribed bounds, and to assert themselves at the expense of others. The fear of retaliation by others is rarely a sufficient inhibition; desire blinds men to danger.

At the First Congress at Sparta, the Athenians bitterly defend themselves against the charge of being oppressive overlords, by making yet another jaundiced observation on human nature. The argument of the Athenians is indeed ingenious. They claim that their treatment of subordinate states is resented bitterly precisely because it is comparatively lenient. The Athenians go through certain legal forms before they impose burdens; and this legality

> makes [their satellites] forget to be grateful for being allowed to retain most of their possessions, and more vexed at a part being taken, than if we had from the first cast law aside and openly gratified our covetousness. If we had done so, not even would they have disputed that the weaker must give way to the stronger. Men's indignation, it seems, is more excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled by a superior (I, 77; p. 45).

Again, during the celebrated colloquy with the Melians, the Athenians voice pessimism about still another quality of human nature. The observation comes at a very dramatic moment. The Melians, confronted by a desperate situation, exhaust almost every conceivable argument in an attempt to dissuade the Athenians from aggression. Their last argument is a pious one: "But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust. . . ." The Athenian rejoinder is not only shockingly impious, but dark in its claim about human na-

[4] Thucydides, 170. The debate between Cleon and Diodotus is marked by a splendid irony. Cleon is an ultra democrat who praises virtues normally thought to be Spartan, and a violent man who urges a violent policy in the name of strict justice. His opponent, Diodotus, is a humane man who urges a humane policy in the name of naked self-interest, and who, while denying the possibility of conjoining expediency and justice in political life, succeeds in gaining Athenian assent to a policy which is both expedient and just.

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ture. They say, "Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can . . . everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do" (V, 104–05; pp. 333–34). The Athenians are saying what Hobbes was later to repeat; it is as natural for the strong to rule the weak as it is for flowing water to fill every crevice. Men and cities will do whatever they think they can safely get away with. The passion to have one's way, to leave one's mark on reality, to make people aware of one's existence, to act to the limits of one's capacities, to influence the destinies of others, is taken as a fixed, as a major, component of the nature of gods and men alike. No one in heaven or earth is spared the force of the Athenians' generality. The quest for power is not merely the quest for the fruits of power, such as security and material abundance; power is an end in itself. The joys of wielding it are intense, and universally irresistible. And because this tendency is natural, how can it be wrong?

The Athenians pessimism concerning human nature, then, is made up of several parts.

Two questions must be asked concerning these assertions about human nature. First, did the Athenians believe them to be true? Second, whether or not the Athenians believed them to be true, are they in fact true? We must ask the first question because it is clear that in every case, except for the remarks of Diodotus, the observations made by the Athenians contribute to a defense of some kind of questionable behavior. Whether or not sincerely espoused, expressions of pessimism are rhetorically convenient. For example, by speaking of envy as he does, Pericles, in effect, weakens the force of the charge that he exaggerated the virtues of Athens by anticipating it and then offering a plausible explanation of it. It is not easy to defeat a man in argument who tells you what you are going to say and which weakness in you tempts you to say it. Omniscience disarms opposition. To take another example, when the Athenians come to account for the hostility of their dependents, the mere fact that the Athenians made dependents of others and imposed burdens on them is not held to be sufficient explanation for that hostility. Resentment is attributed, rather, to perversity: "Men's indignation . . . is more excited by legal

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wrong than by violent wrong." Their resentment would have been less if Athenian oppression had been greater. It almost is made to seem that the grievance of the Athenians is as great as that of their dependents, that the received injury of ingratitude is as great as the inflicted injury of domination. Again, when talking with the Melians, the Athenians excuse their intentions by claiming that such intentions inhere in human nature; and like everyone strong, the Athenians are powerless to resist them. Indeed, the very Melians, about to become victims, are supposed to feel that their suffering deserves no pity; they are potential aggressors: "you [the Melians] . . . having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do." In intention, there is no moral difference between the strong and the weak, between those who attack and those who defend. Being strong, the Athenians are in a position to be true to human nature; whereas the Melians, being weak, can appear to be moral. In sum, a low opinion of mankind served the Athenian cause. But did the Athenians think they were uttering the truth, when they spoke as they did? In answering this question, we should remember first that Callicles in the *Gorgias* expresses a view which is rather close to that expressed by the Athenian speakers at Melos.[5] We can infer therefrom that there then existed at Athens some thinkers who taught that if men were to live in obedience to the law of nature, they must assert themselves at the expense of the weak and strive to satisfy to the fullest degree possible as many passions and appetites as possible. Callicles, like the Athenians at Melos, claims that all men by nature desire dominion over others; but that it is only the strong who are in a position to act from that desire. Before this natural fact, conventional moral judgment must be silent. Indeed, what is natural must be truly moral. The law of nature is the highest law. In short, it is possible that at least some of the Athenians at Melos believed as Callicles did. (We may add that Hermocrates, a Syracusan, was in agreement with the Athenians: "It is just as much in men's nature to rule those who submit to them, as it is to resist those who molest them; one is not less

[5] See Plato, *Gorgias*, 482–84, 491–92. Callicles is saying that men ought to rule wherever they can; the Athenians are saying that men always rule wherever they can. Later, Alcibiades was to say that men must rule wherever they can.

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invariable than the other" [IV, 61; p. 240]. This opinion apparently was not confined to Athens.)

As for the other observations made by the Athenians, there is no way, direct or indirect, of finding out whether or not the Athenian speakers thought them to be true. All we can say is that no one who reads Plato and Aristotle—not to mention the Greek tragedians—could fail to conclude that a continuous theme in Athenian thought was the nearly insuperable intractability of human nature. There is almost no enormity of the spirit or ferocity of the will which does not somewhere or other receive the attention of the great Athenian moralists. Pessimism about man was part of Athenian mental culture.

We come next to the question whether the assertions made by the Athenians are, in fact, true. Are we learning something about human nature when we read these defamations of it? The answer must be that if the words of the Athenians are taken strictly, they are false. Obviously, not every man who ever lived felt envious toward the greatness of others or was under the thraldom of one or another fatal and master passion; not every man or group of men has done everything that could be safely gotten away with. Apart from certain biological statements, there are no generalizations about human beings which apply to all and sundry, in all places and at all times. There are always exceptions; and it would be foolish even to try to determine what proportion of the race behaves or feels in the way described by the Athenians. The only reasonable manner of receiving what the Athenians say is the manner we would accord to the maxims of Machiavelli or La Rochefoucauld, or of any worldly or cynical man. When Machiavelli says that "men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony"; or when La Rochefoucauld says that "We all have enough strength to bear the misfortunes of others," we are, if we are innocent, startled into reflection. The fact that we know that there are many men who grieve more over the loss of a relative than over the loss of money, or that the sorrows of another can crush a man, does not lead us to say that the comments of Machiavelli or La Rochefoucauld are false. What we can say, instead, is that though there are numerous exceptions to the cynical rule, though not literally

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everyone feels as the pessimists allege everyone feels, there is "a good deal of truth" in these remarks. Unexpectedly, many men turn out to be very much like what the enemies of human nature say all men are. The cynical moralist, for whatever reason, or out of whatever hurt, has brushed away the conventional pieties, and detected a painful, unflattering *tendency* in some, probably many, human beings. We are now put on our guard for the future. Such knowledge is demoralizing, but our understanding of men and their motives is now more adequate because more complicated. We recover our sense of proportion when we realize that the cynic has indulged in simplification, the simplification of exaggeration. But he had to exaggerate in order to get us to pay attention to him. We make proper use of the cynic when we see that he has, in fact, spoken exaggeratedly, but that he has, after all, spoken with a measure of truth. And this is the proper use to be made of the Athenian observations about human nature.

In sum, when we come across the observations scattered profusely throughout Thucydides' narration, we must mix our gratitude for the wisdom with a little caution. We must remember that those who speak do not always speak disinterestedly; we must make proper allowances. But after we have done so, we are in a position to reap a rich harvest.

There are many other observations which do not require this sort of suspiciousness from us, and which also have the same power to instruct us or to remind us of some bit of political knowledge. To mention just a few: the rationale of preventive war given by the Corinthians at the First Congress at Sparta, in the course of their analysis of the Spartan character; the sense of the unpredictability of the use of violence for political ends which Athenians and Spartans share; the comment by Archidamus, the Spartan, on the difficulties of waging a war which are likely to be faced by a coalition; Cleon's defense of mediocrity in high office; Cleon's comments on the usual shortcomings of the foreign policy of a democratic people; the rival comments of Cleon and Diodotus on the value of severely punishing some for deterring others from committing unwanted acts. More could be instanced. Though these observations are made without qualification, and with a presumption of universal

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and permanent validity, they need not be taken at face value to be cherished. In a few words, on many occasions, and under great pressure, men of affairs speak their minds. The results are often worth more than the labored and extended discussions to be found in other books of great reputation.

IV

Description of extreme situations. There are three descriptions, each several pages in length, of times when human beings are subjected to such strains that the customary bonds of social life disintegrate or the system of reciprocal moral feelings collapses. Not only is the psychology of power and prestige explored in Thucydides' book, but also the psychology of suffering. It is the latter psychology which becomes Thucydides' subject, when he undertakes to describe what I have called—using a phrase of Bruno Bettelheim's—"extreme situations."

The theme of the first two of the three descriptions—the plague at Athens and the civil war in Corcyra—is the way in which suffering corrupts human nature. The theme of the third—the destruction of the Athenian army in Sicily—is simply the awfulness of suffering; before the spectacle of what the Athenians endured, while fighting and after defeat, the voice of Thucydides becomes reverent and pitying, as he proceeds from misery to misery, coming at last to the Athenians imprisoned in the quarries, where "no single suffering to be apprehended by men thrust into such a place was spared them" (VII, 87; p. 453). The stress in the first two descriptions is on the fragility of civilization; the stress in the third description is on nothing less than the fragility of the human creature.

What place, then, do these descriptions have in a "manual of statecraft"? What do these descriptions teach the student of politics? It could be said that their greatest value derives from their ability to convey a sense of the limitations of human nature. What is involved here is not a worldly pessimism regarding the motives of men immersed in action, the pessimism underlying the observations made by the Athenians and others throughout Thucydides' narration. These three descriptions (made by Thucydides himself, not by any of his speakers) go beyond worldly pessimism to a deeper

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pessimism. And this deeper pessimism consists in the setting of narrow bounds to the expectations we can reasonably entertain of average human beings. The strict dependence of morality or decency or forbearance on tolerable conditions of life emerges unmistakably from these pages of Thucydides. In our age this view receives its unwelcome confirmation from the studies of life in concentration camps and prisoner-of-war camps, like those by Bettelheim, Rousset, Cohen, Lifton, Schein, and others. Common to these studies and to the descriptions of Thucydides is the lesson that under certain kinds of pressure, human nature goes to pieces.

In his writing on the plague, Thucydides delineates the ways in which the fear of death through contagion disorganizes all human relations. It is the peculiar power of contagious disease to isolate people from each other; normal communal ties give way before the desire of every man to avoid contact which could bring on the disease and with it, death. The wish to remain free of sickness overrides all duty and all affection. The result at Athens was a kind of negative state of nature: instead of the war of all against all, there was the avoidance of all by all; only on those terms could the effort to survive—futile, in the long run, for most—be made. Joined to this was the desperate attempt to "seize the day," to make the most of what little life remained. Thucydides says, "Men now coolly ventured on what they had formerly done in a corner, . . . seeing the rapid transitions produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and those who before had nothing succeeding to their property. So they resolved to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their lives and riches as alike things of a day" (II, 53; p. 113). In the absence of what perforce had been thoughtlessly taken for granted, namely health in the city, the most dreadful events could happen.

In his writing on the struggles of classes and parties, first at Corcyra and later elsewhere in Greece, Thucydides delineates the ways in which suppressed hatred and resentment, when allowed release, rage intoxicatedly. Factional feeling, reinforced by the generally demoralizing effects of wartime scarcity, and finding occasion for display in the weakening of established order brought on by the larger war of cities against each other, destroyed the truce between conflicting

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interests. "Death . . . raged in every shape . . . blood became a weaker tie than party . . . the confidence of their members in each other rested less on any religious sanction than upon complicity in crime. . . . Revenge also was held of more account than self-preservation . . . society became divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow" (III, 82–83; pp. 189–91). There is almost no form of political extremism missing from Thucydides' account. We can feel that in a few pages Thucydides has described not only the domestic strife and cruelty of his own time, but the domestic strife and cruelty of so much of later history. He robs the political experiences of our time especially of their novelty; after reading him, nothing we afterwards read about or experience can surprise us; we find in those few pages a brilliantly articulated summary of the very essence of civil feud.

In his writing on the *debâcle* of the Athenian army in Sicily, Thucydides delineates the ways in which misery envelopes a large group of men (VII, 75–87; pp. 445–53). Though there is some attention paid to the fact that at times the soldiers' misery turned them against each other, because the survival of some necessitated indifference to the survival of others, the main burden of Thucydides' story is the horror of fellow suffering. There are few passages in other books which better tally the cost of war, the cost in the blood of the youth of a state. And it is not only in blood that the soldiers paid the cost of war, but in various kinds of torment and degradation before death came.

In sum, these three descriptions of Thucydides must have a chastening effect on the political mind. It is precisely because Thucydides avoids melodrama and, instead, writes with a clear-eyed gravity, that these pages have the power to impress on the reader their truth, the pessimistic truth regarding human behavior in extreme situations.

V

Accounts of typical political predicaments. When we come to this, the third main way in which Thucydides' *History* rewards those in quest of political knowledge, we come to the heart of the matter. This book is a great work on politics, a great "manual of statecraft," primarily because it deals with a unit of action—the Peloponnesian War—in which a

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large variety of what we have called "typical political predicaments" followed on one another. Naturally, there are countless other works of history which treat of the troubles and struggles of states and hence contain accounts of typical political predicaments. Yet it could be safely said that no comparable work has the same ability to educate the generations of men as Thucydides'. The explanation of this is to be found, quite obviously, in the fact that Thucydides presents to the reader the deliberations which took place in the midst of the predicaments. There is no mere narration of steps taken and policies pursued; there is also a recounting of the thought behind the steps and the policies. Even more, Thucydides sometimes presents to the reader the spectacle of speakers of the same city offering contrasting commentaries. The problematic quality of political action is thus powerfully rendered.

Writers on Thucydides have often remarked that the struggle between Athens and Sparta takes on added interest when certain similarities and differences between Athens and Sparta are remembered. On the side of similarities, Athens and Sparta were both Greek cities, and had fought a common and glorious war against the Persians; they were of the same race and had formerly been desperate allies. On the side of differences, Athenians were of Ionian stock, Spartans of Doric stock; Athens was a great sea power, Sparta a great land power; Athens had a comparatively large population, Sparta a small one; Athens was a democracy, Sparta was ruled by a landed military aristocracy; Athens favored democracy in other cities, Sparta favored oligarchies; Athens was a dynamic open society, Sparta was a repressive closed society; and so on. All these things are surely deserving of notice, and, in accumulation, add to the dramatic splendor of the struggle. But to the student of politics and, one feels, to Thucydides himself, the really important similarity between Athens and Sparta was that they were both major or first-rate powers; the really important difference between them was over their prevailing attitudes toward power. The essence of Thucydides' story, then, is the contest of two great powers. And the typical political predicaments that it fell to Thucydides to describe were the predicaments in which first-rate powers found themselves. Not all predicaments which could con-

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ceivably arise for all kinds of state at all times have a place in his narration. *The Peloponnesian War* is not a textbook in international relations, but a limited story in which some great moments of political decision have a prominent place. To be sure, the policies and actions of the two first-rate powers confronted lesser powers with their own moments of political decision; and Thucydides' narration includes these moments. But at the center of the stage are the causes and the conduct of a war between two first-rate powers.

Let us take up the crucial places in the text where a predicament elicits great words from leading men of affairs. As we shall see, the words are sometimes those of persuasion in the name of a favored line of action in the future, sometimes those of apology for or defense of some line of action in the past.

There is first the Congress at Sparta in 432 B.C., on the eve of hostilities, at which Corinth and other cities gave voice to their grievances against Athens and urged an activist policy on Sparta; Athens defended its past policies; and Sparta deliberated on the course to follow. At this Congress, almost all the considerations later adduced by speakers on both sides and in all predicaments are brought forth. After accusing Athens of a consistently aggressive course toward many of the cities of Greece, Corinth pleads for what is, in effect, a preventive war to be waged by Sparta and its allies against Athens. The policy of not waiting for an enemy to become "twice its original size," and, instead, of "crushing it in its infancy," is recommended by Corinth (I, 69; p. 39). The underlying assumption of Corinth is that Athens will not, of itself, stop or rest; its ambitions are limitless. All that could be said in favor of preventive war is said by Corinth's speakers.

In a brilliant and resourceful speech, the Athenians undertake a defense of their behavior from the time of the end of the war with Persia to the present. The Athenians touch on every conceivable argument to vindicate themselves. They refer to Athens' role in the war against Persia, and speak of the right of those who sacrifice and win to gain something from their effort. In its inception, the Athenian quest for hegemony over some of the smaller maritime states is thus pictured as a natural consequence of successful Athenian

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exertion against a tremendous enemy. But this is not the main point. The main point is that Athens was driven to do what it did because of fear for its security, fear of Persian reassertion, fear of some other future foe. What appears to be aggression is, after all, only a policy of defense; to keep what Athens had, Athens had to acquire more. As Machiavelli was to say later, fear of loss can make men act exactly as a desire for gain. The underlying assumption here is that the ordinary rules of morality cannot be applied to the acts of a state bent on self-preservation. The Athenian apology, however, does not end there. Though fear was the first and most important motive, "honour and interest afterwards came in" (I, 75; p. 44). The strength of Athens permits it the luxury of acting from motives other than fear; it can indulge the desire for opulence as well as the desire for prestige, reputation, for the respect, even awe, of others. In any event, "at last, when almost all hated us . . . when you [the Spartans] had ceased to be friends that you once were . . . it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who left us would fall to you" (I, 75; p. 44). The Athenians do not draw from this reasoning a conclusion which begs to be drawn, and which we can draw. The conclusion is that the Athenians, acting from fear of others, gave fear to others; that the Athenians, seeking security for themselves, jeopardized the security of others; that the Athenians, acting against the day when others would attack them, brought on that day by preparing for it. Yet how else could they have acted? Would they have had security simply by remaining content with what they already had? A state can invite attack on itself by being either strong or weak, by preparing for attack or not preparing for it. And Athens chose the way of strength, the way of preparation. A state's strength frightens others states, but a state's weakness invites the aggression of other states. The most awful dilemma of security is thus the unarticulated basis of Athenian reasoning. The Athenians then drop these practical (and poignant) considerations, and go on to the most fundamental of all considerations, that pertaining to human nature. They say that "it had always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger"; justice has no place, has never had a place, can, in the nature of things, have no place in the competition

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of states. The Athenians have at their disposal a *tu quoque*, and no one seems able to deny the charge.

The Spartans then must decide what to do. The aged Archidamus, as befits his age, counsels caution. He urges the Spartans to wait a few years before taking on the Athenians, so that the Spartans, by added preparation, could reach a position from which they could negotiate from strength and induce the Athenians to behave sensibly; and repeats the Athenian argument that war is unpredictable, the future uncertain, and that a hasty policy could lead to disaster (I, 78–85; pp. 46–49). The words of Archidamus are compelling and they are plausible, as all the words of all the speakers in Thucydides are plausible. But his moderation is beaten down by the equally plausible words of the Ephor, Sthenelaidas. In the words of Thucydides:

> The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them (I, 88; p. 50).

As Athens acted out of fear, interest, and honor, so Sparta must now do the same. Having the same aspirations, the two first-rate states are driven to war on each other, because the world—a world of scarcity, a world in which one state's advantage can only be gained at the expense of another state—cannot accommodate the aspirations of both.

Thus, early in his work, Thucydides recounts a debate in which most of the perplexities of power politics are laid bare. We are given in that debate words which are adequate to a great occasion. That in itself would be much to be given. When we see, however, that that great occasion was a typical political predicament, a predicament frequently recurring through time and present in the world today, we can only feel the deepest gratitude. This is not to say that all crises in the careers of first-rate powers can be looked at by means of the speeches at the Congress of Sparta; that would be to make an absurdly large claim for Thucydides. It is only to say that, at the very least, a few pages in Thucydides' book are a matchless preparation for further thought about the crises of first-rate powers.

We turn next to the speech of Pericles urging Athenian

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firmness in the face of the demands of Sparta and its allies. The speech is marked by sober advocacy and contains a number of points which make of this speech, again, a model utterance for that kind of occasion. The most interesting point refers to the danger of making any concession. Pericles says:

> If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand, as having been frightened into obedience in the first instance; while a firm refusal will make them clearly understand that they must treat you more as equals (I, 140; p. 80).

Later statesmen, in similar situations, can only repeat, in more or less the same words, what Pericles here says.

All through the first hundred pages or so, in which Thucydides describes the preparations for war and the incidents and events before and just after the outbreak of the great war, he preaches no sermon on the general folly of war. If it is true to say, as R. C. Jebb has said, that Thucydides "has not, in the sense of Plato or Aristotle, a theory of ethics or politics," [6] he does have an attitude toward politics. And it is an attitude which never calls into question the game of politics, as men have always played it. Thucydides believed in moderation; he hated cruelty and excess. But the quest for security, that is, the desire of a city to preserve itself as a city, free from foreign influence or domination; and beyond security, the quest for greater wealth, for greater prestige, for greater power and influence over others and at the expense of others: all these things, so manifestly at work in the political situation in Greece, Thucydides passes no moral judgment on. Where Socrates, in the *Gorgias,* could say of Pericles that he had corrupted the Athenians and left them wilder than he found them, Thucydides finds in Pericles the ideal political man.[7] Pericles did not call into question the game of politics; he did not call into question the traditional aims of politics. Rather, he pushed Athens to a great-

[6] Jebb, "The Speeches of Thucydides," 274.

[7] See Aristotle's judgment: "As long as Pericles was the leader of the people, the state was still in a fairly good condition, but after his death everything became much worse." This comment is made in *The Constitution of Athens.* See Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens and Related Texts,* translated and edited by Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp (New York, 1950), 98.

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ness that it had never known, and the greatness was of the most worldly sort. Furthermore, Pericles, in the opinion of Thucydides, "for as long as he was at the head of the state during the peace . . . pursued a moderate and conservative policy" (II, 65; p. 120). From the point of view of moral absolutism, Pericles was an immoral man, corrupt and corrupting; from the point of view of those who took for granted that the game of politics had rules of its own and was not liable to the moral questions of an absolutist, Pericles was a political hero. Thucydides takes his stand with the latter. It is for this very reason that his book is accessible to those who look for a manual of statecraft. It could be said, I think, that the closest Thucydides could come to passing a moral judgment would have been to say what Pericles said in his speech after the plague at Athens: "to take it [the empire] perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe" (II, 63; p. 118). What Pericles is saying is that perhaps—*just perhaps*—the Athenians could have contented themselves with less than they took in the fifty years before the outbreak of general war; but in any event, the deeds are done, Athens has an empire, it has made itself many enemies, it has extended its interests and commitments, it has grown to need what it has taken, but there is no giving it back, there can only be armed defense of it. Its life may not be at stake; but its opulence, and honor, and reputation present and future are at stake. And that the stake is worth defending, Thucydides no more doubts than Athens and its leaders.

The next political situation covered by Thucydides which we shall consider involved not the question of whether or not the time had come for one first-rate power to assert itself against the ambitions of another, but rather whether or not a first-rate power, in a time of truce, should seek to extend its power over peoples seemingly ripe for dominion. I refer to the debate over the projected invasion of Sicily by Athens.

I have already said that the really important similarity between Athens and Sparta was that they were both first-rate powers, alike motivated (as all powers are motivated) by the desire to be secure, and alike able (as none but first-rate powers are able) to pursue a foreign policy in which security is actively promoted; first-rate powers can do, not only be done to. Also being first-rate powers, Athens and Sparta

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could aim at other things besides security; they could seek material increase or prestige or glory. The record of Athens and Sparta from the end of the war with Persia to roughly fifteen years after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War is the record of two first-rate powers behaving like first-rate powers. Of course, there were divergences in their policies. For example, Athens sought wealth and found it in an imperial system of taxation, whereas Sparta contented itself with keeping its large slave population down. But, by and large, what divergences there were pale into insignificance before the basic sameness of concern. When we come, however, to the Athenian expedition to Sicily, a really important difference between Athens and Sparta shows itself. The game of power politics takes on a different style; Athens departs from the game's traditional rules.

Once again, Thucydides treats us to the spectacle of men on the same side in a struggle debating with themselves on the proper policy to undertake. Although Thucydides lamented the decision finally made, namely, to make the preparations for invading Sicily, he does not omit Alcibiades' defense of that policy. Nor, on the other hand, does he report it in such a way as to make it seem absurd. (He hated Cleon, yet who could dismiss Cleon as ignorant, after reading Thucydides' report of Cleon's speech in the Mitylenian affair?)

Alcibiades' opponent is the respected soldier Nicias, speaking as Pericles, were he still alive, would have spoken, though lacking in Pericles' mastery over the populace. The heart of Nicias' argument is that Athens should not grasp "at another empire before we have secured the one we have already" (VI, 10; p. 344). The risks attendant on a policy of expansion into distant areas are carefully and eloquently detailed, and a number of shrewd points about the psychology of power-relationships and the psychology of revengeful exiles are made. But all to no avail. Alcibiades, then thirty-five years old and enjoying a vivid though ambiguous reputation, offers the main rebuttal. Although "most of the Athenians that came forward spoke in favour of the expedition," it is the words of Alcibiades that Thucydides chooses to report; for it is the words of Alcibiades (together with

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those of some exiles) which helped to make the Athenians "more eager for the expedition than before" (VI, 15 and 19; pp. 346 and 350). Furthermore, Alcibiades introduces considerations hitherto missing from all the speeches reported by Thucydides. To be sure, the reasons given by Thucydides as those producing sentiment for the expedition are not the reasons brought forth by Alcibiades. But Alcibiades must have appealed to something deep in the Athenian psyche.

Alcibiades begins his speech with reasonable references to the state of disarray in Sicily and to the needs of Athens' Sicilian allies, which Athens must satisfy if it is to remain faithful to its role in the world. But then Alcibiades reaches for novelty in his discourse. He says, "And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop" (VI, 18; p. 349). These words suggest that it is in the very nature of political activity that no bounds can be set to it; and that, indeed, no bounds can be set to appetite once the prospect of satisfaction is opened up. Power has a dynamism of its own and subjects those who seek power to laws of its own which they are helpless to resist. Alcibiades does seem to offer a prudential reason for this limitlessness. He continues, "we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend it [the empire], for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves" (VI, 18; p. 349). He here anticipates what Hobbes was to say centuries later:

> Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him (*Leviathan,* Chap. 13).

The only trouble is that such a support for the Sicilian expedition is wanting to Alcibiades. The conquest of Sicily is not needed to strengthen Athens' hand against its Peloponnesian enemies; the Sicilians offer no threat to the security of Athens. The very reasoning which the Athenians used

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to justify their expansion in mainland Greece and the surrounding islands, and which then seemed convincing, is used to justify an attack on a remote island. It cannot seem convincing in this instance. In the midst of the Sicilian campaign, Euphemus, an Athenian ambassador, repeats this sort of argument to the Camarinaeans, hoping to persuade them to assist the Athenian cause. He says,

> fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas, and fear makes us now come, with the help of our friends to order safely matters in Sicily, and not to enslave any but rather to prevent any from being enslaved. . . . We assert that we are rulers in Hellas in order not to be subjects; liberators in Sicily that we may not be harmed by the Sicilians; that we are compelled to interfere in many things, because we have many things to guard against . . . (VI, 83 and 87; pp. 385 and 387).

The argument must, however, again ring hollow. Worse, this argument, containing as it does an expression of the profoundest problem of politics, is brought into disrepute by the hypocritical use made of it, in a situation where it does not apply. Just as we are ready to adopt a Homeric attitude of tragic pity for combatants locked in mortal and necessary combat, the mendacity of the Athenians checks us.[8] Not even the brutal words which the Athenians speak to the Melians before they liquidate them leave so bad a taste in the mouth. Like Pericles, Alcibiades worships political greatness and glories in the extent of the Athenian empire and the splendors accruing from it. But unlike Pericles, Alcibiades sees, or claims to see, no limitation on that empire. Where Pericles could say that Athenian imperialism had made Athens finally invulnerable, even at the cost of "immorality," and of generating fear and enmity, Alcibiades would scorn the very idea of invulnerability. Like Pericles, Alcibiades is willing to have suspended the rules of ordinary morality when the ambitions of states are under consideration. But unlike Pericles, Alcibiades does not allow prudence to take the place of morality as a check on the ambitions of Athens.

There is more novelty in the conclusion of Alcibiades' speech. He says, "by sinking into inaction, the city, like everything else, will wear itself out, and its skill in every-

[8] This is the more appalling because our prepossessions are all in favor of democratic Athens in its struggle with anti-democratic Sparta.

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thing decay; while each fresh struggle will give it fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself not in word but in deed. In short, my conviction is that a city not inactive by nature could not choose a quicker way to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a policy, and that the safest rule of life is to take one's character and institutions for better or worse, and to live up to them as closely as one can" (VI, 18; p. 350). It is hard to say whether Alcibiades completely believes what he says; surely his own life as described by Thucydides and, brilliantly, by Plutarch, seems to have been lived in conformity with these words. Perhaps he is voicing a sentiment which he would like to be true, out of some romanticism of his nature; and hopes that the Athenians would act as if they believed it to be true. His own personal ambition, invested in the success of some glorious enterprise, is not enough, by itself, to account for these words. In any case, implicit in these words is the most sublime sort of recklessness, a recklessness for which it is right that a state do all that it is capable of doing so that it may realize itself to the full, as long as time is with it; and then after its duration of glory, after its genius has exhausted itself and fortune turns to some other state, it can tell itself that it made the most of what it had. Who can deny the mad beauty of such an idea? But it is an idea which exacts a cost, the cost of longevity. And "irresponsible" is too tame a word to apply to a man who is willing that a state trade the longer life of moderation for the shorter but more heroic life of limitless action. In *The Iliad,* Achilles can make the same choice for himself, but the consequences of his choice are confined to himself and to his loved ones. Athens is not one man.

In Alcibiades' speech, then, a new style of politics makes its appearance in Thucydides' narration. It is not the last time such a style will have a place on the world scene, and to read about it in Thucydides, and about its consequences, is a further enhancement of one's political knowledge.

It is an ample vindication of Thucydides' claim that what he had written was not "an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but . . . a possession for all time."

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WANG CHING-WEI: CHINA'S ROMANTIC RADICAL

MAN'S addiction to wishful thinking and uninhibited hindsight makes it hardly surprising that the history of any people tends to be a volatile blend of myth and reality. In China the triumph of Mao Tse-tung and the Communists at mid-century has obscured earlier developments, even as the apparent triumph of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists in the nineteen-thirties blurred earlier chapters in the evolution of the Chinese nationalist movement. *Ex post facto,* the accomplished fact masquerades as inevitable conclusion, predestined and foregone. The fiction of inevitability is most clearly shown in Peking's version of modern Chinese history, a never-never land where relationships between economic forces and social classes allegedly define all political alternatives, mold all historical patterns, and preclude the need for independent assessment of causation.[1]

Actually men, as well as ideas, institutions, and accidents, shape history. And in China it is notable that one individual, who a generation ago ranked as one of the most prominent figures of the republican period, is already obscured, his memory shrouded by both Nationalists and Communists with the darkest of drapes, that of "national traitor." The man is Wang Ching-wei. For nearly forty years, from 1905 until his death in 1944, Wang's energy, magnetism, and vitality served to leave his personal imprint on the political history of twentieth-century China. During the early, secret-society phase of the modern Chinese nationalist movement, he was an eloquent spokesman for Sun Yat-sen's cause and became a national hero when he risked his life in 1910 in a bold attempt to assassinate the Manchu prince regent at Peking. Wang remained close to Sun Yat-sen after the 1911 revolution and was a member of his most intimate political circle when Sun died in 1925. During the decade between 1927 and 1937, Wang steadily feuded with Chiang Kai-shek for top authority in the Kuomintang, the ruling political party in Nationalist China. Following the outbreak of the

[1] Ho Kan-chih, *A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution* (Peking, 1959) gives the official version of recent Chinese history from 1919 to 1956.

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Sino-Japanese War, Wang left Chungking and, after an attempt on his life at Hanoi in 1939, moved to Japanese-occupied territory. There he ended his career as head of a puppet regime established at Nanking in 1940, apparently believing that he could best serve China's national interests through collaboration rather than resistance.

The golden boy of Chinese nationalism at the time of the anti-Manchu coup of 1911, Wang Ching-wei was a many-sided man: a handsome, perennially youthful,[2] romantic poet in quest of China's quintessential soul, and a self-styled political realist who hoped to ensure China's safety and security by emulating Sun Yat-sen's persistent tendency to look first to Japan for aid in time of need.[3] Wang Ching-wei's claim to realism is dubious, for his public career was a monument to miscalculation, poor timing, and exiguous foresight. It is rather as political romantic that Wang Ching-wei may best be remembered, republican China's classic case of the man who perished more for his follies than for his sins. Twenty years after his death, it is appropriate to attempt to place Wang within the context of twentieth-century Chinese political history.[4]

I

Born on May 4, 1883, at Canton, bustling hub of China's great southern province of Kwangtung, Wang Ching-wei[5]

[2] Wang's youthful appearance and personal allure were legendary in republican China; even after his death, some elderly female hearts in China and Hong Kong beat faster when his name was mentioned. An excellent photograph of Wang in his prime appears in T'ang Leang-li (ed.), *Reconstruction in China: A Record of Progress and Achievement in Facts and Figures* (Shanghai, 1935), following p. 12.

[3] The most detailed study of this theme is Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954).

[4] There is no satisfactory critical biography of Wang Ching-wei in either Chinese or English. T'ang Leang-li, *Wang Ching-wei: A Political Biography* (Peiping, 1931) is an adulatory account by a close associate; Don-Bate, *Wang Ching-wei: Puppet or Patriot?* (Chicago, 1941) is a sympathetic but superficial journalistic profile. Professor James R. Shirley of Northern Illinois University has dealt with all except the final period of Wang's career in a dissertation prepared for the department of history at the University of California, Berkeley. For the present, bibliographical guidance to some basic Chinese and Western-language sources is given, respectively, in Eugene Wu, *Leaders of Twentieth-Century China* (Stanford, 1956) and T. L. Yuan, *China in Western Literature* (New Haven, 1958).

[5] Wang's given name was Chao-ming. Ching-wei is actually his *tzu*, or

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is customarily viewed by his compatriots as a Cantonese, though in fact his ancestral home was at Shao-hsing in Chekiang, the native province of Chiang Kai-shek. During the Ch'ing period (1644–1911) Chekiang was culturally one of the most cultivated areas in the empire,[6] and Wang's father, Wang Shu, was a native of one of Chekiang's most advanced prefectures. For financial reasons, Wang Shu moved south to Kwangtung to take a post as legal secretary, personally employed by an official of the imperial civil service.[7] The youngest of ten children, Wang Ching-wei received his childhood education in the Chinese classics, studying at home under his father's tutelage. The boy's ethical and aesthetic standards during his formative years were conventionally Chinese, his later reminiscences referring particularly to the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) and to the poetry of T'ao Ch'ien (365–427) and Lu Yu (1125–1210). Like other sensitive young Chinese growing up in the eighteen-nineties, Wang Ching-wei's reading of Chinese history made him impatient of China's weakness and resentful of the alien dynasty then ruling at Peking.

Penury was a constant dimension to life in the Wang family, since his father was in straitened circumstances and forced to continue working until he was over seventy. "It was a poor and miserable life," Wang later wrote.[8] A rapid series of deaths left the family financial situation especially precarious at this time. Wang's father died when the boy was about fourteen. The mother had passed away a year earlier, and two of his three elder brothers died soon thereafter. Wang was admitted to one of the Canton academies in 1898, working as a tutor at the same time to help support the family. He also continued to study independently with

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courtesy name, which he adopted in 1905 when he assumed his first public position as editor of the *Min Pao* in Japan.

6 For discussion of the position of Chekiang during the Ch'ing period, see Ping-ti Ho, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368–1911* (New York, 1962), Chap. 6.

7 A description of the system is given in the section on "Private Secretaries" in T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, *Local Government in China under the Ch'ing* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 93–115.

8 Wang offers a brief description of his childhood in his autobiographical memoir in *Tung-fang tsa-chih* (Eastern Miscellany, XXXI (1934), 1–3.

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the help of an uncle's well-stocked library and in 1903 was able to pass the Kwangtung provincial examination and to gain a government scholarship for study in Japan the following year. Modernizing Meiji Japan opened new vistas for Wang Ching-wei, even as militarized Showa Japan played an important role in his political life a generation later. In Tokyo he found a congenial group of fellow Cantonese students, including Hu Han-min and others destined to become prominent in the politics of republican China. He learned the Japanese language rapidly, supplemented his government stipend by doing translations, and studied constitutional law and political theory at the Tokyo Law College, obtaining his degree in 1906.

Before graduation, however, he joined the new Chinese patriotic society, the T'ung-meng-hui, formed in Japan in 1905 by Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing, and other anti-Manchu activists.[9] Elected chairman of one of the three key councils of the T'ung-meng-hui, Wang, then twenty-two, began his close personal association with Sun Yat-sen, seventeen years his senior. In the Chinese student communities of Tokyo and Yokohama, Wang Ching-wei first established his reputation as a brilliant polemicist.[10] In November 1905 the pro-republican group in Japan established the *Min Pao,* its official propaganda organ designed to disseminate Sun Yat-sen's precepts and to promote anti-Manchu sentiment.[11] Its principal political competitor in Japan was another refugee group, led by K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, which ad-

[9] The most perceptive biography of Sun Yat-sen is still that by Lyon Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning* (New York, 1934). On Huang Hsing, see Chun-tu Hsueh, *Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford, 1961).

[10] A more cynical account by a contemporary who later became a Communist depicts the youthful Wang as a gay deceiver, eloquent and attractive on the surface, but underneath a "spineless man, irresolute, easy to change." See Wu Yu-chang, *The Revolution of 1911* (Peking, 1962), 80. Wu Yu-chang (1878—), began his career as intellectual radical during the late years of the imperial period and is still living in Peking, where he is regarded as a prestigious elder statesmen of the Communist party of China.

[11] Peking has rendered a valuable service to Western scholars by reprinting the complete text of the *Min Pao* in four volumes (Peking, 1957). The two articles by Wang Ching-wei referred to here are *Min-tsu te kuo-min* (A nationalistic people), No. 1, pp. 1–31, and No. 2, pp. 1–23, and *Lun ko-ming chih ch'u-shih* (On the revolutionary current), No. 25, pp. 1–19, and No. 26, pp. 1–20.

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vocated constitutional monarchy for China. Wang Ching-wei wrote the leading article in the premier issue of *Min Pao* (November 20, 1905), and soon proved himself an eloquent controversialist in a literary duel with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Drawing upon theories absorbed at the Law College, Wang waxed in stature as an interpreter of "nationalism," later canonized as the first of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. Forced to leave Japan in 1907, Sun, accompanied by Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei, moved to Southeast Asia to expand the T'ung-meng-hui organization and to enlist political and financial support in the overseas Chinese communities. There Wang continued to demonstrate his talents not only as forceful journalist but also as persuasive public speaker on behalf of a political movement which had as yet won scant success in the effort to rid China of Manchu rule. Wang's oratorical brilliance, a quality for which he remained well known throughout his public career, played an important role in attracting new overseas Chinese support to the T'ung-meng-hui and in establishing new branches, the most important of which were at Singapore and Penang.

When Sun Yat-sen left Singapore for Europe in 1909, Wang returned to Japan. There he edited a short-lived clandestine edition of the revived *Min Pao,* ostensibly published in Paris by young Chinese anarchists sympathetic to Sun but actually printed underground in Tokyo. The Chinese revolutionaries in Japan were then greatly influenced by the ideas of Russian anarchists, many of whom had fled to Japan after the failure of the Russian revolution of 1905. Wang Ching-wei's editorial tone in this period was thus distinctly militant. In the final issue of *Min Pao* (February 1, 1910), he wrote a fiery discourse, "On the Revolutionary Current," advocating assassination to spark the overthrow of the dynasty. Although not the first modern Chinese revolutionary to turn to terrorism, Wang was drawn to direct action by his concern lest the repeated failures of the uprisings started by the T'ung-meng-hui in south China undermine the prestige and patriotic image of the organization. With a small group of fellow conspirators, Wang journeyed incognito to Peking early in 1910 and led an attempt to assassinate the Manchu prince regent by placing a massive bomb under a bridge over which the prince was scheduled

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to pass. An error on the part of the conspirators upset the plot and aroused the police, who combed the city and apprehended Wang in April 1910. When interrogated, Wang freely admitted his identity and voiced his hope that this sensational act, if consummated in the imperial capital, would rouse the Chinese people to revolution. The Manchu authorities were so struck by Wang's forthright stand and courageous bearing that he was only imprisoned, though he had prepared himself for execution and a martyr's death. When released in the wake of the Wuchang revolt in October 1911, Wang found himself a national hero at twenty-eight.[12]

Despite his spectacular start, Wang remained aloof from Chinese politics after the establishment of the republic, possibly influenced by anarchist ideas then found in some emancipated intellectual circles.[13] In 1912 he was an active figure in organizing a Society for the Promotion of Virtue, dedicated to the propositions that basic social reform had to accompany political change and that China, if she were truly to build a new society, had first to create a new morality. That same year he was one of the organizers of the movement to encourage and help Chinese students to go to France for a combined work-and-study program. Wang himself sought new integration in marriage. His bride was Ch'en Pi-chun, daughter of a prosperous overseas Chinese family from Penang and an ardent admirer of the dashing young revolutionary in his T'ung-meng-hui days. Following the marriage, Wang left China on a wedding trip to the Straits Settlements and Europe. He then spent the years of the First World War in France, intermittently involved with the training of Chinese students there but quite uninvolved with political maneuverings at home. His relation to China during this interlude of comparative leisure and detachment was rather at the literary level. Wang was a member of the

12 Official Kuomintang accounts of the 1910 assassination attempt may be found in Feng Tzu-yu, *Chung-hua-min-kuo k'ai-kuo ch'ien ko-ming shih* (History of the revolution before the establishment of the Republic) (Shanghai, 1946), II, Chap. 50, 230–55 and Tsou Lu, *Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang shih-kao* (Draft history of the Kuomintang) (Chungking, 1944), III, Chap. 21, 784–95.

13 See Robert A. Scalapino and George T. Yu, *The Chinese Anarchist Movement* (Berkeley, 1961).

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Southern Society, a group including many former T'ung-meng-hui members and significant as the major society advocating and using traditional literary forms during the early republican period. Although he was a radical nationalist intellectually, Wang's connection with the Southern Society exposed the romantic stratum in his personality. His poetry, collected as the *Shuang-chao-lou shih-chi,* reveals an aspect of the man which is sensitive, contemplative, oriented to nature in the classical Chinese manner.[14] Its style and serenity stand in marked contrast to the political tumult which dominated his later career.

Wang returned to China late in 1917 and joined Sun Yat-sen, who was then in Canton leading an organized opposition regime and attempting to rally independent military strength. During the next seven years Wang was a member of the personal entourage serving Sun as he sought new theoretical and organizational formulae to guide the nationalist cause. The patriotic outburst stemming from the May Fourth Movement of 1919, combined with Sun Yat-sen's contacts with Soviet representatives in China after the Bolshevik Revolution, led in 1922–23 to Sun's decision to collaborate with the infant, Comintern-dominated Communist party of China.[15] While he played no direct role in the negotiations leading to the alliance between the Chinese nationalist movement and Soviet communism, Wang occupied a prominent political position at Canton. At the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in January 1924, when the party was reorganized on Leninist lines, he was elected second-ranking member of the Central Executive Committee, following Hu Han-min in the number of votes received.

National unification remained Sun Yat-sen's primary objective, and late in 1924 he made a final journey northward to confer with the men holding power at Peking: Chang Tso-lin, Feng Yu-hsiang, and Tuan Ch'i-jui. Sun's group left Canton in November, with Wang Ching-wei accompanying the party leader and serving as his confidential secre-

[14] The volume takes its name from the name of Wang's studio, *Shuang-chao-lou.* A sampling of Wang's poetry in English translation is given in *Poems of Wang Ching-wei* (London, 1938).

[15] See Tse-tsung Chow, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960) and Shao-ch'uan Leng and Norman D. Palmer, *Sun Yat-sen and Communism* (New York, 1960).

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tary. From Shanghai Sun proceeded to the north via Japan —a constantly recurring stop on his political peregrinations— while Wang went directly by rail to Tientsin to work out arrangements for the talks. Sun Yat-sen arrived in north China at the end of the year, only to discover that Tuan Ch'i-jui, then the chief executive in Peking, had no intention of permitting either Sun or the Kuomintang to interfere in the operation of the new regime there. Sun's health was then rapidly deteriorating, and in January 1925 he was admitted to the hospital of the Peking Union Medical College with cancer. After two decades of association with Sun Yat-sen, Wang Ching-wei was the most senior and trusted Kuomintang leader then in Peking.[16] Except for Sun's young second wife, Soong Ch'ing-ling, and his son, Sun Fo, probably no individual was closer to the dying man. On February 24, Wang drafted Sun's final political testament, or will, a brief injunction to Sun's followers to carry the national revolution through to completion in accordance with the principles set forth in his major writings. This document Sun signed on March 11, 1925, the day before his death.[17]

II

The demise of Sun Yat-sen, who had become the unchallenged symbol and leader of the Chinese nationalist movement, closed an era in twentieth-century China's political history. Within the Kuomintang that event precipitated a period of competition for personal influence and political authority. The two leading contenders in 1925 were Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei, both personal and political associates of Sun, and themselves close friends for twenty years since they had gone together as students from Canton to Tokyo in 1904.[18] Hu, the elder man, was an individual of

16 Hu Han-min had remained in the south as governor of Kwangtung, with full authority at Canton.

17 A discussion of the circumstances of Sun's death and final will is given in Jerome Ch'en, "The Left Wing Kuomintang—a Definition," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, XXV, Part 3 (1962), 557–63.

18 A third contender, Liao Chung-k'ai (1878–1925), was also a native of Kwangtung province; but his untimely assassination at Canton on August 20, 1925, removed him from the arena.

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unimpeachable integrity but uncompromising stubbornness. Wang, more expansive and articulate, dominated the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang in January 1926, which dropped most of Hu Han-min's associates and elected a substantial group of Wang's supporters to the central apparatus of the party. Shortly thereafter, however, following a clash with Chiang Kai-shek, commander of the Nationalist military forces at Canton, Wang left for Europe in the spring of 1926.

Internecine personal strife inside the Kuomintang evolved within the larger context of the uneasy alliance between that party and the Chinese Communists, one of the more ambiguous sections of Sun Yat-sen's political legacy. The Nationalist-Communist entente, lasting from 1923 to 1927, marked a complex period, of political interest both because of the mutual antipathy of the partners and because of the effect which that alliance had on the political rise of the Nationalists. After the Nationalist military drive to unify China reached the Yangtze valley in central China, the Kuomintang was sufficiently split on the issue of continued collaboration with the Communists that two separate regimes emerged at the beginning of 1927: a right-wing group centered about Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking, and a left-wing group at Hankow. As the breach between the two factions widened, the government at Hankow, anxious to offset the growing military authority of Chiang Kai-shek, who had grown in power and prestige during the military push northward, called for the return of Wang Ching-wei from Europe. Wang, still distrustful of Chiang Kai-shek, arrived at Hankow in April 1927 to become the dominant figure in the Left Kuomintang group then collaborating with the Communists.[19] Chiang broke the alliance with the Communists by launching a bloody coup at Shanghai in April; Wang severed relations in July after M. N. Roy, the Comintern representative at Hankow, indiscreetly informed him of Moscow's aggressive plans for China.[20] For several months, the political stew in the Nationalist camp simmered. While

[19] Detailed consideration of the "Left Kuomintang" group is given in the previously cited paper by Jerome Ch'en, 557–76.

[20] See Robert C. North and Xenia J. Eudin, *M. N. Roy's Mission to China: the Communist-Kuomintang Split of 1927* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963).

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all factions were now agreed on an anti-communist line, the clash of personalities continued. Wang believed that he should hold undisputed leadership over the Kuomintang but found himself increasingly harassed by sharp criticism from political antagonists in the party's right wing. Such criticism was particularly sharp at the time of the Communist-led Canton commune affair in December 1927, and Wang, disturbed at the turn of events, abruptly left Shanghai to return to France.

From 1928 to 1931, whether abroad or in China, Wang headed the "Association for Reorganization of the Kuomintang," a group within the Kuomintang which opposed the growing power of Chiang Kai-shek, and was thus denounced as heretical by Chiang's orthodox supporters.[21] Having consolidated power at Nanking in 1928, Chiang did exercise increasingly dictatorial power over both the National Government and the Kuomintang. This control was manifest at the Third National Congress of the Kuomintang, which met at Nanking in March 1929. Dominated by Chiang Kai-shek supporters, that congress leveled charges of political deviationism at Wang Ching-wei, who only four years earlier had been the senior Kuomintang leader with Sun Yat-sen at the time of his death, and expelled several of Wang's associates from the party. Wang Ching-wei's opposition to Nanking's authority did, however, evoke response from several military leaders dissatisfied with Chiang Kai-shek's policies, suspicious of his intentions, and jealous of his rising star. Among Chiang's leading rivals were Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, who controlled substantial armed strength in north China and had begun a brief but destructive civil war with Nanking. In 1930 Wang Ching-wei joined these men in attempting to establish a rival "national government" at

21 The most useful edition of Wang's writings for the period up to 1929 is *Wang Ching-wei chi* (Collected Works of Wang Ching-wei), 4 Vols. (Shanghai, 1929). Many of Wang's political statements of the ensuing period were released in English by the China United Press, Peiping and Shanghai. See, for example, *The Chinese National Revolution: Essays and Documents* (1931) and *China's Problems and Their Solution* (1934); also *China's Own Critics*, a selection of essays by Hu Shih and Lin Yu-t'ang, with commentary by Wang Ching-wei (Peiping, 1931). T'ang Leang-li, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (New York, 1930) provides a useful contemporary statement, intended for Western consumption, of the Reorganizationist case against Chiang-Kai-shek.

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Peiping, a move which failed because of Nanking's success in gaining the support of the Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang, who controlled Manchuria. Following the collapse of the anti-Chiang coalition at Peiping, Wang again found himself a political refugee, a dissident with a cause but little support. He then moved south where, during the early months of 1931, he became the senior Kuomintang leader active in a new opposition movement at Canton, sparked by Chiang Kai-shek's house arrest of Hu Han-min at Nanking and sustained by the political ambitions of Kwangtung and Kwangsi military leaders. This Canton movement, though not successful in dislodging Chiang Kai-shek, did nevertheless restore Wang's position and pave the way for his rapprochement with Nanking.

These domestic dissensions sapped the energies of the National Government established in 1928 and frustrated its efforts at nationwide unification. The grave challenge posed by Japanese military aggression in Manchuria beginning in September 1931 forced many of the feuding factions in the Kuomintang to set aside differences in the interests of national self-preservation. Temporary political compromises on the part of all Kuomintang leaders followed, though personal frictions continued into the war years. Wang Ching-wei made his peace with the Nanking authorities, and with the reorganization of the National Government in the winter of 1931–32 was named president of the Executive Yuan, or prime minister. He officially assumed that position on January 28, 1932. That very night, the Japanese garrison at Shanghai launched an undeclared attack against Chinese troops in the area. Wang Ching-wei was not to see peace again in his lifetime.

From February 1932 until November 1935, Wang sustained an uneasy collaboration with Chiang Kai-shek, heading the government at Nanking while Chiang supervised the military operations aimed at extirpating the Communist bases in Kiangsi and elsewhere in the hinterland. Although Nanking's positive accomplishments are now often ignored, it appeared to some independent observers during the early nineteen-thirties that a new nation was emerging in the lower Yangtze valley and attracting the loyalty of many patriotic Chinese. The dimensions of reconstruction and expansion

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were varied: fiscal and financial reform; development of communications, including civil aviation; rural rehabilitation; the modernization of university education; the revitalization of public morals and morale. From 1932 to 1935, when Wang Ching-wei headed the Executive Yuan at Nanking, his political authority and personal incorruptibility did much to make that the most progressive period in the history of the Nationalist Government. Yet the period was not without personal frustrations. Although Wang was prime minister, Chiang Kai-shek never fully trusted him and ensured that his own relatives by marriage, H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, held key posts at Nanking to guarantee appropriate checks on Wang. Irritated by this suspicion and surveillance, Wang went on leave in October 1932, visiting Europe for six months, allegedly for medical reasons, while T. V. Soong acted in his place at Nanking.

On his return to China in March 1933, Wang resumed his portfolio as Executive Yuan head and served concurrently as acting foreign minister. Although welcomed at Nanking, Wang became involved in negotiations with the Japanese diplomatic and military authorities regarding the establishment of railway and mail communications between China proper and Manchoukuo, and the legal arrangements defining the Japanese position on the mainland of China. While sincerely attempting to defend China's territorial and administrative integrity, Wang found himself in an increasingly vulnerable political position: the man most closely associated in the public mind with the policy of yielding to Japan, the individual censured by all patriotic groups which advocated positive resistance. The climax came on November 1, 1935, when, at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at Nanking, he was shot and wounded by an assassin who disguised himself as a photographer. Surgery in Shanghai failed to remove all the bullets, and Wang was forced to resign all official posts in December to seek medical care abroad.

When Wang left for Europe in February 1936 after four years as administrative head of the National Government, medical exigencies appeared paramount. Beneath the surface, however, lay a deeper malaise. Wang was being ruined politically by the long, agonizing process of appeasement, for

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which Chiang Kai-shek was ultimately responsible, during the lean years between the Mukden Incident of 1931 and the Marco Polo Bridge attack in 1937. Throughout this period, the forces of reform, patriotism, liberal opinion, Communist pressure, student sentiment, and national self-respect fed the opposition to Nanking's cautious line. Wang Ching-wei had found himself the civilian leader of a government pursuing an intensely unpopular policy, yet unable to profit from the rising opposition, losing popularity while he shielded Chiang Kai-shek from anti-appeasement criticism. Following the Sian incident of December 1936, a move designed to force Chiang to take a firm stand against Japan, Wang Ching-wei hastened back to China from Europe. But Chiang, the veteran Chekiang political gambler, continued to hold the high cards; and when war finally broke out in mid-1937, he gained full powers as top commander of the Nationalist war effort. In March 1938, when the Kuomintang held a special wartime congress at Hankow, Chiang's position as party dictator was confirmed when he was elected *tsung-ts'ai* (leader), with Wang Ching-wei his deputy. Wang's personal power was now more nominal than real, and his political associates were excluded from key offices in favor of Chiang Kai-shek's intimates.

III

The motivations underlying Wang Ching-wei's decision to desert the central government and to form a separate regime under Japanese sponsorship remain a subject for conjecture rather than exposition. Attuned to the actualities of political power within China, Wang felt himself to be equally perceptive toward the realities of the Japanese invasion. During the first year of the war, he became discouraged over the eventual outcome and proposed that the National Government negotiate a peaceful settlement with Japan. When the government evacuated to Chungking after the fall of Hankow in October 1938, Wang was increasingly dubious of China's ability to sustain a protracted war against the well-trained military forces and well-mobilized industrial system of Japan. He was quietly referred to at the time as head of the "low tune club," a euphemism for those advocating caution rather than active prosecution of the war.[22]

[22] For a profile of "The Mysterious Mr. Wang Ching-wei" by an experi-

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On December 16, 1938, Wang sought an interview with Chiang Kai-shek, during which he made no mention of his private pessimism regarding the military situation. Two days later he flew to Chengtu, the Szechwan provincial capital, for a ceremonial occasion, thence enplaned to Kunming, and on December 21 arrived at Hanoi in French Indochina. The day after Wang's emergence at Hanoi, Prince Konoye, the Japanese premier, issued a statement announcing that Japan would collaborate with a new Chinese regime in order to readjust Sino-Japanese relations on the basis of a "new order in East Asia." Chungking at once refused the Konoye offer. On December 29, 1938, Wang issued a public declaration of his advocacy of peace in a telegram to the central government at Chungking requesting Chiang Kai-shek to halt armed resistance and to work out a peaceful settlement with Japan. Knowing of Chungking's adamancy, Wang planned to leave for France. There he intended to await China's inevitable collapse and defeat, when Chiang Kai-shek would be discredited and he himself could return to organize a new government. Meanwhile, Wang lingered at Hanoi during the early weeks of 1939, talking with Japanese representatives from Tokyo.

A stroke of violence shattered the false calm. In the early morning hours of March 21, 1939, secret agents of Chungking, intent upon sabotaging Wang's plans, entered his residence in Hanoi and fired dozens of shots. Wang was uninjured, but his long-time protégé and confidant, Tseng Chung-ming, was fatally wounded.[23] The mystery of the shooting is still unsolved, but the most prevalent theory is that the gunmen were aiming for Wang Ching-wei but shot Tseng by mistake. Whatever the facts, Wang regarded the murder of his friend as a personal outrage. Infuriated to the point of no return, he spent the last years of his life working actively with his country's major foreign enemy. Proceeding from Hanoi to Shanghai in the spring of 1939,

enced Western reporter, see John Gunther, *Inside Asia* (New York, 1939), 263–66.

23 Tseng Chung-ming (1896–1939) was a French-educated scholar and government official who had had long-standing personal and professional ties with Wang Ching-wei in the Kuomintang. In addition to literary works and translations, Tseng was also the author of *La Chine qui lutte* (Peking, 1930). Following the Hanoi shooting, Wang wrote an eloquent tribute to his murdered friend, *A la mémoire de M. Tsen Tson-ming* (Hanoi, 1939).

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he conferred with Chinese who were active in the North China puppet regime and in the so-called Reformed Government already existing at Nanking to arrange a merger of the various Chinese administrations in Japanese-occupied China. After visiting Tokyo twice, in May and again in October of 1939, Wang worked out a joint statement with the Japanese authorities covering the "new relations between China and Japan" which was secretly signed at the end of the year.

Wang's movement suffered a setback in January 1940 when two Kuomintang associates who had been privy to the effort from the beginning defected to Hong Kong with copies of Wang's secret agreement with Japan. The leak failed to deter Wang's preparations, although publication of the terms of the secret agreement created a furor in China.[24] On March 30, 1940, a new "national government" of the Republic of China, patterned on the five-yuan structure of the legitimate central government, was formally established at Nanking with Wang Ching-wei as its ranking official.[25] He immediately issued a general invitation to all civil servants and party officials in Chungking to participate. In April, discussions were initiated for a treaty to govern the new relations between Nanking and Japan. Actually, since Japan's original intention in supporting Wang had been to force Chungking into entering peace negotiations, it delayed granting formal recognition to the Nanking regime until the informal peace feelers to Chungking had apparently failed. Tokyo did not sign a basic treaty with Nanking and accord formal diplomatic recognition to that government until November 30, 1940, almost two years after Wang had first left Chungking, and eight months after his regime had been established. The November 1940 agreement, contrary to

24 The Chinese Communists, for example, at once denounced Wang's actions. See the internal party directive issued on January 28, 1940, and the statements made at Yenan on February 1, 1940, as the Communists launched a massive propaganda campaign against "the traitor Wang Ching-wei." Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, III, 1939–1941 (New York, 1954), 157–74.

25 The most detailed account of Wang's wartime regime by a Chinese who himself played a substantial role in the Nanking government is given in Chu Tzu-chia, *Wang cheng-ch'uan te k'ai-ch'ang yü shou-ch'ang* (The Beginning and End of the Drama of the Wang Regime, Hong Kong, Ch'un-ch'iu tsa-chih she, 4 Vols., 1959–61). A useful review of this work by Robert H. G. Lee appears in the *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXIII (1963), 126–28.

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what Wang and his followers had hoped, maintained strong Japanese military and economic domination over the occupied areas while granting the Chinese authorities at Nanking only token responsibility for internal administration.[26]

Wang's pessimism regarding China's prospects for effective resistance against the Axis powers was intensified during 1940 by military developments in the European theater, particularly the fall of France and the desperate position of England in the face of the German air assault. Within the context of Chinese politics, Wang Ching-wei took the position that his government was the legitimate national government of China; his party was the Kuomintang; his flag was the Kuomintang flag; and the principles of his government were the Three People's Principles of Sun Yat-sen.[27] Prior to the outbreak of war with the United States, the ideology underlying the Nanking government—a pan-Asian, anti-Western mystique—was not unattractive to many Chinese. In Tokyo's eyes, the Nanking government and the doctrine of Asian solidarity which lay behind it offered the greatest potential for securing a settlement of the "China Incident" on terms favorable to Japan.[28]

IV

China during the early nineteen-forties was, like ancient

[26] Text of the 1940 treaty and annexed protocol appears in the *American Journal of International Law,* XXXV (1941), supplement, 125–28.

[27] A collection of Sun Yat-sen's pan-Asian writings were issued at Shanghai in 1941 under the title, *China and Japan: Natural Friends—Unnatural Enemies: A Guide for China's Foreign Policy* (Shanghai, 1941), with foreword by Wang Ching-wei.

[28] A detailed Japanese analysis of the 1937–41 period is given by Usui Katsumi, *"Nit-chū sensō no seijiteki hatten"* (Political development of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–41), in the recent Asahi Shimbun series, *Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi* (The road to the Pacific war), Vol. IV, 1963, especially pp. 200–56. See also Robert J. C. Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War* (Princeton, 1961); David J. Lu, *From the Marco Polo Bridge to Pearl Harbor* (Washington, D. C., 1961); and the two articles by Hilary Conroy in the *Pacific Historical Review,* "Government versus 'Patriot': The Background of Japan's Asiatic Expansion," XX (1951), 31–42, and "Japan's War in China: An Ideological Somersault," XXI (1952), 367–79. Chalmers A. Johnson describes the establishment of Japanese-sponsored puppet governments in *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945* (Stanford, 1962), 41–48. A valuable study of the years after the outbreak of the China war, written from Western sources, is F. C. Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937–45* (London, 1954).

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Gaul, divided into three parts.[29] One section was Nationalist China, the areas in the west extending from Kansu through Yunnan which were controlled by or nominally loyal to the legitimate central government, located at the wartime capital of Chungking. Another was Communist China, a series of expanding Red enclaves behind and between the ports and railway lines of north, east, and central China which were controlled by or loyal to the Communist insurgent government at Yenan in Shensi province. Still a third division was Japanese-occupied China, a series of semi-autonomous regions stretching from the Amur river in northern Manchuria to the Gulf of Tonkin in the south. This third China, the area under Japanese domination, was itself sub-divided into Manchoukuo, the Manchurian regime which had been established in 1932; a north China puppet regime at Peiping; Meng-chiang, the Japanese-controlled government in Inner Mongolia; and Wang Ching-wei's "National Government" at Nanking.

The outbreak of the Pacific war in December 1941 brought little immediate change in the political geography of China. The expansion of conflict did, however, enhance the role of the Nanking regime as an important element in Tokyo's China policy as that policy developed during the war between Japan and the Allied powers. Militarily, the Japanese settled into a holding operation on the mainland, with main efforts and power committed farther south. Yet despite the glittering prizes gained in Southeast Asia during 1942, China still remained of vital economic importance to Japan as a source of coal, iron ore, and other essential raw materials. In late 1942 and early 1943, Japan did make certain moves designed to ease the more glaring inequalities in the original position of the Nanking government. Wang Ching-wei again went to Tokyo, where he had conversations with Tojo and other members of the Japanese government, as well as an audience with the Emperor. As a result of these negotiations, Japan relinquished her concessions in

[29] Paul M. A. Linebarger, *The China of Chiang Kai-shek* (Boston, 1941), provides an informed contemporary survey of Chinese politics before the outbreak of the Pacific war. An invaluable reference tool for studying the occupied areas is Frederick W. Mote, *Japanese-sponsored Governments in China, 1937–1945* (Stanford, 1954), which provides annotated bibliographical guidance to relevant Chinese materials at the Hoover Institution.

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China and the right of extraterritoriality, while the Nanking government on January 9, 1943, formally declared war against the United States and Great Britain.

During the summer of 1943, following a visit of Tojo himself to China and Japanese pressure upon the representative of the Vichy regime in Nanking, agreements were signed under which Nanking assumed administrative control over the International Settlement and the French Concession at Shanghai. On August 1, 1943, the Nanking authorities entered into formal possesion of these areas, long the heart of Western control in China's major trading and financial metropolis. Following the return to Tokyo of Shigemitsu Mamoru, who had been Japanese ambassador at Nanking, to become foreign minister in 1943, Japan's "New China Policy" took more definite shape. Aimed at achieving a settlement with Chiang Kai-shek, this policy embodied the concept that Japan would modify her earlier ambitions for dominant control of East Asia while at the same time blocking the return of the Western powers to their former position of influence.[30]

Japan's gambit had the corollary effect of conceding to Wang Ching-wei's government at least the outward status of an ally and an equal. When a new treaty of alliance between Nanking and Tokyo was concluded on October 30, 1943, voiding the earlier treaty of November 30, 1940, its preamble expressed the resolve of the two governments to cooperate as equal and independent neighbors in the establishment of Greater East Asia. But the key aspect of Tokyo's China policy was not so much its psychological effect upon the "face" of Wang Ching-wei's government as its potential political effect upon individuals and groups in Chiang Kai-shek's government at Chungking. Through the October 1943 treaty with Wang Ching-wei and through covert dealings with Chungking channeled through the redoubtable General Tai Li,[31] Japan pressed the line that

[30] See the section by F. C. Jones in Jones, Hugh Borton, and B. R. Pearn, *The Far East, 1942–1946* (London, 1955), 13–24.

[31] Tai Li (1895–1946) was head of the Chinese Nationalist military intelligence organization during the Sino-Japanese war. Though his activities were cloaked in secrecy, it was generally believed in China that he wielded enormous power and enjoyed the implicit confidence of Chiang Kai-shek, his fellow provincial from Chekiang. Tai Li worked closely with Captain (later

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Chiang's true interests lay in severing relations with the United States and Britain and in collaborating with Nanking to liquidate the Chinese Communist movement, then steadily growing in strength in the countryside. During 1944, even as Japan absorbed mounting disaster in the Pacific campaigns and Germany was retreating on the Western Front, growing political frustration at Chungking found outlet in renewed alarm over the threat of Mao Tse-tung. And the idea of joint Chungking-Nanking operations against the Chinese Communists reportedly gained some support from conservative elements in the Kuomintang who viewed the Communists as a greater long-term threat than the Japanese, a fact which complicated United States actions and policies in the China theater during that period.[32]

At Nanking, still in ailing health from the bullet wounds received several years earlier, Wang Ching-wei was again forced to go to Japan for medical treatment. There, at Nagoya, he passed away on November 10, 1944, at sixty-one, without seeing the unfortunate end of his regime or the fate of his loyal Chinese associates.[33] Never able to undermine the

Rear Admiral) Milton E. Miles of the United States Navy in planning the Sino-American Cooperation Organization (SACO), the joint intelligence group established in 1943 and active during the remaining war years. At the same time, Tai Li's personal organization provided one major channel of covert communication between the Chinese authorities at Chungking and those at Nanking. Tai was killed in an airplane crash near Nanking on March 17, 1946.

32 Of the three competing parts into which China was divided during the war years, the Japanese-occupied areas and their puppet governments remain the most obscure despite the fact that these governments then controlled over half of China's area, population, and resources. The volumes giving the United States view of the China-Burma-India theater prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, take virtually no account of developments in the Japanese-occupied areas: Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (1953), *Stilwell's Command Problems* (1956), and *Time Runs Out in CBI* (1959). Nor do the official papers released by the Department of State contain any detailed data on the covert communications and traffic between "free China" and "occupied China" which continued throughout the war: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China* (1956); *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, China* (1957); *United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949* (1949). The recent scholarly study prepared by Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941–50* (Chicago, 1963), makes no mention of Wang Ching-wei; nor does the earlier volume by Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle* (Princeton, 1953).

33 Early in 1964 the Hong Kong Chinese semi-monthly magazine, *Ch'un-ch'iu,* published a 5,000-word document purporting to be the "political testa-

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position of the National Government as the internationally recognized wartime ally of the Western powers or to attract any substantial group of men of first-class calibre to desert the legitimate Chinese government, Wang had remained surrounded at Nanking by friends bound to him by ties of personal loyalty. Ch'en Kung-po (1892–1946), a Cantonese who had been close to Wang since 1927, formally succeeded him as head of the Nanking government, but Ch'en lacked the prestige which Wang had formerly enjoyed in Nationalist circles. Another individual prominent as political strategist at Nanking was Chou Fo-hai (1897–1948), who had previously been the most widely read Kuomintang theorist prior to his joining Wang Ching-wei's "peace movement" in 1938. Yet it had been Wang Ching-wei's seniority and reputation for probity which had held the government together. By the end of 1944, when Wang died, Japan's hopes of bringing Chinese resistance to an end had dimmed, and the outcome of the war was no longer seriously in doubt.

For the millions of Chinese remote from the world of high policy and international diplomacy who had no practical alternative but to live under Nanking's administrative control, Wang Ching-wei's regime did provide a measure of Chinese protection against the Japanese from 1940 to 1945. In dealing with the Japanese, Wang attempted to maintain maximum integrity and to preserve maximum rights from a brutal enemy which had permitted the rape of Nanking in December 1937 and was for some years thereafter intent upon maintaining "order" in China through bayonets and military police. There was notably little public remonstrance or violence directed against the puppet authorities when Japan surrendered.

Together with his other principal associates, Wang Ching-wei's widow, Ch'en Pi-chun, was tried for treason following the Japanese defeat. In testimony given at her trial, she

ment" of Wang Ching-wei. Dated October 1944, the month before Wang's death in Japan, the will is entitled, "My Final State of Mind." While controversial, the document is written in Wang's style, and there would appear to be scant reason for forgery. For the Chinese text and discussion of its authenticity, see *Ch'un-ch'iu,* No. 159 (February 16, 1964) and No. 160 (March 1, 1964).

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stressed Wang's sincerity and patriotism in believing that a peaceful accommodation with Japan was the only realistic method of preserving Chinese national interests.[34] An impetuous and determined woman, Ch'en Pi-chun had been one of the early anti-Manchu conspirators of the pre-1911 period. She had exerted great influence on her ambitious husband during their long married life and had been bitter that his later career in the Kuomintang had not matched its earlier brilliance. Sentenced to life imprisonment in April 1946, she died of illness in the prison hospital at Shanghai in June 1959 at the age of seventy-six.[35] After her cremation, the Chinese Communist authorities permitted the remains to be sent out from Shanghai to be finally disposed of by her surviving children, who now live outside China.

In a period of ethical relativism in his country, Wang Ching-wei never permitted scandal or corruption to taint his personal life. In the realm of politics, however, his career was blemished by the fact that his principal consistency lay in devotion to the personal interests of Wang Ching-wei. Believing himself to be the true heir of Sun Yat-sen, he was resentful of Chiang Kai-shek and his wife (Soong Mei-ling), viewing Chiang as a political parvenu of limited intellectual background and distrusting the *bona fides* of the Chiang-Soong "dynasty." Versatile, sincere by his standards, an eloquent public speaker in a country which favors dramatic virtuosity, Wang Ching-wei was nevertheless a thwarted man. Essentially his frustration stemmed from that fatal flaw which was his political opportunism. Wang's ardent patriotism outran his political judgment; his surpassing confidence in his own ability at persuasion convinced him that he could get more out of the Japanese by talking than Chiang Kai-shek could by fighting.

Intelligent enough to be a radical in a period when China's new problems required radical approaches, Wang Ching-wei remained a romantic radical. He was a romantic radical both in the modern European sense and in another

34 See Chu Tzu-chia, IV, 90.

35 See Chu Tzu-chia, IV, 93. Edgar Snow apparently errs in stating that Mme. Wang Ching-wei was still alive in 1960, teaching a literary class in the Ward Road Jail at Shanghai. See *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today* (New York, 1962), 547.

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particular sense in which the term is pertinent to twentieth-century Chinese politics. Wang possessed virtually all of the qualifications required for political success in republican China except one: control of military power. Lacking that vital element, he relied on personal brilliance and virtuosity rather than on political consistency, theoretical insight, or organizational ability. Throughout his adult career, Wang was pre-eminently the opportunist. He failed to create or adapt any unified body of political doctrine which could rally mass support; and he never succeeded in building an integrated political organization through which words could be transmuted into reality. Attractive as he was to many Chinese, Wang Ching-wei was ultimately a dreamer. He became, as one Western observer has put it, the victim of an *idée fixe,* a man who believed that "if he impersonates government devotedly enough, and with careful enough detail, he will become government." [36]

In a larger sense, the label of romantic may also be applied to the political party in the service of which Wang Ching-wei spent the bulk of his active career. As it developed in China during the nineteen-thirties and forties, the Kuomintang was also characterized by an ambivalent escapism. Internally, its most distinctive characteristic was that its top leaders all employed an organizational strategy which relied principally on the manipulation of personal cliques, a conventional Chinese system appropriate to a period of political stability but not to an era of political disorganization and potential revolution. Externally, the Kuomintang's most distinctive characteristic was its refusal to face facts, to confront and analyze disagreeable social realities, and to plan practical programs to mobilize sufficient popular support to deal effectively with those realities. In the end it was the Kuomintang's nemesis, the Chinese Communist party, which —eschewing romantic escapism—evolved and sustained doctrine, organization, and military power sufficiently potent to mount a serious attack upon twentieth-century China's massive social problems.

HOWARD L. BOORMAN

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36 Linebarger, 200.

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THE AGING OF THE HOUSE

THE ratio of members of the House of Representatives serving in their first or second terms of office to members in their tenth term or beyond has declined drastically over the last seventy years. It was more than 26 to 1 when Cleveland began his second term, 34 to 1 when McKinley came to office, 27 to 1 when Theodore Roosevelt took over, 25 to 1 when Woodrow Wilson succeeded him, 8 to 1 at the time of Harding's inauguration, 6.3 to 1 at the beginning of Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term, 3.3 by the time Dwight Eisenhower began his administration, and 1.6 to 1 when President Kennedy assumed the mantle. These and further details are set out in Tables 1 and 2 [1] (see Appendix).

Another way of looking at the same phenomenon is through a kind of political actuarial table, showing the survivorship rate of men elected to the House for the first time over periods of, say, five successive Congresses. Such is Table 3. All along the line survivability has been increasing. The chances of a second term for a man elected to Congress in the years 1952–60 were more than twenty-five per cent greater than they were for a man first elected between 1892 and 1900. The same is true and to more marked degrees for a third term, fourth term, fifth term, and so on, pretty much in that order. In short, the greater the number of terms we compare, the greater the increase in the chances of a new member's holding office for that number of terms.[2]

[1] All data in these tables and elsewhere throughout this paper have, unless otherwise noted, been compiled from the *Congressional Directory* beginning with the first session of the 53rd Congress and continuing through the first session of the 88th Congress. For the convenience of those who do not readily associate Congresses (in terms of which most of the material herein is presented) with presidential administrations and years, the following is set out:

Cleveland	53rd–54th	(1893–97)	Coolidge	69th–70th	(1925–29)
McKinley	55th–56th	(1897–1901)	Hoover	71st–72nd	(1929–33)
McKinley/Roosevelt	57th–58th	(1901–05)	Roosevelt	73rd–78th	(1933–45)
Roosevelt	59th–60th	(1905–09)	Roosevelt/Truman	79th–80th	(1945–49)
Taft	61st–62nd	(1909–13)	Truman	81st–82nd	(1949–53)
Wilson	63rd–66th	(1913–21)	Eisenhower	83rd–86th	(1953–61)
Harding/Coolidge	67th–68th	(1921–25)	Kennedy/Johnson	87th–88th	(1961–65)

[2] It will be noted that "second term," "third term," and so forth, as used in this paper, do not necessarily mean continuous service to the number of

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TABLE 3

RATIO OF FIRST-TERM MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE IN SPECIFIED CONGRESSES TO MEMBERS SERVING ADDITIONAL TERMS IN SUBSEQUENT CONGRESSES *

	53rd–57th	58th–62nd	63rd–67th	68th–72nd	73rd–77th	78th–82nd	83rd–87th
First-termers at beginnings of	623	481	536	368	499	403	302
ends of	668	526	603	409	562	465	335
2nd-termers one Congress later	66.9	76.0	73.6	78.5	77.9	74.8	84.5
3rd-termers two Congresses later	41.3	54.8	58.0	65.8	60.3	60.9	75.1 †
4th-termers three Congresses later	32.9	39.5	47.6	53.3	48.4	52.5	69.2 ‡
5th-termers four Congresses later	27.2	29.1	37.6	40.3	39.3	43.4	
6th-termers five Congresses later	22.6	21.1	30.7	31.3	30.1	37.4	
7th-termers six Congresses later	16.2	16.2	25.2	24.0	24.9	33.1	
8th-termers seven Congresses later	11.1	11.6	19.9	19.1	19.2	26.8 †	
9th-termers eight Congresses later	8.5	8.6	14.9	14.4	15.3	22.8 ‡	
10th-termers nine Congresses later	6.4	7.4	10.6	11.2	13.2		
11th-termers ten Congresses later	4.2	4.8	7.3	7.8	10.7		
12th-termers eleven Congresses later	2.5	3.0	5.5	7.3	8.9		
13th-termers twelve Congresses later	1.3	2.3	4.0	6.6	6.6 †		
14th-termers thirteen Congresses later	0.9	1.1	3.3	5.1	5.2 ‡		
15th-termers fourteen Congresses later	0.8	1.0	2.5	4.2			

* The figures for the first-termers are absolute numbers as of the beginnings and ends of the Congresses specified; all other figures are percentages of the latter numbers of first-termers.

† Four Congresses only. ‡ Three Congresses only.

I

Such data as these raise a number of questions. The first is why this should be happening. How much of this increase in survivability, for instance, is due to the later group's having entered Congress at a younger age than the earlier group? How much of it reflects the increase, common throughout the country, in life expectancy? How

terms indicated. A second or third term, for present purposes, is a second or third term whether it follows immediately or at some later time. In the 88th Congress, for example, there are a total of twenty-six non-consecutive members and 343 members with continuous service of two terms or more.

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much of it is due to the sheer merit of today's incumbents as compared with yesterday's? How much of it is due to better means for an incumbent to keep in touch with his constituency—radio and television, for instance, mimeograph machines and robotypers, and air travel? How much of it is due to a greater willingness to continue to serve, a willingness motivated, perhaps, by the better salary of present members than of their predecessors? How much, to take the other side of the coin, is due to an increased unwillingness of potential qualified opposition candidates to take on the job, perhaps because of a more comfortable income at home? How much of it is due to fewer judgeships, ambassadorships, and executive office appointments being open to members of the House? How much to a lessened frequency of governorships and senatorships? How much of it can be traced to constituencies' having come to regard their congressmen more as errand boys in Washington on local and even personal problems than as participants in a national legislature and as spokesmen on national issues and, having done so, to prefer the man experienced in handling this type of congressional work to one who lacks the experience, regardless of other factors? How much of it is due to a growing apathy on the part of the voting public toward political labels and even, perhaps, toward the immensely complicated issues of the day and, therefore, toward the voting records of their representatives on such issues? How much, on the other hand, is owing to better techniques for learning a constituency's preferences on public issues and a greater willingness to vote those preferences when the roll is called on the floor of the House?

For only a few of these questions are there reasonably firm data on which to predicate an answer, even if the "how much" aspect of the questions is not pressed.

Although $22,500, the current salary of members of Congress, puts the recipient well toward the top of the top ten per cent income bracket of the population, changes in the cost of living reduce this amount to little if any more than the five thousand dollars that members were receiving at the beginning of the period. Salary, therefore, can be pretty well ruled out as a factor explaining the changes with which we are concerned.

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Whether a decline in the entering age of first-term members accounts for any substantial part of the phenomenon is also doubtful. Judging from samples taken at five-term intervals, the entering age has decreased from about three and a half years from the beginning of our period to the end. But little stress can be laid on this for several reasons: (1) The sample may not be wholly accurate. (2) The years in which the entering age, based on this sample, were lowest are the most recent, and there is no means of knowing what the long-term survivorship rate of this group will be. (3) There was, again based on the sample, a significant upturn in the average entrance rate in the middle of the period, particularly in the Seventy-third Congress, yet the survivorship of those who entered at this time was higher than that of their predecessors. On the other hand, the Fifty-eighth Congress sample yields an average entering age nearly as low as that for the Eighty-third and Eighty-eighth Congresses, but the survivorship rate for its group neatly falls into line with that for its predecessors and successors. The conclusion is that entering age must be severely discounted as a factor in accounting for the phenomenon.

Increased life expectancy, however, may well be of some significance. Standard tables indicate an increase of nearly four years in the expectancy of the male white of age forty between 1900–02 and 1958–59—from 27.74 years to 31.50 years, to be precise.[3] This alone could account for two of the two and a half terms by which the Eighty-eighth Congress average exceeds the average for the Fifty-seventh Congress. But, politics being what it is, it is doubtful that we can or should try to rely exclusively on any such prosaic explanation as this to account for the trend.

Congressional office-staffing, we also know, has increased considerably. The allowance for clerk hire was fixed at one hundred dollars per month during the session in 1893. It was gradually increased until today it is well over $45,000 per annum. Similarly, air travel, radio, television, robotypers, and mimeograph machines are put to immense use now where they were unheard of in the early nineteen-hundreds. All of these help organizationally and in keeping members

[3] United States Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Washington, 1960), 24.

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in touch with their constituencies, but it must also be pointed out, as an offset, that contemporary members have to spend a much larger part of the year in Washington than did their predecessors and that, therefore, extended personal contact at home is harder now than it was before.

It is only thus far that material is available on which to predicate reasonably firm answers to such questions as those we have asked. Answers to the others require data which, though they might perhaps be secured, have not been gathered or, in some cases, require judgments on the part of long-time close observers of Congress that are not available. Hence we hazard no guess as to them but turn, instead, to the next inquiry: Where are these older members coming from? Are there any significant trends in the various regions of the country in this respect?

The answer to the first of these two questions is that well on to three-quarters of the ten-plus group in the House come from two areas. One is the South, the other a complex of industrial states lying between the Atlantic and the Great Lakes (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan). Each of these two regions has approximately the same number of ten-plus term members in the House, and both of them have very considerably increased their membership of this class during the twentieth century. The two areas had, during the Eighty-third–Eighty-seventh Congresses, averages of 20.4 and 24.6 such members per term, respectively. Their nearest competitors were far behind. New England and the Border states had an average of five each. The ratios between the ten-plus term members from these regions and their total numbers of seats in the House were 1 to 5 in the case of the South, 1 to 7 in the case of the industrial East, 1 to 6 in the case of New England, and 1 to 8 in the case of the Border states. The Midwest's ratio was 1 to 9, and that of the Mountain and Pacific Coast states 1 to 32. In all cases, however, these ratios were very much lower than they were during the Fifty-eighth–Sixty-second Congresses. At that time, the South's was 1 to 93, the industrial East's 1 to 26, New England's 1 to 72, the Border states' 1 to 82, and the Midwest's 1 to 61, and there were no ten-term representatives at all from the Mountain and Pacific Coast states. In short, a degree of solidifi-

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cation has set in the whole way across the country that was not present in the early nineteen-hundreds, but it is decidedly greater in the South and the East than anywhere else.

II

What, then, are the consequences of such a trend as this? This is our third problem. I put to one side the intriguing question, legitimate though it is, whether the temper of the House with a 1 to 1.7 ratio between the ten-plus group and those in their first and second terms may not be very different from what it was when the ratio was, say, 1 to 20. *Prima facie,* one would expect it to be. I also put aside the closely related question of the effect of ten or more terms of service in a continually abrasive and tension-laden atmosphere on those who live through it. This is a subject that is no doubt worthy of study by those professionally competent to undertake it, but it cannot detain us here.

The first and most obvious consequence of the trend that we can note is the rise of what, for want of a better term, we may call the professional member of Congress—a man, be it noted, who is not merely a professional politician but one who makes a career of his membership in the House of Representatives. He is not a casual comer to the Congress, honored by his friends and acquaintances by being sent to Washington for a few years and expected to remain no longer. He is a member who knows his district, its personalities and its problems, backward and forward. He has, generally speaking, become skilled in the rules and usages of the House and the tricks of the parliamentary trade. He knows the quirks and idiosyncrasies of everyone in the House who counts for anything, and his quirks and idiosyncrasies are known to them. Through service on one or two committees of the House, he has almost certainly become quite thoroughly acquainted with at least one of the major departments of the executive branch, knows and has sized up the bureau heads and assistant bureau heads of that department, and has definite convictions—perhaps well-founded, perhaps not—about what the department is doing that it ought not to be doing and about what it is not doing that it ought to be doing. He knows and is known by the industrial groups, the lobbying organizations, and the newspapermen who deal

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with the matters with which his committees are concerned. His pipelines of information and gossip extend far and wide. And, though he would not like to hear it said of himself, he has acquired a lot of the characteristics of the permanent, strategically-placed civil servants in one of the downtown offices about whom every new cabinet member complains—complains because he cannot get along without them and yet finds them (or so he thinks) less responsive to the new policies that he hopes to put into force than they ought to be.

A second consequence, attributable to the trend plus the seniority system of the House and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, is an immense concentration of the powers of the House in a small group of very senior members. Seniority, of course, could exist with or without the trend, but with it its importance is accentuated. Concentration of power in committee chairmen is likewise nothing new but, by reducing the number of standing committees of the House from forty-eight to nineteen, the Legislative Reorganization Act both multiplied the powers of those who attain a chairmanship and made long-continued service in the House far more important than it had been before. When Woodrow Wilson became President, the average service in the House of the chairmen of the Agriculture, Appropriations, Banking and Currency, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Judiciary, Military Affairs, Naval Affairs, Rules, and Ways and Means Committees, for instance, was 8.3 terms and the average service in the House of the ranking minority members of these same committees was 8.4 terms. When John F. Kennedy came to the presidency, the average service of the chairmen and ranking minority members of these same committees (substituting Armed Services for Military Affairs and Naval Affairs) was 16.9 and 12.3 terms, respectively.

The bipartisan and striking nature of the aging process is evident from the picture in Table 4 of these same committees as of the beginning and end of our period of observation and as of the times in between when the leadership of the House changed from Democratic to Republican or *vice versa*.

The reinforcing effect of the trend on the seniority system is thus evident. But we may go further: However much

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TABLE 4

AVERAGE SERVICE OF CHAIRMEN AND RANKING MAJORITY AND MINORITY MEMBERS OF SELECTED COMMITTEES

Congress	Chairmen		Ranking Majority Member		Ranking Minority Member	
	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
53rd	6.8		4.6			6.4
54th		6.7		4.2	5.6	
62nd	7.4		6.6			10.1
66th		9.2		6.7	8.6	
72nd	10.8		8.6			10.6
80th		12.6		9.2	14.7	
81st	15.6		10.0			12.1
83rd		13.2		10.7	15.0	
84th	14.5		10.9			14.2
88th	18.0		13.0			11.8

outsiders may deprecate it, nothing short of a massive revolt will overturn the system, and such a revolt is less likely now than ever before. This we may put down as consequence number three of the trend. At the beginning of Wilson's administration, the 251 first- and second-termers, if they had put up a united front, could have swamped the 182 who were in or beyond their third term. At the beginning of Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, they would have needed minor assistance from the third-termers, and at the beginning of Eisenhower's they would have had to have the help of all of the third- and part of the fourth-termers. But by the beginning of John F. Kennedy's, it would have taken all the first-, second-, third-, and fourth-termers plus a goodly share of the fifth-termers to do the job. In view of the prevailing attitude—as one comparatively new member put it recently, "I didn't think very highly of the seniority system when I came here, but the longer I stay the more appeal it has for me"—there is nothing in the figures to lend hope to anyone who thinks the system ought to be abandoned that it will be. Until someone convinces the third-, fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-termers that most of them are quite remote from a place in the sun, loyalty and the value of doing things in the accustomed manner will continue to work against the probability of any such occurrence.

The corollaries of what has been said thus far for juniors

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and would-be members of the House are quite clear. First, the opportunities for breaking into the House have been declining. The average number of freshman members at the beginning of the Fifty-third–Fifty-seventh Congresses was 125. This dropped to ninety-six for the Fifty-eighth–Sixty-second Congresses and rose again to 107 for the Sixty-third–Sixty-seventh. It was seventy-four at the beginning of the Sixth-eighth–Seventy-second, one hundred for the Seventy-third–Seventy-seventh, eighty-one for the Seventy-eighth–Eighty-second, and sixty for the Eighty-third–Eighty-seventh. Second, though it probably took the sixty no more time to become House-broken than it did the 125, it will take most of them a great deal longer than it did their predecessors to carry comparable weight with their fellows. How much loss to the country and the House this means in terms of less receptiveness to suggestions for change, whether those suggestions come from the Right or from the Left, or how much gain it means in terms of stability, wisdom, and the other fruits of long experience in the House are matters about which the reader may speculate for himself.

As consequence number four of the trend, we may note the fact that the House has become a more formidable body for the Senate to deal with than it formerly was. Judging from the service records of the chairmen and the ranking majority and minority members of some of the principal committees of the House and their counterparts in the Senate, it has fully overcome the built-in advantages of the senatorial six-year term of office. This may be seen if, as in Table 5, we list these committees and compare the average years of congressional service of the three ranking members of each as of the beginning of the Fifty-eighth, Seventy-third, and Eighty-eighth Congresses. As this table indicates, the ranking members in the House of five out of eight committees averaged, at the beginning of the Eighty-eighth Congress, more years of service than did their companions in the Senate. At the beginning of the Seventy-third Congress, the picture was reversed: in six cases out of nine, it was the senators who had the longer average service. And at the beginning of the Fifty-eighth, the Senate was ahead in eight cases out of eight. The House, in short, can now back up its constitutional equality with the Senate as a legislative

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body with equality of service records if we can judge from these examples.

TABLE 5

AVERAGE YEARS OF SERVICE OF CHAIRMEN AND RANKING MAJORITY AND MINORITY MEMBERS OF SELECTED HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES *

Committee †	88th		73rd		58th	
	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate
Agriculture	25.0	22.0	12.0	20.0	9.3	13.3
Appropriations	30.7	33.3	18.0	23.7	14.7	32.7
Armed Services	33.0	21.3				
Military Affairs			13.3	22.0	16.7	18.7
Naval Affairs			17.3	15.0	9.3	16.0
Banking and Currency	25.0	24.0	14.7	23.0		
Foreign Relations	18.3	22.3	11.0	22.0	13.7	28.7
Interstate and Foreign Commerce	18.0	19.0	19.3	16.3	11.3	19.3
Judiciary	28.7	24.3	16.7	21.7	10.0	22.0
Ways and Means	21.0	20.3	17.3	17.0	13.3	28.0

* It will be noted that this table, unlike the others, is in terms of years rather than terms of service. In the case of the Senate, the figures given include years of service in the House as well as in the Senate.

† The committee names are those of the House; Senate names do not always correspond.

As a final consequence, we may note that the increased survivability of House members means increased prestige and power vis-à-vis the executive. Any new President, regardless of party, who comes into office nowadays has to reckon with the fact that his Cabinet will, with comparatively few exceptions, be made up of novices in the business of government and even of their own departments compared with the committee chairmen with whom they will have to deal. If a new Secretary of the Navy, for instance, were appointed tomorrow, he would be the eighteenth man whom Carl Vinson of Georgia has seen bear that title since he began his service on the Naval Affairs and, more recently, on the Armed Services Committees. A new Secretary of Defense would be the ninth holder of that office whom the same chairman has been in a position to appraise closely. A new Attorney General would find himself the twelfth in the procession that has appeared before the Judiciary Committee since the time Emanuel Celler of New York, its present

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chairman, first took his seat on that committee. A new Secretary of Commerce would be the ninth since Oren Harris of Arkansas came to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, of which he is now the head. A new Secretary of the Treasury or a new Secretary of Agriculture would be the seventh since Wright Patman of Texas and Harold D. Cooley of North Carolina were first appointed to the Banking and Currency Committee and the Committee on Agriculture, respectively.

The wonder in these circumstances is not so much that there are occasional lapses on the part of congressional committees from Montesquieu's doctrine of separation of powers but that there are as few of them as there are, not so much that committees show a tendency to get into details best left to administrators but that they restrain themselves as fully as they do, not so much that new enthusiasms on the part of a Cabinet officer or new approaches to perennial problems suggested by a new President and his principal secretaries are so rarely greeted with unalloyed fervor but that so many of them finally find their way into the statute books.

III

But let us turn to another and completely different problem. This is the double question whether we can expect to see a continued increase in the ten-plus membership of the House, a levelling off, or a reversal of the trend that has prevailed to date and whether we can expect to see a continued decline in the number of first-termers, a levelling off, or a reversal of the trend.

The answer to the first of these questions is that there is nothing inherently improbable in an expectation that the ten-plus membership will remain, during the Eighty-eighth–Ninety-second Congresses, approximately where it was during the Eighty-third–Eighty-seventh and that it may even increase somewhat. It will, of course, be made up of the survivors of first-term classes that averaged fewer members than the first-term classes from which the ten-plus members of the Eight-third–Eighty-seventh came. Hence, for it to remain where it then was will require a further increase in survivorship rates, but the increase called for is not out of line with what has happened in the past. For it to increase more than

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a little, on the other hand, would require a larger increase in survivorship rates than projection of the past trend would warrant us in forecasting.

We will be on treacherous ground if we attempt to project into the Ninety-third–Ninety-seventh Congresses, but it is worth noting that the ten-plus members during those Congresses will, for the most part, be drawn from entering classes which were still smaller—in fact, decidedly smaller—than those from which the Eighty-eighth–Ninety-second older membership will come. It is not unlikely, therefore, that there will be a falling off in the number of ten-plus members at that time.

If this is correct, there will be a corresponding increase in the availability of seats for first-term members. We may, in other words, expect to see a reversal of the trend toward fewer and fewer freshmen members in the not far distant future. As is obvious, the present trend could not continue much longer without getting to the point where it would not supply an adequate base for the maintenance, let alone the expansion, of the older membership. In sum, the two major phenomena we have observed—the decrease in the number of first- and second-term members and the increase in the ten-plus members—are, at one and the same time, complementary and antagonistic to each other. The data given in Table 6 (see Appendix) will assist the reader in judging the correctness of these conclusions.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1 (see p. 526)

DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE BY TERMS OF SERVICE *

Terms of Service	53rd	54th	55th	56th	57th	58th	59th	60th	61st	62nd
10 or more	8	4	7	6	6	7	11	6	8	11
6–9	23	25	29	29	33	44	56	84	89	75
3–5	109	70	83	101	150	147	138	143	148	125
1–2	211	256	237	215	165	187	181	156	144	178
Average	2.7	2.3	2.6	2.8	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.6	3.9	3.7
	63rd	64th	65th	66th	67th	68th	69th	70th	71st	72nd
10 or more	10	24	26	22	25	18	22	23	23	34
6–9	68	62	71	61	54	69	87	111	133	116
3–5	104	132	158	178	159	155	164	189	169	151
1–2	251	216	177	170	194	189	162	112	106	132
Average	3.1	3.5	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.6	4.0	4.5	4.8	4.7
	73rd	74th	75th	76th	77th	78th	79th	80th	81st	82nd
10 or more	34	31	34	37	39	48	49	43	36	40
6–9	95	80	72	69	70	72	75	79	109	105
3–5	90	105	155	151	169	160	162	169	121	154
1–2	213	218	173	178	157	154	148	143	169	135
Average	3.9	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.8
	83rd	84th	85th	86th	87th	88th				
10 or more	42	54	71	66	74	74				
6–9	112	108	116	105	112	125				
3–5	138	149	160	143	126	115				
1–2	140	124	86	122	120	121				
Average	4.8	5.2	5.7	5.4	5.7	5.7				

SUMMARY

	53rd–57th	58th–62nd	63rd–67th	68th–72nd	73rd–77th	78th–82nd	83rd–87th
10 or more	31	43	107	120	175	216	307
6–9	139	348	316	516	386	440	553
3–5	513	701	731	828	670	766	716
1–2	1084	846	1008	701	939	749	592
Average	2.7	3.6	3.6	4.3	4.0	4.6	5.4

* All data in this and other tables, unless otherwise indicated, are as of the beginnings of the Congresses indicated.

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TABLE 2 (see p. 526)

RATIOS OF FIRST- AND SECOND-TERM MEMBERS TO MEMBERS IN THEIR TENTH TERM AND BEYOND

CONGRESS BY CONGRESS							
53rd	26.3	63rd	25.1	73rd	6.3	83rd	3.3
54th	64.0	64th	9.0	74th	7.0	84th	2.3
55th	33.9	65th	6.8	75th	5.1	85th	1.2
56th	35.8	66th	7.7	76th	4.8	86th	1.8
57th	27.5	67th	7.8	77th	4.0	87th	1.6
58th	26.7	68th	10.5	78th	3.2	88th	1.6
59th	16.6	69th	7.4	79th	3.0		
60th	26.0	70th	4.8	80th	3.3		
61st	18.0	71st	4.6	81st	4.7		
62nd	16.2	72nd	3.9	82nd	3.4		
FIVE-TERM AVERAGES ENDING WITH CONGRESS INDICATED							
		63rd	19.8	73rd	5.3	83rd	3.5
		64th	16.0	74th	5.4	84th	3.4
		65th	12.2	75th	5.4	85th	3.0
		66th	10.7	76th	5.4	86th	2.2
57th	35.0	67th	8.9	77th	5.4	87th	1.9
58th	35.3	68th	8.2	78th	4.7	88th	1.7
59th	26.6	69th	7.9	79th	3.9		
60th	25.1	70th	7.5	80th	3.6		
61st	24.6	71st	6.9	81st	3.6		
62nd	22.0	72nd	5.8	82nd	3.5		

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TABLE 6 (see p. 537)

MEMBERSHIP OF CLASSES IN THE HOUSE AND OF THE ENTERING CLASSES FROM WHICH THEY PRINCIPALLY DERIVE

Column (I) = Number of members at the beginnings of the Congresses indicated
Column (II) = Number of members of entering classes from which the membership shown in column (I) is principally derived
Column (III) = Column (I) as percentage of column (II)

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(I)	(II)	(III)	(I)	(II)	(III)	(I)	(II)	(III)
	Second-Termers			Third-Termers			Fourth-Termers			Fifth-Termers		
58th–62nd	365	493	74.0	278	518	53.7	233	566	41.2	190	652	29.1
63rd–67th	472	616	76.6	337	588	57.3	241	600	40.0	153	562	27.2
68th–72nd	333	444	75.0	306	482	63.5	278	507	54.8	244	561	43.5
73rd–77th	440	572	76.9	303	523	57.9	214	480	44.6	153	450	34.0
78th–82nd	346	472	73.3	296	493	60.0	247	486	50.8	223	511	43.6
83rd–87th	290	339	85.6	258	359	71.9	254	417	60.9	204	440	46.4
88th–92nd		x			x			x			326	
	Sixth-Termers			Seventh-Termers			Eighth-Termers			Ninth-Termers		
58th–62nd	151	668	22.6	93 *	570 *	16.3	53 †	459 †	11.5		x	
63rd–67th	111	526	21.1	85	493	17.2	62	518	12.0	58	566	10.2
68th–72nd	185	603	30.7	148	616	24.0	106	588	18.0	77	600	12.8
73rd–77th	129	409	31.5	101	444	22.7	87	482	18.0	69	507	13.6
78th–82nd	169	562	30.0	134	572	23.4	82	523	15.7	55	480	11.5
83rd–87th	174	465	37.4	146	472	30.9	133	493	26.6	100	486	20.8
88th–92nd		335			339			359			417	

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TABLE 6 (*Continued*)

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(I)	(II)	(III)	(I)	(II)	(III)	(I)	(II)	(III)
	Tenth-Termers			Eleventh-Termers			Twelfth-Termers			Thirteenth-Termers		
63rd–67th	46	652	7.1	28	668	4.2	15 *	570 *	2.6	7 †	459 †	1.5
68th–72nd	48	562	8.5	25	526	4.8	17	493	3.4	11	518	2.1
73rd–77th	58	561	10.3	44	603	7.3	30	616	4.9	17	588	2.9
78th–82nd	46	450	10.0	32	409	7.8	31	444	7.0	32	482	6.6
83rd–87th	85	511	14.7	60	562	10.7	46	572	8.0	28	523	5.4
88th–92nd		440			465			472			493	
93rd–97th		326			335			339			359	
	Fourteenth-Termers			Fifteenth-Termers								
68th–72nd	6	566	1.1	5	652	0.7						
73rd–77th	11	600	1.8	8	562	1.4						
78th–82nd	24	507	4.7	15	561	2.7						
83rd–87th	22	480	4.6	16	450	3.6						
88th–92nd		486			511							
93rd–97th		417			440							

* Three Congresses only
† Four Congresses only

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ORIGINS AND POLITICAL CHARACTER OF NAZI IDEOLOGY *

I

"THE ideology is intolerant and cannot be content with the rôle of 'a party among other parties.' It imperiously demands its own, exclusive, and unqualified recognition as well as the complete transformation of the whole public life according to its views." [1] With these words Hitler in 1926 proclaimed his determination not to tolerate any ideology other than the National Socialist one. Only pure ideology can engender the "fanatic" faith that will build the "movement" and the "racial community" (*Volksgemeinschaft*). In the last weeks before his death, in what he called "the last quarter-hour" of the Third Empire, Hitler said that the Allies would now erase the German people as well as the National Socialist ideology.[2]

But in spite of the emphasis laid not only on ideology but also on pure and correct ideology, there existed few canonic National Socialist writings. The party program of 1920, written by the engineer Gottfried Feder, contained among its twenty-five points more economic than political demands, some of which soon became meaningless, since they were geared to the peculiar conditions of Germany in the first years after World War I. In 1925 after Hitler had returned from prison, discussions on a new party program were held, for which apparently Gregor Strasser had prepared a draft. But Hitler, anxious to restore his leadership of the party, opposed a new program and insisted that the program of 1920 should be publicly pronounced "unalterable." Just the same, it was changed later by the dubious reinterpretation of certain points, while others were simply shelved after 1933.

*Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New York City on September 6, 1963.

[1] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (3rd ed.; Munich, 1928), 506.

[2] February 6, 1945, see F. Genoud (ed.), *Le Testament Politique de Hitler, Notes Récueilliés par Martin Bormann*, préface de H. R. Trevor-Roper (Paris, 1959), 65.

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Hitler's *Mein Kampf* is by far the most important source for Nazi ideology. He opened the second volume, written in 1925 with the subtitle "the National Socialist movement," with a chapter on "ideology and party." It is noteworthy that Hitler never mentions any of Feder's points specifically, although he starts the chapter with a glowing reference to the first National Socialist mass meeting, at which Feder's program was adopted by acclamation, and goes on to explain that a program to a party is what dogma is to a church. Hitler obviously was cautious not to commit himself to very specific objectives which were likely to limit the appeal of National Socialism with groups that he hoped to win over. His bombastic and rambling book remains fragmentary in many respects and does not offer a systematic presentation of Nazi ideology. This again is partly due to political considerations. To give only one example, although Hitler's radical anti-Christian attitude was well established and a careful reader could sense it most distinctly, the issue of National Socialism versus the Christian churches is covered up in the book.[3] Other political calculations are revealed in the changes made in the text after 1933. Whereas the first and early editions said: "the movement stands . . . for the principle of a Germanic democracy: election of the leader, but absolute authority for him . . ." the passage later reads: "the movement stands . . . for the principle of the absolute authority of the leader, coupled with the highest responsibility. . . . The leader is always appointed from above and at the same time endowed with unlimited power and authority. . . ." [4]

But although political and propagandistic reasons of the moment explain many omissions as well as the obliqueness of many references, the unsystematic character of *Mein Kampf* is essentially the true expression of Hitler's peculiar mind. His was an unkempt and primitive mind that lacked the power of discrimination but excelled in reducing simple

[3] This largely continued after 1933. A shocking preview of what Nazi policy with regard to the Christian churches would have been after a victorious war can be gleaned from the church policies of the Nazis in the conquered and annexed Polish territories. See Martin Broszat, *Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 1939–45* (Stuttgart, 1961), 167 ff.

[4] See Hermann Hammer, "Die Deutschen Ausgaben von Hitlers 'Mein Kampf,'" *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, IV (1956), 161–78.

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ideas to even simpler terms while believing thereby to have achieved a higher wisdom. On this account he considered himself an original thinker and never cared to give credit to any person from whom he had borrowed his ideas. Moreover he was interested only in those ideas that through propaganda would build organizations. The growth of the Nazi movement became to him a criterion of the truth of the Nazi ideology.[5] He did not pay any attention to the subsequent systematic expositions of National Socialist ideology. Thus he did not read Alfred Rosenberg's *The Myth of the Twentieth Century* (1930), taken by most people as the official treatise on Nazi philosophy,[6] nor any other of the theoretical writings of the Nazis and Nazi fellow travelers.

The quality of Hitler's mind and the tactical nature of all of his statements make it necessary even for the study of ideology to analyze his actions and the political reality created by them, as Franz L. Neumann was the first to do in his *Behemoth*. Yet at the time Neumann wrote his still important book only two canonic writings were known to Hitler's followers and the world at large, the party program, which is of only limited value, and *Mein Kampf*, while by now we have a wealth of authentic Hitler material, spread over the years down to April 1945, which allows us to describe the Nazi ideology as well as the motivation of Nazi action rather exactly.[7]

[5] When in 1932 a group of economists, among them Alfred Weber and Wilhelm Roepke, challenged him to a debate on problems of economic policy, he replied that the professors should first prove their ability to build up something like the NSDAP or SA before he would debate with them.

[6] See Hitler's statement in Henry Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941–42*, edited by G. Ritter (Bonn, 1951), 275.

[7] A bibliography is now readily available in the monumental work of Karl Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, and Gerhard Schulz, *Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung* (Cologne, 1960). Hugh R. Trevor-Roper ("Hitlers Kriegsziele" in B. Freudenfeld [ed.], *Stationen der Deutschen Geschichte* [Stuttgart, 1962]) likes to give preference to the "four windows through which light falls into the most recondite thoughts of Hitler at the four turning points of his political career." These are the hours "of his political defeats" (*Mein Kampf*); "of his political triumphs" (Rauschning conversations 1932–34. H. Rauschning, *The Voice of Destruction*, [New York, 1940]); "of his military triumphs" (*Table-Talks* 1941–42, see footnote 6 above); and "of his military defeat" (Bormann dictations, 1945, see footnote 2 above). To these Trevor-Roper would probably be willing to add G. Weinberg (ed.), *Hitlers Zweites Buch* (Stuttgart, 1961), written in 1928 on the eve

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II

What stands out most clearly today is the consistency and continuity of Nazi ideology. Hitler was a great opportunist and tactician, but it would be quite wrong to think that ideology was for him a mere instrumentality for gaining power. On the contrary, Hitler was a doctrinaire of the first order. Throughout his political career he was guided by an ideology, parts of which were played down or even publicly denied occasionally or even for a considerable length of time because they seemed to frighten people whom he intended to subject to his will. But step by step he realized his basic ideas, which from 1926 onward do not show any change whatsoever.

Fundamental in his thinking was the conception of life as an eternal struggle for survival and domination. Hunger and love he called the elemental forces behind this process.[8] Struggle rules supreme within peoples and among peoples. This crude social Darwinism is then linked up with an equally primitive racialism; not peoples but races are the primordial forces of history. Hitler admitted that there are no pure races and that, for example, the Germans mixed with peoples whom they conquered and with invaders they later absorbed.[9] But as a rule that did not keep him from asserting the superiority of pure races.[10] The strength of the Germanic race may be sapped by the admixture of other races, and Hitler ascribed the individualistic party spirit of the Germans to this fact. Once the true Germanic elements will have gained full power over the people, it will be possible to eliminate racially inferior groups and to enhance the breeding of the superior racial stock.

Among the races the Nordic or Aryan race is the highest

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of the big expansion of the Nazi party. But there are many other documents, particularly between 1933 and 1945, which though not as extensive as the aforementioned sources are of primary importance.

8 *Hitlers Zweites Buch*, 46.

9 Picker, 444.

10 Usually he declared the American people to be inferior for this reason. But occasionally he argued that if it had been possible to create in two hundred years an American nation it was because the immigrants had been the best people, and that meant mostly the Nordic elements of Europe! *Hitlers Zweites Buch*, 131.

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and its chief representative is the German people. It deserves the satisfaction of all its needs for life and growth. Since agriculture cannot raise production beyond the present level, Germany needs a greater *Lebensraum,* which can only be gained by war and the expulsion, if necessary even annihilation, of other peoples. Already in *Mein Kampf* racialist nationalism looks to the East for the conquest of *Lebensraum,* and Hitler never modified these ideas which led to his ultimate doom.[11]

Hitler's biological materialism tolerated no ethics. In the pursuit of its struggle for power, which is the dictate of the blood, the racial people may use any means. Any restraint is *Gefühlsduselei,* silly sentimentality. Hitler gloated that his conception of race was the true revolutionary principle of the twentieth century, as the idea of nation had revolutionized the preceding century.[12] In this connection he used almost Marxist terminology in deriding the stupidity of the bourgeoisie and the old upper classes for being hampered by humanitarian scruples and for their inability to conceive of better programs than the restoration of the German frontiers of 1914. Only "dynamic" or "fanatic" people fully believing in "race" would be able to fight without being bothered by humanitarian and traditionalist inhibitions. Hitler readily admitted that this fact called for barbarians.[13]

Anti-Semitism was the major instrument in this policy of barbarization.[14] Through the vilification, torture, and mass murder of the Jews the ruthlessness was produced that Hitler wanted to inculcate in his followers. He described quite often the practical political value of anti-Semitism, particularly in the sense that in order to arouse hatred among people it was essential to personify the enemy.[15] But it cannot be stressed enough that Hitler himself was a passionate believer in extreme anti-Semitism. The anti-Jewish demonstrations and pogroms of April 1, 1933, and of November 8–9, 1938 (*Reichskristallnacht*) were carried on in public,

11 See Wolfgang Sauer in *Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung,* 744 ff.

12 Rauschning, 231 ff.

13 Rauschning, 80.

14 See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951) and Eva G. Reichmann, *Hostages of Civilization* (Boston, 1951).

15 Rauschning, 235–38.

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but when in 1942 Hitler ordered the physical extermination of all the European Jews, he knew that this "final solution" [16] of the Jewish problem would frighten most Germans and it was therefore secretly executed. It was a personal act of Hitler. But anti-Semitism was only part of Hitler's racism. While the Jews were to him subhuman, there were also low human races, such as the Slavs, whom he did not propose to destroy but to deprive of further growth and of their national education. The Nazi occupation policies in eastern Europe provide indications of these intentions.[17]

The use of terror against enemies of the party and regime was another means of barbarization, but not even terror and violence were mere instruments of power. Hitler believed in their permanent value. People do not have a natural herd instinct, he said; [18] if left alone they will rather fight among themselves. Only the fear of an authority commanding and using force can create a community.

The National Socialist ideology, which Hitler did not wish to be called "the myth of the 20th century" but "the science of the 20th century," [19] included the self-esteem and worship of its prophet. In him the Germanic race has come to full consciousness of its inner self and of its mission in the world. With the deepest insight he combines the greatest will-power, hallmarks of the born leader. Therefore he must demand complete obedience from the whole people.

The Nazi ideology was quite rigid. Its activist racialism and totalitarian authoritarianism contained distinct and immutable principles for a political theory and even for specific policies. We must assume that Hitler had acquired a faith in the main body of these ideas before he left Austria and a good many years before he decided to enter politics. These crude ideas were originally his personal revenge on the old society of property and education, in which he, in his own eyes a budding genius, had been a misfit. In all his intimate conversations one can sense a profound contempt of generals, of the bourgeoisie, and especially of professors, which changed

16 G. Reitlinger, *The Final Solution* (New York, 1955).

17 See Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–45* (New York, 1957).

18 Picker, 71.

19 *Ibid.*, 275

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to outbursts of fiery hatred when the underlying feeling that these gentlemen considered him an upstart welled up in him. This social resentment made him embrace the basic ideas from which the Nazi ideology developed. Its conception of "people" or "race" leveled down all social classes and attached no significance to educational differentiation.

Essentially, this was all that Hitler's "socialism" meant. Equality was his idea only in the abstract sense that everybody was a racial tribesman, for each person was placed immediately into a hierarchical system of military subordination that makes equality a sham. The rise to higher rank was made less dependent on class than before and more on service and loyalty to the party and leader. Equality was not linked to any specific economic system. Hitler was quite ignorant of economic affairs. He was originally concerned only with agriculture as the source not only for the physical survival of the people but also as the ideal breeding ground for pure race and the right ideology that goes with it. There is little in Hitler's statements about the artisan and craftsman, but obviously they were considered creative producers. This attitude carried over to industry, whereas big commerce and finance smelled of profiteering and exploitation.

Such general sentiments were inadequate foundations for a principled economic policy. Hitler's vacillations in this respect reflected his lack of knowledge as well as interest. Prior to 1933 he subordinated economics to propaganda, as shown by his reinterpretation of Gottfried Feder's program. After he had come to power he followed an economic policy that seemed to promise him the maximum of war production. He quickly stopped the activities of the party in favor of artisans, small businessmen, and the like, and before very long gave up the attempt at building a corporative state. What came into being is probably best called a "command economy," a term coined by Franz L. Neumann.[20] It was not corporatism, nor socialism, nor state socialism or state capitalism, but an economy more and more directed by the state. The process of integrating the economy into the totalitarian state was in the beginning slower than the imposition of

[20] Franz I. Neumann, *Behemoth* (New York, 1942), 293 ff. See also his *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State. Essays in Political and Legal Theory*, edited by Herbert Marcuse (Glencoe, Ill., 1957).

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totalitarian controls on other activities, but it was accelerated by the approaching war and in the end equally far-reaching. But Nazi economic policies were less directly affected by Nazi ideology, except insofar as the latter was bent on war.

III

The discussions of the origins of Nazi ideology have often neglected to reduce the pattern of ideas to those that served the double function of a political ideology, namely, to win through propaganda a people as well as to set up a model of ultimate political action. I have tried to confine my definition of Nazi ideology largely to those elements of Hitler's political thinking that constantly and decisively determined his general course of action. It also is a common mistake to describe Nazi ideology as the summary of all the ideas that came to the fore in Germany in the period before 1933. There can be no doubt that some of the ideas of the so-called conservative revolution, in the first place Moeller van den Bruck's "Third Empire," were taken over by Hitler and made part of the official ideology. But actually van den Bruck's conception assumed an entirely different meaning in the context of genuine Nazi ideology. Other "conservative" ideas were left uncensored, because Hitler or Goebbels thought they would gain for National Socialism the support of groups not otherwise easily accessible to Nazi ideology or because they thought it useful to throw sand into the eyes of their opponents.[21] Although naturally all these ideas are of the highest importance for the study of the acceptance of National Socialism by the German people and particularly by a large section of the German intelligentsia in 1933, they are of secondary importance for the understanding of the origins of the genuine Nazi ideology. Italian fascism, too, was of no significance for the growth of Nazi ideology. Mussolini's actions, particularly the March on Rome, made a profound impression on Hitler, but fascist ideology was too nebulous and volatile to change Hitler's ideas. The adoption of corporatism by Italian fascism found some imitation among the National Socialists, but it did not become official policy after 1933.

[21] See Hitler's curious statement on Rosenberg's *Myth*, "It gives me considerable pleasure to realize that the book has been closely studied only by our opponents," in Picker, 275.

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We still do not know enough about the reading Hitler did in his formative years and down to 1926. It is clear, however, that it was neither very extensive nor critically selective nor systematic. Some books obviously were only read in part, others were misunderstood or not understood at all. There is no indication that books helped him to improve his abominable style, which remained to the last turgid and full of clichés, and aimed at impressing his readers or listeners by stuffing an unbearable number of overworked metaphors into a single sentence.[22] One of the signs of a half-educated person, the preference for words borrowed from foreign languages and their occasional use in the wrong place and with the wrong meaning, is characteristic of Hitler.[23] With this evidence we are well advised not to look for any original philosophical or literary works as the immediate sources of Hitler's first ideas. As a matter of fact, he received them from the political marketplace and even lowlier sources.

The Pan-Germanism of Georg von Schönerer and the Christian Social movement under Vienna's Mayor Karl Lueger gave Hitler his first notions about anti-Semitism and its potential power to move the masses. His theoretical enlargement on anti-Semitism in this period derived from the cheap little *Ostara* pamphlets, issued by a former monk who called himself Lanz von Liebenfels[24] (alias Adolf Lanz) and who peddled a racialist "theozoology" of his own concoction. These tracts, sold at tobacco stands, and probably similar sheets, together with certain newspapers,[25] provided his chief literary fare. He no doubt read Richard Wagner's political and anti-Semitic writings and found in them the confirmation of the racialist and anti-Semitic faith that he had adopted in his Vienna years. Richard Wagner was to Hitler the conclusive proof that the right ideology would produce the highest art. Hitler was familiar with the book by Richard

22 On Hitler's metaphors see the recent article by Hermann Glaser, "Adolf Hitlers 'Mein Kampf' als Spiesserspiegel," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Bonn, July 24, 1963.

23 Privately Hitler disapproved of the public agitation of purist Nazi linguists. Picker, 382 f.

24 Wilfried Daim, *Der Mann, der Hitler die Ideen gab* (Munich, 1958).

25 On the Vienna newspapers at this time see William A. Jenks, *The Young Hitler* (New York, 1960), 126 ff.

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Wagner's English-born son-in-law, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *Foundations of the Twentieth Century,* the widely read racialist interpretation of world history. He knew, of course, about Count Arthur de Gobineau's *Inequality of the Human Races,* although it is doubtful whether he ever did more than dip into it. Passing on to original thinkers, I have been unable to discover any specific reference to Nietzsche.[26] Whether, if he ever read him, he was repelled by the philosopher's contempt of anti-Semitism and Germanism no one can say. We have, however, a statement by Hitler on the deep impression that Schopenhauer had made on him. Yet he was quite incapable of indicating what was the special fascination of Schopenhauer's philosophy or what concretely he had learned from it. Even Wagner had misunderstood Schopenhauer in many respects, but Hitler's whole thinking did not show the slightest impress of Schopenhauer; it was indeed a world apart from a philosophy strongly opposed to man's being submerged in the state and looking for salvation from the ills and sufferings in the negation of the will for life.

It was on the basis of his limited reading in popular and often cranky and murky writings that Hitler formed his original racialist and anti-Semitic ideas. In this respect he did not add any new ideas during his years in Germany.[27] But Hitler experienced the full impact of German militarism and imperialistic nationalism. The Austrian Pan-Germanists prior to World War I were chiefly concerned with the merger of the German parts of the Habsburg Empire with the German Empire. There are some signs that Hitler's dreams were already in these prewar years going beyond the mere realization of a Greater Germany; his migration to Germany in 1912, his obvious reluctance to report for obligatory military service in Austria prior to 1914 and, by contrast, his enthusiastic welcome of the outbreak of World War I as well as his immediate volunteering in a Bavarian regiment point in this direction. But irrespective of what conclusions Hitler may

26 There is a brief reference to Nietzsche's superman in one of the conversations with Rauschning, but it is the latter who introduces Nietzsche. Rauschning, 246 f.

27 Except that the acquaintance with *The Wise Men of Zion* after World War I may have given his anti-Semitism an even more poisonous character. Rauschning, 238 ff.

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have drawn from the Pan-German propaganda before 1914, only the outbreak of the war made it possible to think of an early realization of the Pan-German demands for world power. Hitler undoubtedly came into close contact with these ideas which since August 1914 not only constituted the war aims program of the German rightist parties but colored the policies of the parties further to the Left. Within the German army, particularly after Ludendorff had become its leading spirit in the fall of 1916, intensive indoctrination of the troops was carried on in which the alleged superiority of the German people over the degenerate French, the mercenary English, the brute and servile Russians served as the justification for German conquests sufficient to make any future aggression against Germany impossible and to establish her as a world power.[28]

There was already talk in public and in government councils about removing foreign populations in lands adjacent to Germany for the settlement of Germans. Hindenburg promised the soldiers land for settlement after the war. The peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk with the Ukraine and Soviet Russia as well as subsequent military and political actions created a vast orbit of German satellites and colonies that reached from the White to the Black and Caspian Seas. These experiences of World War I emboldened Hitler to draw the most extreme consequences from his racialist nationalism. Besides, we may surmise that four years of participation in the slaughter of that war stirred up the ferocity that was in his nature. The loss of World War I by Germany confirmed his belief in his own political mission.

While Hitler adopted some of the major objectives and methods of the imperialistic German nationalism of World War I, he also firmly rejected others. Although his great scheme of eastern expansion was clearly a continuation of the Pan-German aspirations of World War I, he sharply criticized the German government and the German nationalists for simultaneously aiming at the acquisition of colonies overseas, thus antagonizing England. Yet he was even more critical of the methods by which the imperial German government

28 A full view of the war aims of the German government, army, and political parties is presented by a recent historical work that exploits for the first time all the relevant German archives, Fritz Fischer, *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (Düsseldorf, 1962).

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had expected to achieve its ends. He radically disapproved of its mismanagement of internal affairs, particularly by its toleration of opposition parties and a critical press. In this situation a mass movement such as the Fatherland party with its four million members was doomed to failure. The Fatherland party, founded by Admiral von Tirpitz and Wolfgang Kapp in order to mobilize popular support for the Pan-German war-aims program, by claiming to be a national movement above the existing political parties, was a direct forerunner of the Nazi party. Hitler must have watched it with great interest and found it wanting. The Fatherland party, though heightening the patriotic sentiment of its bourgeois membership, did not produce determined fighters against the double enemy at home and abroad. When the revolution came, they surrendered to the internal enemy and broke off the war.

Although Hitler in his propaganda against the Weimar Republic made the utmost use of the "stab-in-the-back" legend and of the "November crimes," he was always convinced that the old regime was responsible for its own downfall. Its national ideology was weakened by liberalism and by lack of knowledge about the vital needs of the nation. Moreover, the Pan-German ideology, even if adequately propagated—and this should have begun years before the war—was not likely to integrate all classes. Something more elementary and robust was needed. Hitler believed that in his own ideology he possessed the right principles for building a powerful Germany that would resume the battle for German supremacy. Before this war could be won abroad, it first had to be won at home by the destruction of liberalism, socialism, and communism as well as by the implementation of a common ideology that would make the German people immune to foreign propaganda and ready to fight with unmatched determination for *Lebensraum* and race superiority. Hitler made another correction in the World War I ideas of Pan-Germanism. To be sure, anti-Semitism had been a strong ingredient of the movement from the beginning, but, as everywhere else in Central Europe, this anti-Semitism aimed at taking full citizenship away from the Jews and inflicting other humiliating conditions on them. Its intention was to harry the Jews, not to exterminate them. Only Na-

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tional Socialism proceeded to that level of crime. It is impossible to say exactly at what particular moment Hitler set his mind on the physical destruction of the Jews. But the racialist nationalism developed by him during World War I to feverish pitch was bound to give his anti-Semitism the highest radical note.

Hitler derived his ideology from few sources, all of them of a rather low type. Many German writers during the Nazi period endeavored to relate Hitler to the great classic tradition of German philosophy—Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel—or even linked him with Luther. National Socialism then appeared as the crowning achievement of the German spirit. Outside Germany this view has often been expressed, though usually in polemics against Germany. But all the evidence that we possess forbids this interpretation. Not even the fact that a large segment of the German intelligentsia fell for Hitler's ideas in 1933 can be explained in such manner. Actually, this event cannot be traced back ideologically beyond the eighteen-forties and must be explained largely in political and social terms. The phenomenon of Hitler himself also calls chiefly for a political and social interpretation, since he was satisfied with the mere rudiments of an ideology that allowed him to act as the charismatic leader of the German people.

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HAWAII: A SYMBOL OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT

THE change over a period of four decades in the attitude of Great Britain toward the annexation of the Sandwich Islands by the United States from one of concerted protest and the substitution of tripartite—British-French-American—protection in 1854, to gradual recognition and acceptance of the predominance of United States interest in the archipelago, and finally to tacit approval of annexation in the eighteen-nineties, was similar to the metamorphosis of British policy toward the construction of an isthmian canal. At mid-century Great Britain would agree only to an Anglo-American canal jointly constructed, owned, and operated; in 1900, in search of cordial friendship, she agreed to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and substitute an arrangement which permitted the construction of an exclusive American canal under specific safeguards.[1]

I

British Consul General William Miller in Honolulu was instructed in 1853–54 to do his utmost, in cooperation with the French commissioner there, to defeat the schemes of annexation, to suggest as an alternative a tripartite protectorate, and if a treaty of annexation was finally negotiated and signed, to protest in the name of his government.[2] He carried out his assignment admirably, repeatedly raising the twin specters of slavery and racism, as well as the treatment meted out to Indian tribes in the United States, to deter the ailing king, the vacillating crown prince, and the influential high chiefs from relinquishing their hereditary lands, signing

[1] For a discussion of the implications of this Anglo-American friendship for Canada as well as Great Britain, see Donald Grant Creighton, *Dominion of the North—A History of Canada* (Boston, 1944), 404–06.

[2] F. O. to Miller, various dates in 1853 and 1854, British Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 58/76 and 58/79. Since all Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and Admiralty documents referred to in this article are in the British Public Record Office, London, reference to this depository will hereafter be omitted and the abbreviations F. O., C. O., and Adm. employed.

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away their birthright, and consigning themselves to humiliation and segregation and their people to bondage and despair.[3]

Miller was reinforced in the third week in July 1854 by the auspicious appearance of Rear Admiral David Price, commander in chief of a combined British and French squadron visiting Honolulu, and Admiral Febvrier des Pointes, who, in a royal audience at the palace, allegedly brought concerted pressure to bear on Kamehameha III, warning him that alienation of his sovereignty might lead to difficulty and perhaps war, in which his kingdom would be involved.[4]

The Anglo-French campaign was carried to Washington. The Earl of Clarendon instructed John F. T. Crampton, British minister to the United States, to protest vigorously against a treaty of annexation that was postulated on the inability of Kamehameha III's kingdom to maintain its independence. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs denied that the Hawaiian government was forced to surrender its independence. Furthermore, he argued that, although the United States government declined, on grounds of traditional policy, to join Great Britain and France in a formal agreement to respect the independence of the Hawaiian islands, the pronouncements of Secretaries of State Upshur, Calhoun, and Webster had given assurances of the disposition of the government to respect the sovereignty of those islands.[5] When Crampton called at the State Department and read the British protest note he was attended and supported by his French counterpart. This Anglo-French pressure applied in Honolulu and in Washington simultaneously in opposition to President Pierce's dynamic program for "Young America" was not aimed exclusively at the Sandwich

[3] See my "Slavery and Racism as Deterrents to the Annexation of Hawaii 1854–1855," *Journal of Negro History,* XLVII (1962), 7, 9–14.

[4] David L. Gregg, U. S. Commissioner in Hawaii, to Secretary of State William L. Marcy, No. 48, July 26, 1854, National Archives of the United States, State Department archives (hereafter USDS), Dispatches, Hawaii, VI; USDS, Legation Archives, Hawaii, Private and Official Interviews, II, July 27, 1854; David L. Gregg Diaries, July 24, 1854, III, transcript copy in the University of Hawaii Library, Honolulu.

[5] Clarendon to Crampton, No. 219, Oct. 6, 1854, F. O. 5/592: printed in *Report of the Historical Commission of the Territory of Hawaii for the Two Years Ending December 31, 1924* (Honolulu, 1924), 45–48.

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Islands, but was directed also toward Cuba, Samaná Bay, and the Mosquito Coast of Nicaragua, and was resented by the President, Secretary of State Marcy, and several senators.

More realistic than the officials in the Foreign Office and anticipating, if not expressing, the basis for an understanding between the two English-speaking powers, was the editor of the London *Post* who, on October 20, 1854, recognized that the extension of sovereignty over the Hawaiian group "could be made more conveniently by America than even by England," and regarded such an acquisition "as a circumstance auspicious to the commerce of the world," making not only for the development of the vast natural resources of the Sandwich Islands, but for the Pacific area, "through the enterprise and public spirit of the American Government."

A proposal to lease the Pearl River lagoon as a *quid pro quo* for commercial reciprocity in 1873 called forth opposition from several quarters, including Commissioner James H. Wodehouse; Theophilus H. Davies, a wealthy English agent and sugar-planter, founder of Theo. H. Davies & Company, who for a while served as British vice-consul and in 1873 as acting commissioner in Wodehouse's leave, "and from the first a firm upholder of the integrity of Hawaiian soil"; [6] Rear Admiral Charles F. Hillyar, commander of the British Pacific squadron, who on a June visit to Honolulu in the ironclad vessel Repulse en route to Vancouver, advised the Hawaiian government against the cession; [7] Robert Stirling, a Scotsman who was Minister of Finance and was opposed to ceding any territory on any terms, but favored reciprocity "pure and simple"; [8] the dowager Queen Emma; High Chiefess Bernice Pauahi (Mrs. Charles R. Bishop); several high chiefs, and enough *haoles* (foreigners) and Hawaiians in general to cause King Kamehameha V to withdraw the offer.[9]

A renewal of the proposal in 1885–86 was again opposed

[6] Davies to Granville, No. 13, confidential, Nov. 27, 1873, F. O. 58/136.

[7] Henry A. Peirce to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, No. 212, July 2, 1873, USDS, Dispatches, Hawaii, XV.

[8] Archives of Hawaii (hereafter AH), Cabinet Council Book, 1866–75, June 9, 1873. See *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1873.

[9] See my "British Opposition to the Cession of Pearl Harbor," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXIX (1960), 381–84.

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by Wodehouse and Davies, as well as by Rear Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour, retiring commander of the British Pacific station; Godfrey Brown, Hawaiian Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Scotsman by birth; and several others, all of whom were apprehensive that acquisition of the unexcelled Pacific harbor would inevitably lead to the annexation of the valuable key to the North Pacific, or at least to the establishment of a sole protectorate in the group.[10] After a lengthy and involved diplomatic exchange in both Honolulu and Washington, the Foreign Office was assured that the cession did not in any way affect the independence of the Hawaiian kingdom, that the privileges granted were compensatory and would expire with the termination of the treaty, and that British rights and privileges conceded in a commercial treaty of 1851 would be maintained unimpaired.[11] Furthermore, the Lords of the Admiralty informed the Foreign Office in 1888 "that as the anchorage and harbour of Honolulu . . . will remain available for use by H. M. Ships when Visiting the Sandwich Islands," the exclusive right to use Pearl Harbor, granted to the United States, would "not prejudicially affect British Naval Interests." [12] Thereafter the matter was dropped.

The Carter-Blaine Treaty of 1889, providing for "complete reciprocal free trade," except in opium, spirits, and other prohibited articles, with the products of Hawaii embraced in the bounty system of the United States, but with a clause—canceled by the Hawaiian Cabinet—permitting the landing of United States troops in certain contingencies, was opposed by Commissioner Wodehouse. When King Kalakaua asked the Englishman's opinion, he replied that he

[11] Jonathan Austin, Hawaiian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Wodehouse, Feb. 16, 1888, enclosed with Wodehouse to F. O., No. 45, March 13, 1888, *ibid.* Copies of both letters are also enclosed in Merrill to Bayard, No. 173, Feb. 24, 1888, USDS, Dispatches, Hawaii, XXIII, and are available in AH, Foreign Office and Executive file. For a condensation of the diplomatic exchange, see my "British Opposition to the Cession of Pearl Harbor," 387–94.

[12] Evan Macgregor to Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, May 22, 1888, F. O. 58/241. See Confidential Memorandum respecting the Designs of the United States on the Hawaiian Islands, No. 5856, printed for the use of the Foreign Office, Nov. 29, 1889, *ibid.*, and C. O. 537/136.

[10] Culme-Seymour to the Admiralty, No. 215, Nov. 7, 1887, enclosed in Adm. to F. O., Dec. 12, 1887, F. O. 58/241, "Designs of the United States on Hawaii."

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hoped His Majesty "would never sign it, as it would involve the loss of the independence of his kingdom." [13] In a revised form, with an article added by Secretary of State James G. Blaine which pledged Hawaii to enter into no treaty engagements with other powers without the previous knowledge of the United States, objections were raised by Canadian-born Attorney General Charles W. Ashford, who had previously cooperated with other members of the reform ministry. However, on a recent journey to the United States and his homeland he had been invited to Ottawa by Sir John Alexander Macdonald, Canada's first Prime Minister (1867–73), who allegedly tendered the visitor a railroad pass to Vancouver [14] and arranged for him to be a special guest of George Stephen (later Lord Mount Stephen),[15] a financier whose ability helped realize the Canadian Pacific Railway and who served as its first president. On his return to Hawaii the Attorney General became an active and earnest opponent of the new convention with the United States and advocated a Pacific cable and a reciprocity treaty with the Dominion of Canada. At a Cabinet meeting on April 10, 1890, he supported the king in his opposition, explaining that the decision of the supreme court that the majority of the Cabinet was competent to advise was "not in the slightest degree binding," was an *ex parte* decision.[16] Subsequently, Ashford contended in the legislature that to abdicate the right to make treaties with other powers without the approval of the United States was a surrender of independence unworthy in itself, and especially detrimental to some probably advantageous commercial arrangements with Canada, which he would communicate upon a suitable occasion.[17] This ad-

[13] Enclosure with Wodehouse to Salisbury, No. 11, confidential, Sept. 27, 1889, F. O. 58/241. See Confidential Memorandum respecting the Designs of the United States on the Hawaiian Islands and *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, Honolulu, Sept. 20, 1889.

[14] Lorrin A. Thurston, *Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution* (Honolulu, 1936), 209.

[15] Sereno E. Bishop, "The Hawaiian Queen and Her Kingdom," *Review of Reviews*, New York ed., IV (1891), 153.

[16] AH, Cabinet Council Minute Book, 1874–91, 491.

[17] Same as No. 15. These commercial arrangements were never communicated, but they probably concerned cable landings on Necker Island. See *Senate Executive Documents*, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, No. 16, 8–10.

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vocacy of a Pacific cable and a reciprocity treaty with the Dominion of Canada aroused suspicion in the Hawaiian capital that he was under the pay of the Canadian Pacific Railway, if not an agent of the Canadian Premier.[18]

The journey of the ailing king to California for his health in late 1890 caused uneasiness in some British circles, particularly in British Columbia. The government of Canada expressed anxiety to the Colonial Office that influence might be brought to bear on Kalakaua during his sojourn on the mainland to consent to the annexation of his kingdom to the United States. Accordingly, on the suggestion of Lord Knutsford, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Wodehouse was instructed to take such steps as he might think judicious to protest against it on behalf of the British government.[19] The commissioner, on his part, was apprehensive that the king might extend his visit to Washington and that an attempt would be made there to negotiate a cession or long lease of Pearl Harbor to the United States in exchange for a bounty on Hawaiian sugar; but relief came on receiving the intelligence that the incapacitated sovereign did not intend during the winter season to cross the continent.[20] He succumbed in San Francisco on January 20, 1891. His capable strong-willed sister and successor, Queen Liliuokalani, was not suspected of any leanings toward union with the United States.

When the *émeute* of January 14–17, 1893, in Honolulu led to the abdication under protest of the Queen,[21] Commissioner Wodehouse, rather belatedly on January 19, after all other members of the diplomatic corps in Hawaii had acted, recognized the provisional government as the existing *de facto* government pending instruction from London.[22]

18 John L. Stevens, U. S. minister in Hawaii, to Secretary of State James G. Blaine, No. 25, May 28, 1890, USDS, Dispatches, Hawaii, XXV, printed in *House Executive Documents*, 53rd Congress, 3rd Session, No. 1, Pt. 1, App. II, Hawaii, 321.

19 F. O. to Wodehouse, No. 1, Jan. 8, 1891, F. O. 58/259. See F. O. to C. O., Jan. 8, 1891, *ibid.*

20 Wodehouse to F. O., No. 2, Jan. 14, 1891, *ibid.*

21 For a treatment of the revolution, see my *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom* (to be published in New Haven in the spring of 1965), Chap. V.

22 Wodehouse to members of the executive council of the provisional government, Jan. 19, 1893, copy in F. O. 58/279.

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He reported to his superiors that many foreigners and most native Hawaiians were opposed to union with the United States and wished to retain the system of monarchical government. He recommended sending a British man-of-war, if possible with a port captain, in order to protect life and property on Oahu and to visit other islands in the group containing plantations and other British interests which in case of the abolition of the monarchy would be endangered by disturbances in consequence of race feeling against all foreigners. Excitement would probably be largely allayed by the visit of a British vessel.[23]

While Wodehouse in Honolulu was importuning the Foreign Office to take some positive action and was pressing Sanford B. Dole, president of the provisional government, for an explanation as to why naval forces from the USS Boston were not recalled to their ships,[24] Sir Julian Pauncefote in Washington calmly reported that according to the opinion of Dr. John Mott Smith, the Hawaiian minister there, the annexation proposal would scarcely be entertained by the moribund Harrison administration.[25]

II

In spite of the widespread predictions of a British protest by the American press [26] and the conviction of the Conservative wing of the British press and some Tories that Great Britain would not suffer another Tahiti in the Pacific, that the United States had no right to annex a group of islands thousands of miles distant from her shores, and that the proper remedy for the Hawaiian difficulty would be a joint protectorate similar to that of Samoa,[27] William Ewart Glad-

[23] Wodehouse to F. O., Jan. 18, and telegram of Jan. 31, 1893, *ibid.*

[24] Wodehouse to Dole, Jan. 30, 1894, enclosed with Wodehouse to Rosebery, No. 1, pol. and conf., Feb. 9, 1893, *ibid.* In January 1893 Wodehouse was promoted to the rank of minister.

[25] Pauncefote to Rosebery, telegrams Nos. 18, 19, Jan. 28, 29, 1893, *ibid.*

[26] See most American newspapers, including the New York *Tribune*, New York *Herald*, New York *Globe*, Boston *Herald*, San Francisco *Morning Call*, San Francisco *Chronicle*, Atlanta *Constitution*, Washington *Evening Star*, and Washington *Post*, January 30, 31, February 1, 1893, as well as the Montreal *Gazette*, and the *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 31, 1893, and Charles de Varigny, "La Crise Havaienne," *Revue des deux mondes*, VII (1893), 195.

[27] The *Times* (London) and London *Globe*, Jan. 30, 1893, *Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 4, 1893; interview of Baron de Worms, conservative member of parlia-

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stone, just returned to power for the third time and determined to carry through home rule for Ireland, remained unruffled over the Hawaiian situation. Rosebery's approval of Wodehouse's *de facto* recognition of the provisional government,[28] and answers by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary to the Admiralty to pertinent questions raised in the House of Commons indicated that Her Majesty's government had no intention of sending ships of war to Honolulu. They considered that the lives and property of British subjects were not exposed to danger —that they were safe under American protection—and that there was no foundation for a report of a protest of any kind in Washington.[29]

When the British corvette Garnet, in the ordinary course of station visiting from Acapulco to Esquimalt, visited Honolulu from February 12 to March 10, perfect harmony existed between her officers and men and those of the United States warships in the harbor, while Minister Wodehouse's relations with Admiral J. S. Skerrett, commander in chief of United States forces in the Pacific, "an old acquaintance," were "very good"; the latter, on his arrival in the USS Mohican, paid the minister "a very friendly visit." [30]

Actually the Foreign Office had no intentions of lodging an official protest against either the action of the United States officials in Honolulu [31] or any proposed annexation, or even of offering "friendly intercession and mediation," as

ment, in the Washington *Evening News*, Feb. 2, 1893 and New York *Evening Post*, Feb. 3, 1893. See my "Great Britain and the Sovereignty of Hawaii," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXXI (1962), 333–44.

The right to annex islands two thousand miles away should not have been questioned by enlightened Englishmen who certainly were acquainted with the Australasian Monroe Doctrine enunciated fifteen years earlier at the Sydney Inter-Colonial Conference of 1883 by Australasian statesmen. That doctrine advocated extensive annexations in the South Pacific as well as the exclusion of all "foreign" (non-British) powers from that region, and claimed as "contiguous" territory islands lying one to two thousand miles from their shores. See my "Australasian Monroe Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXVI (1961), 264–84.

28 F. O. to Wodehouse, telegram, Feb. 10, 1893, F. O. 58/279.

29 Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, 4th series, VIII (1893), 254, 228; The *Times* (London), Feb. 3, 1893; Wellington *Evening Post* and Sydney *Morning Herald*, both Feb. 4, 1893.

30 Wodehouse to Rosebery, No. 6, March 29, F. O. 58/279.

31 F. O. to Pauncefote, No. 15, telegram, Jan. 31, 1893, *ibid.*

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requested by Queen Liliuokalani of Queen Victoria.[32] "The attitude of calm indifference" maintained by British officials in the midst of "the excitement created by the Hawaiian incident," had the effect of cooling the ardor of the annexation party [33] and was most annoying to those who had counted on the "threatening hand of Great Britain" to bring the desired action in Washington. "As the glory was mostly to be won from vexing and triumphing over her," this quiet unconcern "robbed the enterprise of all its glamour." [34]

Apparently Britain was willing to go the extent of removing an offending minister, if such action would contribute to the maintenance of amicable relations. Sir Julian Pauncefote assured Walter Q. Gresham, the recently installed Secretary of State, that England was interested only in seeing stable authority maintained in the Hawaiian Islands, that she had no desire or intention to interfere in their domestic affairs, and was well aware of the close relations existing between their government and that of the United States and of the exceptional interests that the latter had in the archipelago. After the minister had referred to the character of the population, to conditions in the islands, and to the importance of maintaining friendly relations there and elsewhere, Gresham said in an informal and unofficial manner that it was possible that Great Britain might make it easier to maintain such relations by relieving its minister in Honolulu and sending "some one who had no entangling relations with the natives or with aliens prosecuting business" there. Sir Julian replied that he thought Minister Wodehouse "would be very promptly relieved should the Secretary of State say that in his judgment he deemed it necessary for the maintenance of harmony and good feeling." [35]

Although several London dailies were concerned over the nature of the revolution, the slight regard paid to the rights

32 See Queen Liliuokalani's letter to Queen Victoria enclosed with Wodehouse to Rosebery, separate, Feb. 1, 1893, F. O. 58/279. This letter was returned to the Foreign Office without comment; a courteous reply, "with padding," had to be drafted by that office (minutes attached to *ibid.*).

33 Pauncefote to Rosebery, No. 49, conf., Feb. 7, 1893, *ibid.*

34 "The Hawaiian Fiasco," *The Nation,* Feb. 2, 1893. See New York *Post,* Feb. 1, 3, 6, 1893.

35 USDS, Miscellaneous Archives, Memoranda of Conversations with the Secretary of State 1893/98.

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of Queen Liliuokalani, the requirement of all the maritime powers for a coaling station in the mid-Pacific, and the apparent haste on the part of the commissioners to rush matters through before Washington had obtained sufficient information,[36] British periodicals, while questioning the morality and wisdom of the annexation of Hawaii, generally saw no justification for British objection, recognized the imperial significance of the United States drift outward from the American continent, and predicted that she would soon have a foreign policy, a great navy, and a colonial empire.[37] The *Speaker,* a review of politics, letters, science, and arts, and an exponent of the Liberal party's point of view, repeatedly expressed the opinion that "the first article of England's foreign policy in the future must be the cultivation of an identity of interests with America, with the ultimate aim of forming a great defensive alliance of English-speaking Powers." This was an object which not only could be carried out without injuring the interests or offending the susceptibilities of the British colonies, but required their cooperation as an essential feature of the scheme. "In this understanding must England and Australasia approach the settlement of the Hawaiian question when it comes to its decisive state." This matter, which involved international considerations of the widest kind, concerned England and America chiefly, and it would be "the first question which will bring to the test that most interesting of the international problems of the future—the eventual relations of these two great English-speaking Powers." The course of nature appeared to make inevitable that one day the United States would consider the annexation of Hawaii of vital importance. The *Speaker* declared: "We must stand by America in the course which the natural expansion of her interests and the interests of civilisation prescribe to her as necessary; and this policy, an *entente* with America, should enable us to pursue without jeopardising or prejudicing in any way our own or our Colonies' interests in the Pacific."

The journal repeated the theme that "the United States

[36] See the *Daily Telegraph,* Jan. 30, Feb. 4, 1893; *Daily News,* the *Globe,* and *St. James's Gazette,* Jan. 30, 31, 1893.

[37] See the *Review of Reviews,* London ed., VII (1893), 128, 243, 354; *Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science, and Art,* LXXV, Feb. 11, 1893, 143–44; *Spectator,* LXX, Feb. 4, 1893, 153.

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must have Hawaii if they want it—and they will want it . . . if their statesmen are wise in their generation—and we must facilitate their policy in the matter and not obstruct it, notwithstanding the fact that our colonies of Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and British Columbia on the other, in whose track of communication the Hawaiian archipelago directly lies, will raise strenuous objection." This complication, however, with the proper dispositions on all sides, should not be beyond the diplomatic genius of the one race solely represented.[38]

Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, president of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, and author of *The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660–1783* and the *Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire,* cordially reciprocated the idea of an Anglo-American understanding based upon an identity of spirit and warned against offensive arrogance on our part in pursuing our national interests. In his article, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea-Power," which appeared in the March 1893 issue of *The Forum,* he observed:

> Among all foreign states, it is especially to be hoped that each passing year may render more cordial the relations between ourselves and the great nation from whose loins we sprang. The radical identity of spirit which underlies our superficial differences of polity will surely so draw us closer together, if we do not wilfully set our faces against a tendency which would give our race the predominance over the seas of the world. To force such a consummation is impossible, and if possible would not be wise; but surely it would be a lofty aim, fraught with immeasurable benefits, to desire it, and to raise no needless impediments by advocating perfectly proper acts, demanded by our evident interests, in offensive or arrogant terms.[39]

The *Speaker* in a March 18 editorial again pointed out that in the Western Hemisphere was growing up a power far more formidable for Great Britain, whether as an enemy or a friend, than any other power in the world—a power "speaking the same language, governed by the same spirit of liberty

[38] "England and America in Polynesia," and "Hawaii: An Anglo-American Question," *Speaker,* VII, Feb. 4, and March 18, 1893, 119–20 and 300.

[39] *The Forum* (New York), XV, (1893), 11.

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and law, with a kindred civilisation and kindred and closely interwoven commercial interests, and since, like ourselves, it is destined to develop its greatest strength on the sea, the only Power whose hostility England need seriously fear." That weekly advanced the idea that "our foreign policy of the future should look to that Power before all others, and should so direct events as to render impossible a collision which would be against the laws of nature, and to lead to a great alliance . . . of the whole English-speaking race, . . . — an alliance which would be the surest bulwark of civilisation in the future." British statesmen and soldiers, fascinated by events on the European continent, had

> hitherto neglected the impressive, if not too obvious symptoms of American development; the fact that the Monroe doctrine has now been virtually discarded by American political thinkers; that Washington's maxim of non-interference has been rendered obsolete by the sheer inevitable expansion of American interests; the proceedings in the Behring Sea; the growth of the American navy, or, what is of greater consequence, the growth of the American spirit. . . . Now, however, we are face to face with a situation which brings the conflict or coalescence of British and American interests of the first rank forward on the scene as a question of actual politics which cannot be overlooked.[40]

A month earlier a Washington *Evening News* correspondent hinted at the idea of an Anglo-American entente in an article cabled from London reporting that the British government regarded "the possible annexation of Hawaii with remarkable indifference. Her trade with the islands is small and the more America extends her territory and commercial influence the more certain is England of her assistance as an ally in future troubles." [41]

III

The revolution of January 1893 and the subsequent treaty negotiations proved only a step—but not the final one—in the settlement of the Hawaiian question, for the deliberative

[40] "Hawaii: An Anglo-American Question," *Speaker*, VII, March 18, 1893, 300. See "An Anglo-American Alliance," *ibid.*, April 30, 1893, 358–59.

[41] "England, France and Germany Generally Express Moderate Views," Washington *Evening News*, Feb. 9, 1893.

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United States Senate, perhaps influenced by Great Britain's "remarkable indifference," delayed in ratifying the treaty transmitted to it by President William Harrison on February 16. Grover Cleveland, on March 9, withdrew it for further study and, after a thorough investigation of the causes and course of the revolution, decided not to resubmit the document.

The following year, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, attached to the British legation in Washington, commented to a friend in the Foreign Office: "Now, as you know, England has steadily gained ground in public estimation here by her integrity. We did *not* wish to destroy U. S. sealing interests—nor to annex Hawaii, nor to do any of the crimes imputed to us in the papers. It is astonishing the difference, for instance, in Lodge's language to what it used to be. Can we afford to throw this advantage away? " [42]

When the acquisition of Hawaii came up again in 1897–98 in connection with a second annexation treaty negotiated this time by the McKinley administration and the Republic of Hawaii, Great Britain was even less concerned than previously over United States expansion. In official circles there was absolutely no feeling of hostility or even of jealousy toward American proposals to acquire territory in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean.

Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, could not agree with Richard Seddon, the dynamic, expansionist-minded Premier of New Zealand, "that the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States would prejudicially affect the Imperial and Colonial interests both as regards trade and defence. . . ." To his plea that imperial authorities protest the annexation, and to his assertion that "a duplicate or triplicate protectorate—in fact anything would be better than to let the Islands in question form part of the United States," [43] the Colonial Office replied that in view of the feeling and policy predominant in the United States, Her Majesty's government was of the opinion that

[42] Spring-Rice to Ferguson, parliamentary private secretary to Lord Rosebery, March 19, 1894, Stephen Gwynn (ed.), *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, A Record,* 2 Vols. (Boston and New York, 1929), I, 155.

[43] Seddon to Chamberlain, June 23, 1897, C. O. 537/136; National Archives of New Zealand, Governor General Archives, G/10, No. 287/97; Richard Seddon Papers, folio 84.

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it would be useless, or worse than useless, to take any action in the direction indicated by Mr. Seddon. The almost certain result of a remonstrance addressed to the government of the United States would be to ensure the confirmation of the proposed treaty by the Senate. That government had invariably maintained that the interests of the United States in Hawaii were paramount, and the probable answer of Washington officials to any suggestion of a joint protectorate would be that they could never allow any nation but themselves to control the Sandwich Islands, which by their position almost belonged to the United States and must sooner or later come under her protection.[44]

After the Japanese government had sought the support of other powers interested in the Pacific area and had suggested to Great Britain a tripartite—Anglo-Japanese-American—control of Hawaii, Premier Seddon again protested against the failure to challenge the annexation.[45] Her Majesty's government, however, felt "that they could not join Japan in attempting to maintain the *status quo* or to establish a protectorate, with a view to securing the right of immigration into Hawaii for the Japanese, more especially in the face of legislation with respect to alien immigration which has recently been passed in some of the Australasian Colonies." It was still more impossible for Great Britain in view of the Anglo-French declaration of 1843 to endeavor to secure predominance in Hawaii. Moreover, the recent policy of the United States with regard to the islands had indicated plainly that she would not tolerate any interference by another power.[46]

In 1897, as in 1921, when the Anglo-Japanese alliance came up for renewal, Great Britain had no intention of joining Japan in any arrangement which would antagonize the United States. There was no question as to the sympathy of

[44] Edward Wingfield to Seddon, July 12, 1897, *ibid.* See Confidential Memorandum prepared by E. Hertslet, No. 4696, printed for the use of the Foreign Office Jan. 8, 1883, and Confidential Memorandum respecting the Designs of the United States on the Hawaiian Islands, No. 5856, printed for the same office, Nov. 29, 1889, C. O. 537/136.

[45] Seddon to Chamberlain, July 30, 1897, C. O. 209/261 and other references in No. 43.

[46] John Bramston (for Chamberlain) to Earl of Ranfurly, Governor General of New Zealand, Sept. 6, 1898, *ibid.*

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the British people; "in case of a white race against a yellow race the English would side with the white race" and the desire and most pressing need of Britain at both periods was for "close and most friendly relations with the United States." [47] The minutes attached to the draft replies to Seddon's letters clearly indicate this; Britain is not "going to join Japan in a war with the United States," one asserted. In respect of commerce and Pearl Harbor, these observations represented a realistic approach. One under secretary minuted:

> The trade between N. Zealand, & Australia & Hawaii is very small, nor is there much between Canada & Hawaii. No doubt it might be advantageous to have a naval base in the centre of the Pacific, but we cannot have everything, and as things are we have got a very fair share of the Pacific which is quite as much as we can manage. The annexation of Hawaii to the U. S. will certainly give it a more stable and efficient administration than it could ever have hoped for as an independent state, and the trade of the Empire there will after all not be in a much worse position than it has been for many years. . . . Mr. Seddon forgets that the U. S. have had a coaling station in Pearl Harbour at Hawaii for many years, without any disastrous results ensuing to the colonies.[48]

Instead of opposing the annexation of Hawaii as the inevitable event approached in the spring of 1898, there was actually some encouragement and unofficial prompting from at least one distinguished British official. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, with years of service in the Foreign Office, in London, in Tokyo, in Washington during the late eighteen-eighties, when warm and genuine friendships had been formed with John Hay, Henry Adams, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Theodore Roosevelt, and who was now on the staff of the British embassy in Berlin, let drop an opinion on the necessity of acting

[47] Rear Admiral Nathan Cook Twining Jr., naval attaché to the American embassy in London, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Nov. 19, 29, 1921, Archives of the United States, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, RG 45, Office of Naval Intelligence file, Register No. 14865-A, Subject file 1911–27. See Merze Tate and Fidele Foy, "More Light on the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXIV (1959), 549.

[48] Minutes on Seddon to Chamberlain, June 23, July 30, 1897, C. O. 537/136 and C. O. 209/261.

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swiftly and of annexing Hawaii before the Spanish-American war ended, when, if the archipelago were acquired, Germany would demand compensation. At the close of April he addressed to John Hay, the United States ambassador to the Court of St. James, a letter with whose contents he probably expected Theodore Roosevelt, a close friend of both, and his intimates to become acquainted. In it Sir Cecil dealt with Germany's attitude toward the war and pointed out that her official newspapers had stated that she would issue no declaration of neutrality "in order to keep her hands free as she did in the case of the Turco-Greek war and the Japanese war." He observed that in both cases she spent neither men nor money but reaped more advantage from the struggle than either combatant. Applying this policy to the present case, her demand would likely be for Samoa or some position in the Pacific. However,

> if the U. S. were to annex Hawaii *now*, Germany would not dare to object. It is most evident that she is anxious to be on the sunny side of the affections of the U. S. But if America put the step off till the end of the war, Germany would immediately demand compensation—i.e. Samoa. . . . So I think it worth while (in case this has been lost sight of) to urge again that it is vitally important, if Hawaii is to be annexed *without* compensation, to annex it now.[49]

John Hay was extremely obliged for this kind letter, which "jumped so precisely" with his own ideas that he sent the substance off to Washington.[50] Before receiving a reply from his friend in London, Spring-Rice again warned: "Don't let the Americans forget what happened after the Turco-Russian war, after the Chino-Japanese war and after the Turco-Greek war. Those who profited were not those who fought." [51]

[49] Spring-Rice to Hay, April 30, 1898, in Gwynn, I, 246–47.

[50] Hay to Spring-Rice, May 5, 1898, *ibid.*, 147. Hay informed Spring-Rice that the substance was sent to the President. This writer has not located the communication in the McKinley papers, but a confidential telegram of May 3, 1898, to Secretary of State William R. Day reads: "Excellent authority in German matters suggests prompt action in annexation Hawaii before war closes as otherwise Germany might seek to complicate the question with Samoa or Philippine Islands." USDS, Dispatches, Great Britain, CXCII.

[51] Spring-Rice to Hay, May 7, 1898, in Gwynn, I, 248.

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There was a genuine basis for Sir Cecil's concern. The year before the German ambassador in London spoke more than once to F. H. Villiers, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, regarding the prospective annexation of Hawaii and proposed joint action by England and Germany for which the object was to be either to acquire from the United States a share in the dominion of Hawaii or, if the United States refused to entertain this proposal, to obtain her withdrawal from Samoa in consideration of the title to Hawaii. Her Majesty's government, however, had no intention of joining with Germany in such a proposition; her reason for declining was the November 28, 1843, Anglo-French declaration to consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent state. In fact, the Under Secretaries in both the Foreign and Colonial Offices doubted if the retirement of the United States from the Samoan arrangement would improve matters in the Pacific so far as the British were concerned. As Mr. March minuted on the draft of Villiers' communication:

> It would leave us face to face with the Germans alone, and wd. I fear, lead to our being readily elbowed out. We can at present usually rely on American support in resisting German encroachment and I shd. be disposed to reply to this that if Germany were to propose to the United States a joint declaration similar to that already existing between H.M.G. and that of France, H.M.G. would welcome such an arrangement. But that as regards Samoa, Mr. Ch. [Chamberlain] doubts that it wd. be of any advantage to this country to obtain the withdrawal of the U. S. from the existing tripartite arrangement.[52]

There were still other indications of Germany's desire to extend her colonial empire and to secure compensation if the United States acquired Hawaii. On July 12, 1898, Andrew D. White, American ambassador in Berlin, was informed by an "exceedingly influential personage" connected with the German government that his country had thus far repelled all approaches of other European powers to interfere in the Spanish-American War and that her admiral under orders from his government had resisted tempting

[52] F. H. Villiers to Sir F. Lascelles, Under Secretary in the Colonial Office, Aug. 18, 1897, with minutes, C. O. 537/136.

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offers made at Manila. The visitor dwelt on Hawaii and other possible annexations to the United States and urged "that Germany ought to have some assurances as to territory in the Pacific. . . ." She did not want large annexations and could not afford to take the Philippine Islands, if they were offered to her, but she should be left unhampered in Samoa, and should eventually have the Carolines and a naval station in the Philippines. He further stated, as reported by White, "that close relations and cooperation of United States with Great Britain will certainly result in a continental coalition against us." [53]

Throughout the period when the joint resolution for the annexation of Hawaii was under debate in Congress,[54] the prevailing attitude in Great Britain toward American affairs, including the prosecution and termination of the war with Spain, was one of sympathetic friendliness and cooperation, even to the extent of unofficial offers of mediation.[55] A noticeable feature of the debate in the House of Commons on the evening of June 10 was the agreement of all speakers of every shade of opinion, and especially of Joseph Chamberlain, as to the desirability of an intimate and cordial understanding between England and the United States, and a recognition of the fact that Sir Julian Pauncefote had contributed greatly to bringing about a friendly understanding between two kindred nations.[56]

Indicative of the cordiality between the two English-speaking powers was the formation in early June of an Anglo-American committee, the declared object of which was to promote better relations between Great Britain and the United States. The committee did not aim at a treaty or any other bond of alliance; it aspired only, in the words of the Right Honorable James Bryce, to "a constant, cordial co-operation." It excluded from the sphere of operations

53 White to Day, telegram, July 12, 1898, and dispatch No. 494, July 13, 1899, USDS, Dispatches, Germany, LXVI.

54 The Newlands resolution was adopted in the House of Representatives on June 15 and in the Senate on July 6, 1898.

55 See Hay to Day, Nos. 386, confidential, and 425, strictly confidential, May 10, June 8, 1898, USDS, Dispatches, Great Britain, CXCII.

56 Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, 4th series, LVIII (1898), 1377, 1437, 1438. The *Times* (London), June 11, 1898. See Hay to Day, No. 426, June 11, 1898, same as No. 2.

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anything directly concerning the Spanish-American War, and did not intend to present any kind of public demonstration. The idea of the promoters was to enroll ten thousand representative men and women in Great Britain. By June 7 more than one hundred had signified their intention of joining the committee, including the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of York; the Duke of Fife; the Earl of Jersey; Earl Grey; the Bishops of London, Durham, Winchester, Chester, Hereford, Liverpool, Manchester, Worcester, Ripon, and Peterborough; Viscount Peel, Lords Brassey, Coleridge, Farrer, Vinnaird, Lister, Welby, and Charles Beresford; and Commoners Asquith, Bryce, Mowbray, Northcote, H. M. Stanley, Sir Frederick Pollock, Anthony Hope, Conan Doyle, Rudyard Kipling, and a number of the leading nonconformist clergymen.[57]

By 1898 the concept of an Anglo-American rapprochement had also taken root in the United States, even among those individuals and the press which not long before had been the most vociferious in their denunciation of Great Britain. In previous years, under demonstrations of American ill-will and expressions of unfriendliness in the American press, the British had comforted themselves by the hope that this feeling was not shared by the better portion of the American people and that some form of union "had been dreamt of and longed for by the best men of both countries." For statesmen of every land knew "that the close alliance of the British Empire and the American Republic will furnish the surest of all guarantees for the maintenance of the peace of the world." On March 19 the *Speaker* observed:

> It is a delightful thing to know that, for the moment at least, this anti-British party in America is not so much silent as active in its support of an Anglo-American agreement. Some of the newspapers which have discussed most approvingly the idea of an alliance between the two countries are those which were loudest in anti-British demonstrations two years ago. Nowhere, so far as we know, has a word been said against the suggestion that the two great branches of the English race should enter into a friendly union.[58]

[57] "Anglo-American Unity," Montreal *Gazette*, June 8, 1898. See London *Daily Chronicle*, June 7, 1898.

[58] "An Anglo-American Alliance," *Speaker*, XVIII (1898), 347–48.

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IV

In her attitude toward American expansion in the Pacific, Great Britain on her part advanced the concept of Anglo-American cooperation. In fact, annexation was promoted by the growing Anglo-American cordiality. This rapprochement and the mutual distrust of the great powers prevented any organized action to check the United States in her designs on Hawaii. Even if at mid-century, in 1873, and again in 1886 Britain strenuously objected to the United States' acquiring sovereignty over the Sandwich Islands, and even leasing Pearl Harbor in exchange for compensatory privileges, by 1893, and certainly by 1898, she preferred that a future great sea power, a kindred people, and a potential ally, rather than an aggressive Germany, come into possession of Pacific groups not already under British dominion. Consequently, the Foreign Office lodged no official protest over the proposed annexation; the Liberal press acquiesced in it; and some statesmen unofficially and secretly encouraged it.

Although not clearly recognized at the time, the annexation of Hawaii without a single protest or a question from Great Britain—despite considerable "twisting of the lion's tail"—illustrated the growing identity of interests between her and the United States and served as the first symbol of Anglo-American understanding or rapprochement which was to become a significant factor in international relations in the twentieth century. Joseph Chamberlain, on June 10, 1898, envisioning the future possibility that Anglo-Saxon liberty and Anglo-Saxon interests might "be menaced by a great combination of Powers," and hoping that "blood would be found thicker than water," repeated what he had earlier said at Birmingham: "the closer, the more definite, the clearer the alliance between the United States and ourselves, the better it will be for both nations, the better it will be for the civilised world, and the better it will be for all which we have a right to hope for." [59]

[59] Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, 4th series, LVIII, 1438. Repeated examples of Anglo-American cordiality in the spring of 1898 can be found in the numerous resolutions of sympathy for the families of the casualties in the USS Maine disaster and for the United States at war passed at meetings of organizations in the United Kingdom, and in gifts of grain and money from the people of the United States to the sufferers from famine in India.

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Recognition by another Englishman of an identity of interest with the United States is found in the correspondence of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice. After the joint resolution for the annexation of Hawaii had passed the Senate, he wrote from Berlin to Henry Cabot Lodge: "I can't tell you with what pleasure I see that Hawaii is at length to be annexed." This gratification was selfish and in one sense had nothing to do with the real or permanent advantage to America which would result from the union. Spring-Rice believed that there was an intention to depose English civilization, American as well as British, from the Pacific, and reflected:

> We have the right and duty to defend what we most certainly have fairly won on the American, Australian and Chinese coasts. I don't believe that England, the island, is strong enough, or will remain comparatively strong enough to defend English civilization alone— . . . And I welcome any step which America takes outside her continent because it tends to the increase of the common good.[60]

Senator Lodge, on his part, was delighted with this letter, for similar thoughts and feelings had been in his mind for a long time. He believed the annexation of Hawaii "to be a good thing not only for the United States but for the world." He felt as Spring-Rice did "about the fate of the civilization of the English-speaking people." One of the general results of the war had been their coming together, and he was optimist enough to believe that it was going to last.[61]

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See USDS, Dispatches, Great Britain, CXCII, *passim;* Pauncefote to Sherman, Feb. 8, 1898, USDS, Great Britain, Notes from, CXXIX; Sherman to Pauncefote, March 21, USDS, Great Britain, Notes, XXIV.

60 Spring-Rice to Lodge, July 8, 1898, in Gwynn, I, 249.

61 Lodge to Spring-Rice, Aug. 12, 1898, *ibid.*, 250. See Captain Alfred T. Mahan and Captain Lord Charles Beresford, "Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion," *North American Review,* CLIX (1894), 551–73.

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REVIEWS

The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938. By Dorothy Borg. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1964.—x, 674 pp. $10.00.

If China's armed forces were to occupy northern India down to the Ganges and set up a puppet rule there; if China were then to demand that India suppress all anti-Chinese propaganda and insist upon Sino-Indian economic and military collaboration to the exclusion of India's independent relations with other countries; if India refused, and if China launched a general armed offensive aimed to subjugate the whole Indian nation; and if the United States, during all those events, were to maintain normal trade with China, including the sale of war materials, and do nothing beyond issuing occasional declarations expressing disapproval of changes brought about by non-peaceful means, and favoring the "preservation and encouragement of orderly processes"; one might fairly compare such a response to the policy of the United States in the Far Eastern crisis of 1933–38, which Dorothy Borg sums up (p. iv) as "refraining from any action," in order to "reduce the likelihood of conflict between the United States and Japan."

President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull carried the prime responsibility for that policy, Miss Borg makes clear. Their field intelligence was notably funneled through Stanley K. Hornbeck, political adviser to the State Department; Joseph C. Grew, ambassador to Japan; Nelson Trusler Johnson, ambassador to China; and their subordinates. The reports of Hornbeck, Grew, and Johnson show, with few lapses, a general grasp of Japan's intentions to conquer China, and a lucid sympathy with their chiefs' desire not to provoke Japan or violate neutrality. In the words of Mr. Hornbeck to Mr. Hull (p. 136), "We do not wish to assume new responsibilities of initiative or leadership in regard to matters of general international interests in the Far East."

Of course one lived then in a very different world. It would be wholly absurd to assert that, alone among the nations, the United States declined to oppose aggression. Miss Borg in no way implies that. The analogy drawn above may nevertheless remind us of the extreme swing of the pendulum of official assumptions concerning United States responsibilities. Within thirty years the administration has moved from a policy of "play-

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ing no favorites" (p. 529) as between aggressor and victim in an international war in Asia, to today's policy of unilateral armed intervention in the internal wars of China and Vietnam.

Miss Borg's book opens with a brief review of the Manchurian Incident, used as the pretext for Japan's easy conquest of territory larger than France and Germany. In the Tangku Truce of 1933, China was coerced to give *de facto* recognition to the theft. That truce violated the Nine Power Treaty and the American-sponsored Kellogg-Briand Treaty (Pact of Paris), but the United States made no protest. This book covers the so-called Amau Doctrine (which warned other powers not to aid China's economic construction); the failure of the United States to secure Japan's agreement to limitations on naval arms construction; Japan's continued attrition in North China; the arrival of the Chinese Communists in the northwest and the impact of the Sian Incident on internal events; America's frustrated efforts to secure Japan's observance of her obligations not to arm her Pacific island mandates; the outbreak of the second undeclared Sino-Japanese war in 1937, and Secretary Hull's preoccupation to avoid entanglements with Japan while protecting U.S. citizens' rights in China; Hull's somewhat quixotic maneuvers (Chap. XIV) to get the League powers and the Brussels Conference of the Nine Power Treaty signators to chastise Japan morally while avoiding any U.S. commitment to use sanctions; and the German role in mediation efforts intended by Japan to bring about a disastrous Chinese surrender, to which Washington at that time seemed resigned. Finally, there was the Japanese sinking of the U.S. river gunboat Panay in 1937, which President Roosevelt angrily protested. Roosevelt got his apology and indemnity, and the one incident of the period when the United States did not follow what would today be called an appeasement policy was closed to the evident relief of the administration.

Miss Borg corrects some ancient illusions. "There is a popular belief," she writes (p. vi), "that the [Roosevelt] administration wished to take strong action against Japan, following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict, and was only deterred from doing so by the force of isolationism throughout the United States." She convincingly proves that "the facts do not lend themselves to any such simple interpretation."

One impression common among Americans was that Colonel Stimson, after enunciating the doctrine of non-recognition of Japan's conquests in 1932, vainly sought British support for an embargo against the aggressor. The record shows that Stimson persuaded Hoover (p. 21), against grave misgivings, to consent

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to the non-recognition doctrine. In spite of an initial faulty response from Britain, Stimson also spurred Hoover to seek special legislation (*unanimously* passed by the Senate) to confer power on the President to "limit or forbid the shipment of arms" abroad (p. 23), under agreements with other nations. One of Stimson's last acts in office under Hoover was to confer with Roosevelt to assure continuity of policy, and he thought he had succeeded. Stimson had become convinced that non-recognition alone was ineffectual; he was anxious to push ahead to discuss an arms embargo with the British. After much vacillation and ambiguity, however, Roosevelt let the embargo legislation die, and such steps were not to be taken for seven years.

In retrospect, Colonel Stimson's doctrine seems the one initiative of United States diplomacy (1932–39) in realistic support of the treaties. Thereafter Roosevelt and Hull aimed to avoid any logical extension of the Stimson doctrine into the realm of effective U.S. action. Even before the League met to censure Japan, Hull rejected "half a dozen proposals" (p. 535) by the British to discuss variants of sanctions or joint naval demonstrations. To Litvinov's demands for sanctions, made at Geneva and elsewhere, the United States remained wholly aloof. Nor did it in any way seek to collaborate with Soviet efforts to aid China—the only foreign military assistance offered that invaded nation.

Late in 1937 the French, under heavy pressure from Japan to cut off China's trade lifeline through Hanoi, asked whether the U.S. Navy would lend assistance if Japan threatened Indo-China. Roosevelt's reply (p. 421) was that "such a remote contingency . . . should not even be discussed at this time." Paradoxically, the President commented that the French and British were behaving like "scared rabbits" and opined that if the Anglo-American fleets ever did combine in the Far East it would be a "simple task" (p. 497) to dispose of the Japanese navy.

Roosevelt's "quarantine" speech made in 1937 prior to the Brussels Conference helped implant other misconceptions that the United States had sought sanctions against Japan but failed to win any response abroad. In fact Roosevelt never defined his term, and made no concrete proposals whatever. When the British eagerly inquired whether he would discuss actual "quarantine measures" (p. 408), Sumner Welles denied that the U.S. had any in mind. The Japanese were given similar assurances. When the American delegate at Brussels, himself confused, asked Hull for permission to exchange views on sanctions with other delegates empowered to discuss that subject, Hull irately forbade him to do so. With great difficulty Hull was then persuaded to

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withdraw his own demand that the Conference should draw up another milquetoast resolution merely to repeat some of the secretary's moralizing on the virtues of peace and "orderly processes."

Miss Borg's history reveals a negligible role for the armed forces in diplomatic decision. The contrast with today's omnipresent Pentagon and CIA officers at policy-making levels is striking. It would seem that the President and Hull made policy, period. Yet the restrictions imposed by internal political considerations would doubtless be underestimated if one relied on the diplomatic record alone. The national security budget was a fraction of the cost of the New York City administration of today; the nation was transfixed by mirages of peace through non-action; certain peace groups and isolationists (later, America Firsters) were a stubborn bloc against minimum preparedness and rearmament; and the average American was determined not to pull Britain's chestnuts from the fire nor die in defense of colonial empires. If Roosevelt himself did not fully share in such popular feelings, neither did he greatly risk his immense influence in order to educate the public in what might today be regarded as more realistic views.

Miss Borg's book lightly treats the attitude of business and banking interests toward the Far Eastern war. Hints are seen in the lack of success of Thomas Lamont in drumming up financial aid for China. Lamont (for Morgan) was warmly praised by Japan for his "non-interference," but actually he seems to have been closely in tune with State Department policy. Wall Street's indifference to China's fate no doubt matched illusions that one could do business, and perhaps better business, with a Japanese-controlled mainland, while increasing trade with Japan.

This record lends little weight to a popular notion that appeasement of Japan was nourished by official hopes that Japan planned to strike Russia. Tokyo embassy reports discounted that possibility from about 1935 onward, and with relief more evident than chagrin. Off-the-record departmental dialogues might yield a different emphasis. Yet the overwhelming truth seems to be that in the midst of a deep depression and conditions seemingly ideal for the emergence of mass followings for demagogues with solutions in terms of militarization and foreign adventures, the United States continued to reject the risks of war, even as a necessity of self-preservation, right down to the twilight before Pearl Harbor.

Miss Borg's excellent summary of her long book concludes (p. 544): "The degree of passivity which the United States government maintained is the feature of our record in the Far East in

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the mid-1930's that is most likely to seem astonishing in retrospect." Even a high political adviser gifted with rare prescience might not have altered that "passivity" one iota, yet it probably did not help that (p. 530) responsible American officials "seem frequently to have been unaware of even the major developments that were contributing to the ferment in China." (Excellent reports by some junior foreign-service field officers often revealed a closer knowledge of the inner dynamics rapidly changing China under the impact of war, but they do not appear to have been always assimilated higher up.) Miss Borg notes that the Sian Incident—which marked a dramatic change in internal Chinese political life and began a whole new destiny for China—was dismissed and misinterpreted by Messrs. Johnson and Hornbeck as a mere "gangster" action of old-fashioned warlords.

Elsewhere, there was no advice intimating the significance of the rapid rise of Chinese Communist power directly in proportion to the penetration of hinterland China by Japanese forces and the waning of Chiang Kai-shek's armies. In perhaps the shrewdest thought here attributed to him, Chiang Kai-shek (p. 460), explaining why he could not negotiate, told the German ambassador that his government would fall if he accepted Japan's terms "and the only result would be that the 'Reds' would gain the upper hand, in which case it would be impossible for the Japanese to make any peace, as the Communists would never capitulate." At about that date Ambassador Johnson was reporting (p. 478) that the Chinese "had reached the end of . . . effective resistance" and that "formal negotiations" (with implied surrender) were "only a matter of time."

Mr. Johnson's apparent failure to comprehend that the Japanese could never win a political decision in China (their ambitions being historically obsolete) was part of a broader American official failure to anticipate either the Chinese revolution or the inevitability of Japan's destruction of European colonial power—as well as a subsequent failure to absorb the full political meaning of that dissolution for the United States. Ideally, foreign policy should synthesize a maximum awareness of the probable future as a product of conditions past and present. Perfection in that respect is doubtless unattainable in the administration of practical politics. Yet it may be pertinent here to ask whether the same time lag or backwardness in bringing observation and policy into focus with changing political reality, which helped pave the road to Pearl Harbor, is not being compounded in today's policy of illusory search for military decisions in East Asia, foredoomed to failure because of an almost total absence of viable political means.

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If our society adequately rewarded achievement in the literature of history Miss Borg should win a decoration. Her book, with its solid bibliographical foundations, reflects patience, industry, discerning research and documentation, and the detachment and objectivity of high scholarship. She does not dramatize, but she quietly imparts cumulative interest to her narrative. By skillful selection, and without sacrifice of thoroughness, she avoids that tautology which so often makes works of this genre unreadable, while clarity and economy of expression keep her text continuously alive.

EDGAR SNOW

PARIS, FRANCE

America's Failure in China, 1941–1950. By TANG TSOU. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963.–xvii, 614 pp. $12.50.

How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941–1949. By ANTHONY KUBEK. Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1963.–xv, 480 pp. $8.75.

The period and the type of events considered by both these books is indicated in their titles, except that Professor Tsou gives brief consideration at the outset to the principles of the Open Door policy during the period prior to the one he considers at length. Both books unavoidably devote much space to a detailed narrative, covering ground that is already well worked in the existing literature. From the standpoint of political science, the narrative content is less worth remarking than the analytical concepts employed by the authors.

Considering how much has been written and said about American policy toward China, the reader who picks up a new book on the subject has no high expectations of finding something fresh and novel. In Professor Tsou's book, it comes as a pleasant surprise to find exactly that. The sources of freshness are in the author's intellectual qualities and approach rather than in the data. He proceeds from a consistent *realpolitik* position and concentrates, with the aid of explicitly defined concepts, on analyzing the decision-making process. He can, therefore, envisage as possible in a given situation several alternative policies. The questions asked then are how was a particular decision arrived at, what was the relation of policy to "objective conditions," and how was policy implemented. Of the several policies followed by the United States during the period under study, Tsou pays par-

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ticular attention to the attemps to make China a great power, to bring about a united and democratic China, and to practice limited assistance to the Kuomintang.

The richness of Tsou's analysis can only be briefly indicated in a short review. One of his major concerns is the relation of means to ends in the policy-making process. In several instances he finds that the determination of ends in American policy was undesirably restricted by some prior assumptions regarding means. In other instances the relation was contradictory. A general conclusion that emerges is that unwillingness to use military power combined with unwillingness to abandon ambitious goals stands out as the most crucial part of the pattern of American policy. Tsou also gives much attention to the effect of cultural predispositions on perceptions of the situation, especially as these led to mistaken estimates of Chinese internal politics and to inappropriate interpretations of the roles of democracy and communism in Chinese society.

One may not wish to accept all of Professor Tsou's analysis without reservations. As one instance, his evaluation of the American liberal temper of the nineteen-thirties and forties seems to this reviewer much more subtle than the phenomenon itself was. At the very least, one has to credit Tsou with the most comprehensive and many-sided analysis of his subject yet made and with a method of analysis that is not bound by its data but that could be applied to other historical situations besides the Sino-American relationship.

In comparison, Professor Kubek's analysis of the same events seems rather narrow. He attempts something Tsou specifically disavows, namely, to trace individual responsibility for specific decisions and to explain decisions in terms of personal motives. Since he is dealing with policies whose outcome is known to have been unfortunate, this becomes an exercise in fixing blame. One cannot help being impressed with Professor Kubek's industry, as shown in the extensive documentation he supplies in support of his thesis. Nevertheless, one must also record that his model of the political process is extremely simple and suggests very little that would contribute to the elucidation of the decision-making process in other historical contexts.

Any book dealing with the material these deal with is bound to be a study of the sources of error in policy-making. Tsou finds these on a number of levels. In some important instances, he traces them to inherent features of the system within which the function is performed. Kubek locates the sources of error in individual infirmities. Both authors in a sense imply that per-

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fection in the making of policy is attainable. As to how it can be attained, Tsou's prescription is by far the more complex.

A. M. HALPERN

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan. By FREDERICK S. DUNN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.—xviii, 210 pp. $5.00.

As an analytical case study of decision-making in foreign affairs, Professor Dunn's posthumously published work complements Bernard C. Cohen's *The Political Process and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1957). While Cohen's work describes the making of the Japanese peace settlement in terms of domestic American politics, Dunn's work discusses the peacemaking primarily in terms of international politics. Nevertheless, Professor Dunn takes a broad view of his topic and lays considerable emphasis upon such internal factors as American policy toward China, the influence of John Foster Dulles, the dismissal of General MacArthur, and the shift from American isolationist and pacifist thinking to the concepts of *Realpolitik*. Less attention is given to internal factors determining the policies of America's allies during the period covered. Although the author feels that it was unfortunate that Dulles failed to visit India during the course of negotiations, Professor Dunn places a high evaluation on Dulles' work. The author recounts Dulles' early tentatives to obtain a security pact for the Pacific area comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty, and how, instead, the ANZUS alliance and bilateral United States–Philippines and United States–Japan pacts were negotiated, largely because our wartime Pacific allies were more afraid of a revival of Japanese militarism than of Communism. The economic and strategic factors of the settlement are adequately treated, full account being taken of the increasing significance of Communist China and of nuclear strategy.

Professor Dunn holds that if any one event was the turning point in America's postwar planning toward Japan, it was a National Security Council decision of November 1948. With that decision, he asserts, the policy of a punitive peace with Japan gave way to a policy of strengthening Japan so that it would be stable and friendly toward the United States. This reorientation of policy embodied recommendations made by George F. Kennan of the State Department Policy Planning Staff in 1947.

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This reviewer would have liked to see a few more footnotes, a bibliography, and a copy of the Japanese peace treaty in an appendix. The Potsdam papers, published by the State Department in 1962, are not specifically referred to, although the author had unusual access to classified materials in the department.

Although Professor Dunn is careful to present various points of view, it is clear that in the main he approves of American policy toward Japan. He eschews minutiae and paints with broad strokes. He has done an admirable job of making a complicated period in diplomatic history comprehensible. Notwithstanding its brevity, this penetrating analysis will doubtless remain the definitive work on the subject for some years to come.

THEODORE MCNELLY

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process. By DAVID BRAYBROOKE and CHARLES E. LINDBLOM. Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press of Glencoe, and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1963.—ix, 268 pp. $5.95.

How do we and how should we form social decisions, choices among alternative policies? An ideal method, to which the authors give the name "synoptic" has emerged in much discussion, mostly at a highly theoretical plane but also in more applied contexts. It is Bentham's felicific calculus, to which successive generations of social scientists, most especially economists, have added their refinements and clarifications. We consider a wide range of logically possible consequences of our policy choices; society, it is assumed, can value any set of consequences (taking account of all complementarities and rivalries among consequences in different fields). Then, in comparing any two policies, we consider all the consequences of each and prefer the one whose consequences, taken as a whole, are valued more highly. In any given situation, we have a range of alternative policies which are feasible at the moment, that is, compatible with the resources available to society and with its technological knowledge. Among these we choose the policy which is preferred to all other feasible ones.

The authors of the present volume, a philosopher and an economist, object strongly to this synoptic decision procedure as being neither a description of actual procedures nor an ideal. At the risk of oversimplification, their objections may be classified under three headings: (1) calculation, (2) uncertainty, and (3) interpersonal consensus.

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(1) The term "calculation" is used in the widest possible sense; the collection of data, the development of logical inferences, the formulation and solution of relations, as well as sheer numerical computation, are all subsumed. Now, as the authors dramatically make clear, the execution of the synoptic ideal for policy-making involves an impossible amount of calculation. (This impossibility, I may add, is not merely a question of the quality and quantity of calculating machines, though this consideration is by no means negligible. It is ultimately a difficulty in our ability to describe the world in a fixed finite linguistic structure.) We *cannot* carry through the synoptic program; we cannot write down our valuation structure once and for all, we cannot describe all the consequences of a given policy, and we cannot list or exhaustively classify the whole range of possible alternative policies.

(2) We are uncertain as to the consequences of our actions and even as to the valuations we assign to their consequences. In addition to the obvious increased difficulty in choosing among alternative social policies, the presence of uncertainty makes worthy of consideration two new dimensions of action, flexibility, which is the postponement of commitment until more information is available, and the gathering of information.

It may be worth remarking, though the authors do not, that from a purely formal point of view, the presence of uncertainty does not destroy the synoptic ideal. Consequences of policies are now described by probability distributions rather than single values, and, as noted, the range of alternative policies is increased; but there is, strictly speaking, no qualitative change in the social decision problem. It must be agreed, though, that the increased complexity of the description of consequences and the greater range of choices put greatly added strain on the calculability of optimal policies; and to the problem of stating one's values must be added that of stating in detail one's beliefs about the probabilities of different possible outcomes.

(3) Even if any individual could adequately calculate his optimal choice among the available alternatives, despite all these complexities, there would still remain the problem, in a social situation, of reconciling the choices of different individuals. Each has his own personal interests, his own views of the social interest, and his own assessments of uncertainties. The formulation of a social welfare function requires in some way or another an interpersonal comparison of preference intensities; though both election systems and the workings of the market seek this end, neither is free from obvious objections and paradoxes.

These points, with perhaps different emphases, summarize the

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authors' objections to the synoptic ideal for social decision-making. In its place, they propose a procedure, given by them the not altogether felicitous name of the "strategy of disjointed incrementalism." It is not easy to give a simple statement of their strategy, since, by its nature, it is intended to be flexible and adaptable to differing situations. Their crispest single characterization of the strategy speaks of its being, "incremental, exploratory, serial, and marked by adjustment of ends to means." A problem for some reason comes within the ken of social discussion. The proposals for meeting it are to be confined to relatively small alterations in the existing order, so that the knowledge of consequences may be as great as possible and the computational difficulties, in the most general sense, be minimized. The unattainable goal of listing all the consequences is abandoned; the unforeseen consequences are left to be discovered in the actual working out of the adopted policy and to be corrected, if need be, by subsequent actions. Even the criteria by which the alternative policies are to be judged are modified in the course of discussion; impossible requirements are dropped, only those ends compatible with the available means being retained.

The theme indicated by the book's subtitle recurs persistently throughout the book, though it is never given systematic development. One of the virtues of abandoning a preconceived synoptic choice criterion is to leave an opening for the creative impulses of individuals; "fluid themes invite, as settled rules do not, exploratory responses." To this end, the social conflict of interests and desires acts as a vital prod in sharpening and deepening the quality of social argumentation; it is not the judgment of the impartial observer, using maximum information in accordance with a well-defined value system, but the conflict of partial, self-interested, and therefore highly motivated contestants from which the best social decisions will come. Indeed, the authors have restated, for social decisions in general, the adversary theory of the law; and Karl Popper has emphasized that even pure science is a social enterprise, whose dynamics are to be found much more in individual motivation than in the stereotype of knowledge for its own sake.

I omit here, for reasons of space, the lengthy discussion in the latter part of the book on the implications of the strategy of disjointed incrementalism for utilitarian ethics; some useful distinctions are made among types of moral judgments, but I feel that the authors are somewhat too ready to yield to the anti-utilitarian assertion of overriding uncompromiseable judgments.

What have we learned from this book? The authors' main thesis is surely correct; we are creatures of limited ability, and

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grand overall optimization is beyond our powers. We must proceed step by step, and it is a reassurance that our ability to commit the future is limited, so that our unforeseen errors can to a major extent be left for correction by our successors.

But the lesson may be too comforting. We can make decisions which will be difficult to undo. Further, as we know, there are many cases in which small steps are pointless; changing an urban environment may be meaningless on a small scale and impossible without simultaneous alterations in transportation systems. Indeed, one example given by the authors may give one pause; they quote Meyerson and Banfield as arguing against systematic investigations of alternatives and of consequences in public housing, the grounds being the extreme cost of the information required. It would have needed "more of a staff certainly than it would be reasonable to expect the [Chicago Housing] Authority to employ." Now slum clearance and public housing are extremely costly, and their consequences are with us for long periods of time. It is certainly widely argued that the consequences of actual public housing have been far from ideal. Has sufficient attention been paid to those actually displaced by the clearance? Or do we not have in fact a tendency to beautify neighborhoods and provide housing beyond the reach of the very poor, developments beneficial to the articulate middle class, no doubt, but not to those whose poverty and degradation are used to justify the use of public resources? A synoptic ideal would at least force the attention of decision-makers on as many relevant factors as social scientists, even with our present highly imperfect knowledge, can see as significantly relevant. A "strategic" approach, relying heavily on self-interest for the production of arguments, can all too easily suppress the claims of the inarticulate and the ignorant. It is precisely the function of the social theorist to point out the unsuspected connection, the interests and implications not apparent on the surface. The synoptic demand for as careful a listing of alternatives and consequences as is possible imposes a criterion of objectivity on social discussion which a wholehearted acceptance of the strategy of disjointed incrementalism would deny.

In short, I would argue that in any given problem area, we should create as well as we can a closed system of values and facts and act as if it were more or less the whole truth. In reality, it will not be, and in time we will know it not to be. Doubtless this realization will give rise to some caution in application of the results. Too, in the long perspective of history, this strategy, which I might call locally synoptic, will in fact be a series of incremental steps, and the authors could consider

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these views as a special case of theirs. But the spirit is different; the unattainable goal of the well-defined complete decision structure provides a better spur for clear and difficult thinking by the social scientist then does a complacent acceptance of our imperfections.

KENNETH J. ARROW

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

The Dawn of a New Age: Reflections on Science and Human Affairs. By EUGENE RABINOWITCH. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1963.—v, 332 pp. $6.95.

Two names, "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" and "Eugene Rabinowitch," have since September 1946 been in large measure synonymous. Born in St. Petersburg, Russia, the Research Professor of Botany in the University of Illinois since 1947 brought from the "Old World" to the relatively "New World" a Ph.D. (chemistry) from Berlin University and experience as assistant at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of physical chemistry in Berlin-Dahlem, assistant in physics at Göttingen, fellow of the Rask Gersted Foundation in the Royal Academy of Science, Copenhagen, University College, London, and also consultant to Imperial Chemical Industries there. Thence research associate, M.I.T., followed by the research professorship at Illinois. Quant suff?—of course not—senior chemist and section chief, Manhattan District project, Chicago. The other face of this citizen of the world is that of the first and continuing editor of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*—this since 1945. In the few remaining hours of his day he has been a devotee of the Pugwash movement from its inception through to its present duality, now named Coswa-Pugwash, the Conferences on Science and World Affairs.

The editor of the *Bulletin* has maintained a high standard of judgment of the articles accepted for publication from a galaxy of leading scientists, earnest and well informed authorities on the still indeterminate character of this "New Age." The *Bulletin* owes the fluid contours of its wide-ranging territory, and its integral coherence, to a rare combination of authoritative information and sensitive social responsibility in its distinguished contributors, and in particular in its dedicated editor.

The first and last sentences of the text in the book now under review say, respectively, "In 1962 mankind came close as never before to the abyss of a nuclear war" and "A Russian and an American astronaut flying together toward some cosmic objective would do more for the mutual understanding of the two nations

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than years of diplomatic wrangling. This day seems only a little less far out of sight now than it was a year ago."

In this book, the author has gathered into four parts thirty articles, all save three having been published previously. The text begins with a one-page "exhortation" which followed his contribution, "The Whole before the Parts," to the London Coswa-Pugwash conference of September 1962. This humanist manifesto calls for

> the rebellion of mankind against a system which sets parts of it against each other . . . against rulers who . . . put the interests and ideals of the fraction of humanity, over which they rule, above the interests of mankind as a whole and above the moral duties all men owe to it. . . . Man owes his highest and overriding loyalty to mankind, not to any of its parts . . . scientists should be the first to join this movement for survival and rebirth of mankind.

Part I of the main text, entitled "Looking Ahead," is prefaced with the warning that

> science and technology are changing before our eyes the very conditions of human existence . . . that, if the art of politics is the art of foreseeing the future . . . this art now requires a growing understanding of the meaning and direction of scientific and technological change. . . . These articles represent an attempt to deal with political situations with as much objectivity, and as little wishful thinking, as scientific training has made it possible . . . to use, as far as possible, a quantitative instead of the qualitative approach common to most political writing.

A previously unpublished exercise in forecasting, "Things to Come—Then (1939–41)" was written in two sections, one on the day of the German invasion of Poland, September 1, 1939, the second in May 1941, after the fall of France and the Battle of Britain. "Reading this piece strengthens my belief that viewing approaching world events with some of the detachment to which the study of science has accustomed one helps to avoid errors into which partisanship often leads the most astute political leaders and observers." A few days after Hitler came to power the author made a bet with a Nazi that war would come in seven years; it came six months short of seven years. This reviewer will comment here on only one part of the forecast: "The cities of Germany and England will by that time [1943] be utterly devastated." This was not a very excessive forecast for Germany; it was, fortunately, grossly over-pessimistic for Great Britain. The other forecast, that "by 1943" North Africa would be in American hands, was not very generous to the British allies,

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from the important victory at El Alamein, October 23, 1942, to the simultaneous landings, British and American, east and west of Algiers.

Part I comprises articles "having in common the intent of looking into the future, to foresee the shape of things to come." Part II is devoted to "Taking Stock," retrospectively, of "what has really happened." Part III, "Talking With World Scientists," opens with an affirmation that "scientists of the world form a single community, speaking a common language, following a common code of procedure. This community embraces scientists from the Communist East as well as those from the libertarian West." The fourth and last Part, "Heretical Thoughts," opens with the charge that

> in the past, nations have been governed by soldiers (such as Caesar), philosophers (such as Marcus Aurelius), churchmen (as Richelieu), historians (such as Thiers), or even artists (such as Paderewski), but never by men trained in natural science. Benjamin Franklin is the rare example of a man of scientific background who has acquired at least a certain prominence in his country's political affairs.

What is a lapsed physicist and a belatedly amateur sociologist and Pugwash addict to do in reviewing the thoughts, anxieties, and wisdoms of the near-twenty-year helmsman of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*? Perhaps no better than to quote some of the passages which this reader had marked or underlined as stirring agreement in his own mind—less frequently as rousing disagreement.

For example:

"We must not delay convincing first ourselves, then our leaders and our people, of the absolute necessity for ending the political fragmentation of mankind."

"The first and main order of international business is to reduce the conflict of interests between the great powers and to replace it by a growing partnership."

"Most of the [Franck] Report was written by me; but the emphasis on the use (or rather non-use) of the bomb in Japan, which has given the report its main historic significance, was due to James Franck and Leo Szilard. . . . The Franck Report was lost somewhere in the higher echelons in Washington. Only vague references to it are found in the memoirs of the then Secretary of War."

"The best possible atmosphere for the achievement of an international agreement could be established if America could say to the world, 'You see what sort of a weapon we had but did not use.' Much more favorable conditions for the eventual achieve-

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ment of such an agreement could be created if nuclear bombs were first revealed to the world by a demonstration in an appropriately selected uninhibited area."

"If there is to be a successful crusade, it must be one in search of the Holy Grail and not for the destruction of Carthage!"

"American leadership has permitted the traditional admiration for America as the land of all parties and opinions to be wiped out by permitting interference with the individual freedoms and the right of dissent in America far in excess—people in Europe believe—of all rational requirements of national security."

The near-to-random samples extracted from the earlier sections of these wide-ranging studies lead to Part IV, "Heretical Thoughts." To those who have the privilege of knowing the author personally it will be clear that the heresies there set down are, in fact, among his most cherished beliefs and aspirations—the title of the section is bait to ensure the attention of the orthodox to the quasi-heresies.

Eugene Rabinowitch has given us the kind of book that one can read with pleasure and profit from end to beginning, or vice versa.

SIR ROBERT WATSON-WATT

TUXEDO, NEW YORK

The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. By GABRIEL ALMOND and SIDNEY VERBA. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1963.—xii, 562 pp. $8.50.

World attention to the dilemmas posed by national development and modernization has fortified our interest in the stability of political process as nation-states struggle toward industrial maturity. *The Civic Culture* is a noteworthy addition to a growing literature on the conditions of stable democratic government. It focuses on a critical but elusive class of conditions: the cognitive and affective orientations of mass populations toward their polities. The authors see such patterns of belief as defining the grass-roots "political culture" of a nation.

The book is at the same time a theory of political culture, so defined, and a report on an ambitious venture in comparative research which attempts to measure and compare patterns of political culture across five nations. While no summary does justice to the texture of the theory itself, in effect three types of

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political man-on-the-street are sketched. These include the *parochial,* whose awareness of his broader polity is simply dim, and whose orientation toward it is little more than a zero-state; the *subject,* who has developed some awareness of the larger national polity, yet who assumes that he is primarily expected to obey its dictates, rather than to contribute guidance or influence; and the *citizen,* whose awareness of the polity is detailed, and who grants it abiding allegiance while feeling expected and competent to influence the on-going political process in policy directions that he deems desirable.

Of course no populace is made up homogeneously of any one of these types. The key question, the authors argue, is the relative mixture of the three types in a given national population, and, where political stability is concerned, the nature of the fit between the population mixture and the type of government. Democracy, it goes without saying, sits most comfortably on the participant culture which boasts a substantial admixture of citizens, as opposed to subjects or parochials.

The empirical data assessed in this framework are drawn from sample survey interviews conducted as comparably as possible over the adult populations of the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. The grossest results tend to follow the expected lines, with participating citizens most numerous (although still a minority) in the stable polities of the United States and Britain, and becoming increasingly outnumbered by subjects and parochials as one moves down the ladder of national development. Fully as intriguing are the varying patterns of civic "lacks" which emerge in the data for the three less stable democracies. In well educated Germany, for example, all of the cognitive skills of participant citizenship are well developed, but the populace tends to refrain from either emotional commitment to the system or strong participant contribution. The "aspirational" culture of Mexico, on the other hand, is marked by high and generally favorable emotional commitment to the polity, but with cognitive skills so impoverished that actual participation in the political process is extremely feeble.

The link between these differential patterns and national political history—the Nazi experience in Germany and the lingering aspirations of the Mexican Revolution, for example—seems obvious. In addition, the study attempts to trace roots of the general political orientations to socialization experience in the family, school systems, and work situations. Other provocative aspects of the data include high levels of interpersonal trust evinced in the Anglo-Saxon democracies, a type of social and political capital lacking in the same measure in the less advanced

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nations; and the strong effects of education in promoting most of the "healthy" political orientations surveyed.

As with any important book, *The Civic Culture* remains open to criticism on a number of counts. Its theoretical aspirations considerably outrun the materials available for close examination, since the five nations studied represent a greatly truncated portion of the total range of political development to which the theory is addressed. Where the dynamics of the developing participant culture are concerned, the book raises fully as many questions as it answers, a matter which the authors are frank to recognize. The data available are analyzed in a relatively routine and cursory fashion.

Criticisms of this order, while more or less true, seem to me to be thoroughly dwarfed by the achievements which the book does represent. If the data appear incompletely analyzed, it is in part an optical illusion created by the great wealth of comparative material which the project as a whole has produced, a wealth which the authors incidentally have been generous enough to throw open to all scholars with more specialized queries. To say that the project might have been pushed farther than it was (to a more fitting range of countries, or to a more intensive dynamic analysis) seems an ungracious way of recognizing how germinal a book—and project—have been provided here. Certainly one of the key accomplishments is the success in objectifying some of the "flavor" of differences in political culture which, like Mark Twain's weather, everyone has talked vaguely about but nobody has done much about in a systematic way. Some mode of measuring these differences is a first step toward broader and more longitudinal studies designed to illuminate many of those questions which the current project, as a first candle in this particular patch of darkness, cannot. To my mind, both for what the book achieves and the guideposts left for the future, *The Civic Culture* is a contemporary classic.

PHILIP E. CONVERSE

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Medieval History: The Life and Death of a Civilization. By NORMAN F. CANTOR. New York, Macmillan, 1963.—xi, 622 pp. 8.50.

This is the best textbook on medieval history to appear in English in the last two or three decades. It has all of the virtues of this (justly) maligned form of American scholarly writing, which is to say that it is full of facts, comprehensive in its range,

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and respectful of the latest technical scholarship in the many areas of study over which it ranges. But it has managed to rise above most of the vices of the textbook form, by which I mean that it is literate, intellectually cosmopolitan, and (*mirabile dictu*) has a manifestly stated, rather than surreptitiously inserted, point of view. Cantor is aware that the facts do not present themselves in virginal simplicity to their naive beholder but are in fact presented to him as constellations or groupings of data which derive their form from traditions of historiographical interpretation which can be distinguished on national, philosophical, and temporal lines. Accordingly, his narrative proceeds on two levels. On the one hand he confronts the documentary record of medieval civilization in all its variety and complexity; on the other hand he informs his readers before, during, and after his own organization of the materials of alternative ways of organizing them. Thus we always know what has been omitted from his particular generalization as well as what has been included, which heightens rather than diminishes the authority of his judgments.

The principal value of this book is not to be found in the over-arching "philosophy of history" which provides the connecting links between the major sections, but in the series of middle-range generalizations about specific aspects of the total cultural endowment of medieval man. Cantor's analysis of the conflict between classical *scientia* and Christian *sapientia* during the fourth century A.D. (an analysis which owes much to the unjustly neglected genius of C. N. Cochrane, to whom the author pays warm tribute) is sensitive, clear, and judicious. So too is his discussion of the conflict between *mundus* and *ecclesia* in the eighth and ninth centuries. In both of these critical sections he carefully isolates the components of the medieval cultural inheritance, explicates the elements within them which are antagonistic to or complementary of each other, and then carefully and realistically outlines the convergence of social, political, and economic forces which allowed for a temporary balance or synthesis of opposed elements in the culture during the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. He then proceeds to study the factors which produced tensions and strains in the world-and-life-view thus achieved, shows how these tensions and strains escaped the bounds of the intellectual and moral order originally improvised to contain them in harmonious interrelationship, and how, finally, the civilization as a whole succumbed to the "death wish" and willed its own dissolution.

The model which Cantor uses to organize his reflections on the breakup of European society in the Middle Ages is the hu-

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man organism provided with a specific cultural endowment (classical learning and Christian pietism) and confronted by a number of technical problems which that endowment had to contain and solve. He sees the eighth and ninth centuries as a period of pragmatic resolution of the more pressing vital needs of the culture, as a period of "take off"—both economic and cultural—to use Rostow's phrase. He then interprets the Investiture Period as the axial age in the crisis of identity of this culture *cum* human organism. At this time, the moral endowment of the culture reasserted itself and harnessed to its own purposes the raw power reflected in population growth, economic revival and innovation, and the embryonic power state. During this period, Europe "had to face up to the fundamental problem of whether the consequences of learning, piety, and power could be reconciled with one another, or whether their conflicting impulses would not undermine and destroy the unity and stability of medieval civilization" (p. 289). The triumph of the Papacy in the early twelfth century laid the foundations for a final flowering of Christian culture in the thirteenth century. Europe, dominated by the aims and programs of Pope Innocent III, found a temporary respite from the potentially destructive conflict between *ethos* and *kratos,* culture and politics, which allowed the final flowering reflected in the life of the towns, Gothic architecture, and Scholasticism.

By 1270, however, the creative possibilities of the classical-Christian synthesis were exhausted, and the synthesis gave way to a new age of violence, which was "no longer the individual brutality of the early middle ages but a new, more sophisticated, corporate violence carried out by state against state and by the state against the church" (p. 290). The series of shocks suffered by late thirteenth-century civilization—its manifest incapacity to dispose of certain heresies, the definitive failure of the crusading movement, the unleashing of an ethic of self-interest as reflected in new economic and political practices—resulted in a loss of nerve, progressive disintegration, and the substitution of repressive measures for the charisma which had once sustained the creative elites in *mundus* and *ecclesia.* The excessive repressiveness of late medieval institutions and ideas resulted in a universal rebellion of the collective unconscious and a release of aggressive instincts against the hitherto successful sublimative powers of Eros. Politics triumphed over culture and succumbed to the death wish, "as is the case with the neurosis of individuals" (p. 547). In short, the very complexity, subtlety, and intricacy of the medieval synthesis became the nagging irritant which required a search for a new point of departure for the organization

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of society. The fourteenth century, then, was a period of unbridled expression of rebellion against conventional morality, a "violation of all standards of decency and honesty" which "corrupted the moral basis of social life and induced men to be completely self-seeking and brutal . . ." (p. 571). And it was this triumph of politics over culture, of Thanatos over Eros, which led to a quest for a new ethic manifested in the cultural flowering of the Renaissance and the religious revivals of the Reformation. In the end, Cantor tells us, "European society had to learn that unrestrained power is self-destructive, for no society can long endure the absence of some moral order without descending into chaos and despair" (p. 571).

It might be argued that Cantor, in opting for both a Freudian model for analytical purposes and a stance on behalf of "values," is trying to have it both ways. As a Freudian, he is allowed to believe that civilizations, like individuals, can so constitute themselves as to effectively deny the deepest impulses emanating from the unconscious and thus generate those tensions which eventuate in the desire to be quit of life altogether. But he is not allowed to endow any specific moral order, or even the moral order in general, with some special value, since on Freudian presuppositions the moral order is nothing but the sum total of abandoned object-choices which have been assimilated to the id as ego and superego by identification. The Freudian must hold that the moral order is necessarily and inevitably repressive and must ultimately result in that kind of rebellion which Cantor designates as the death wish. And it should be noted that whereas individuals do in fact die and are thus relieved of the burdens which civilizations impose upon them as repressions, civilizations themselves do not die so much as change into other civilizations, from "medieval" into "modern" ones, for example. And this change is, in Freudian terms, nothing but a process in which a culture redisposes assimilated object-choices which are found to be incompatible within the given ego-ideal. It would then follow that the rebellion of the aggressive instincts against the moral order is a sign of health rather than sickness; a necessary preliminary to a new cultural life, rather than a manifestation of the will to death. In sum, whereas the death wish or aggression may be fatal to the finite individual, in a civilization as a whole it must be seen as a demand for a re-disposition of contradictory contents in the collective ego-ideal. The lesson to be learned from Cantor's study, if he (and Freud) are correct, is not, as he supposes, that "no society can long endure the absence of some moral order without descending into chaos and despair," but that periodic rebellions against the moral order are both inevitable

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and desirable from the standpoint of human life in general. For only by such rebellions can humanity replenish itself and provide alternative, temporarily satisfactory repressive systems adequate to the exigencies of reality on the one hand and the deepest, amoral, and ineluctable impulses of the species on the other.

HAYDEN V. WHITE

UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

The Association, British Extraparliamentary Political Organization, 1769–1793. By EUGENE CHARLTON BLACK. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963.—344 pp. $6.75.

This book deals with political associations in the United Kingdom outside the official government from 1769 to 1793. The author is careful to point out in his first paragraph that such associations date back at least to the Magna Charta and he lists eighteenth-century examples as late as the Protestant Association of 1745. The importance of the organizations treated lies in the fact that "Modern extraparliamentary political organization is a product of the late eighteenth century" (p. 279). Mr. Black cites the influence on significant legislation in the early nineteenth century of the Anti-Slave Trade Association, the political unions of 1832, the Abolition Society, O'Connell's Catholic Association, and the Anti-Corn Law League. Not all associations of the late eighteenth century, however, are covered in this work.

The titles of the seven chapters indicate the associations included: I, A Tentative Beginning; II, The Associated Counties; III, The Yorkshire Association, Quintuple Alliance and Pittite Reform, 1782–1785; IV, The Children of Darkness, The Protestant Association; V, The Children of Light, The Society for Constitutional Information; VI, Reformers and Revolutionaries; and VII, John Reeves and the Defense of the Constitution. Of these seven chapters five are devoted to some form of attack on the state of representation in the House of Commons or on the part played by the crown in the government; chapter four deals with a pressure group attempting to force Parliament to reverse concessions made to Catholics; and chapter seven describes the tactics employed by an association formed to defend the Constitution against other associations who wished to reform it.

Mr. Black traces the attempts of three groups to bring about the reforms in the Constitution which each felt to be necessary. The first group was made up of the territorial magnates who fought in Parliament for greater power at the expense of the crown. The second group, composed largely of metropolitan

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idealogues and radical politicians, wanted all men to have full civil liberties and to share in the national government. The third group, led by Wyvill from 1779–85, sought a modest parliamentary reform which would restore political power to the propertied middle class. The author concludes: "From 1779 to 1832 these same groups, however they might label themselves at any particular time, conducted a running struggle against each other and for public support. Whenever two of the groups joined forces, the third was subdued, although never quiescent. The union of all three, reinforced by vast social and economic changes, produced the Reform Act" (p. 34).

Thus most of this book is devoted to the motives, techniques, and accomplishments of various associations from 1769 to 1793. It may seem strange, in view of the preceding quotation, that the author should end this monograph in 1793 when the reform movement began its most forlorn years. Evidently the explanation is to be found in the first sentence of the Epilogue: "On the day that John Reeves organized one association to slay others, he riveted the institution to the British scene" (p. 275).

The reviewer feels that in few if any periods of British history have so many worthwhile monographs been published recently as on the reform movements from 1769 to 1793. This is due not only to the calibre of the scholars in the field, but to the fact that so much new material has become available since World War II to which scholars earlier did not have access. One of the most valuable features of this monograph is the narrative on this source material in the bibliography. The secondary bibliography is full and valuable, although the approving comments on some of the works sound a trifle patronizing and condescending.

On the whole the author has been successful in carrying out his objectives and he has made a real contribution to the very interesting twenty-five-year period which he has covered. The reviewer, however, hopes that he will extend his research on associations to the years from 1793 to 1832 and show the part which they played in bringing about the Reform Bill of 1832; or that some other scholar will build on the foundations which Mr. Black has laid for the period from 1769 to 1793.

DONALD GROVE BARNES
WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

Recruits to Labour: The British Labour Party, 1914–1931. By CATHERINE ANN CLINE. Syracuse, N. Y., Syracuse University Press, 1963.—ix, 198 pp. $5.00.

Miss Cline has examined the careers and opinions of sixty-

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eight persons who were prominent converts to the British Labour party during or soon after World War I. Her purpose is two-fold: "to examine the reasons for the Labour Party's rapid growth in the years immediately following the war," and "to trace the converts' impact on the Labour Party's development during the decade following their entrance into the party." Her approach is impressionistic rather than statistical, and the criteria for inclusion of individuals in the study are rather loosely drawn. The author includes so late a convert as William Jowitt, who joined Labour only in 1929, as well as "a few young men who entered the Labour party directly after the university, and who were not, therefore, technically converts [but who] have been included because their Liberal or Conservative family backgrounds seemed to associate them with this group" (p. 5).

This approach might have led to a pretentious monograph, in which the "recruits" emerged as a coherent and homogeneous group, and their "impact" became the whole story of Labour in the nineteen-twenties; indeed, Miss Cline's sweeping subtitle raised fears that this might be the case. From this fate she has escaped by the old-fashioned virtues of modesty and honesty. The recruits were very diverse, and what they underwent was "less a conversion to the principles of the Labour party than a protest against the treatment of their respective causes by the leadership of the old parties" (p. 44). As for tracing their impact, "So successful were they in merging into the party that they ceased to be a group almost immediately, and were frequently to be found on opposite sides of issues under discussion within the party" (p. 131). The author recognizes, furthermore, the impossibility of determining how much of Labour's liberalism came from these particular ex-liberals and how much from the radical tradition in which the Labour party shared from the outset.

All of this makes for difficulty in maintaining a clear focus, and it must be admitted that the book oscillates uneasily between the study of certain specific individuals and their careers in the Labour party, and an analysis of the party's total behavior for a given period. The organization is mainly topical, with chapters on "The Recruits and Socialism" (by which the author means principally public ownership), fiscal policy, foreign policy, and intra-party conflict between 1924 and 1931. There are various interesting passages, describing how collective security found some thoroughgoing adherents in the Labour party for the first time in the mid-nineteen-twenties, or how Oswald Mosley and John Strachey dared challenge the dominance of fiscal orthodoxy as championed by Philip Snowden, in 1925. At the end of the book there are brief biographical sketches of all the

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sixty-eight recruits, a useful reference tool. Not the least commendable aspect of the book is its brevity, in an age when authors seem to grow more long-winded as readers grow more pressed for time. On the other hand there are a good many factual errors, for example: Lansdowne was never Prime Minister (p. 17), Labour party conferences had called for general adoption of socialization before 1918, in 1908 and 1909 (p. 25); Commander Kenworthy was no Colonel (p. 70); Noel-Baker was Henderson's Parliamentary Private Secretary, not Dalton's (p. 71); Jimmy Maxton was no proletarian, but the son of a headmaster and the holder of an M.A. degree himself (p. 104); Thomas Johnston never wrote a book called *My Story* (Chap. V, nn. 44 and 48); there was no general election in 1911 (p. 153); and not only Haldane but Henderson had Cabinet experience before the first Labour government (p. 160).

RICHARD W. LYMAN

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Alliance Against Hitler: The Origins of the Franco-Soviet Pact. By WILLIAM EVANS SCOTT. Durham, No. Carolina, Duke University Press, 1962.—ix, 296 pp. $7.50.

This volume undertakes an examination of the diplomatic relations between France and the Soviet Union during the period between the beginning of rapprochement in 1931 and the signing of the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance in May 1935. The pact itself was of little consequence, as shown by the events of 1936; however, the years concerned are of great importance. They are crucial not only to the diplomatic history of the prewar period but also to an understanding of the formulation and motivation of Soviet foreign policy during that era.

Professor Scott attempts to utilize the existing evidence to illustrate the motivations of both governments that led to the abortive alliance and to demonstrate the relationship between domestic and foreign affairs. He promises in the preface that "the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy is one of the richest aspects of this inquiry." It is on this basis that the book should be judged and it is precisely here that it has failed. For while the author has clearly and thoroughly traced the varying fortunes of the proposed alliance through the dizzying labyrinth of French politics, he has made no effort to offer a corresponding analysis of Soviet affairs. In fact, *Alliance Against Hitler* is a study of French policy from 1931 to 1935 with only incidental references to the Soviet scene. As such, it

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cannot be considered to be a definitive examination of the Franco-Soviet Pact.

French developments are analyzed extensively and convincingly. The inability of France to mobilize a stable government, much less a forceful public opinion; the impact of Hitler's rise on various segments of the French political community; the irony of a rapprochement initiated by a conservative government and a treaty concluded by Laval, its most notable opponent—all these factors emerge vividly. But one wonders what was taking place in the other country. Behind the more obvious economic transformation (though this was certainly part of the process), Soviet Russia was preparing to undergo a political metamorphosis strikingly similar to that which was occurring in Hitler's Germany. The theory of a supreme leader was being institutionalized. Seen in this light, the Franco-Soviet Treaty of 1935 was probably the last major diplomatic success of pre-Stalinist Russia.

It is only very recently that Western scholarship has attempted to cope with the fact that Stalin did not acquire autocratic control of Soviet foreign policy at the time of his political victory over the Right Opposition in 1929. An ideological resistance lingered on. And it is here that Professor Scott's assumption "that it was Stalin who made or approved the significant decisions of foreign policy" (p. 4) has led him to an inadequate portrayal of the motivations and formulation of Soviet policy.

Though the evidence is far from complete, it would seem to indicate that by 1933–34 a group of high party figures had agreed in opposition to Stalin's domestic and foreign policies. The latter aspect of this opposition involved a radically different interpretation of fascism from the one Stalin had advocated since 1928. In that year, the Comintern had adopted a line positing the Social Democrats as the primary enemy, thereby allowing for an occasional collaboration between the German Communist party and the National Socialist party. (This certainly aided Hitler's cause, a point Professor Scott does not develop.) The Comintern's line was predicated on the argument that fascism represented a decay of bourgeois capitalism and that its success would inaugurate a revolutionary situation. The opposing view, that fascism was a new phenomenon equally dangerous to socialism, had been defeated in 1929 along with its main spokesman, Nicolai Bukharin. The excesses and failures of Stalin's policies between 1928 and 1933–34 had revived sympathy for this interpretation and given extra impetus to Litvinov's attempts to come to terms with the Western democracies. Thus the relative success or failure of the Franco-Soviet Pact was

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destined to play a role in the intra-party dispute. It is no accident that the reoccupation of the Rhineland was followed shortly by Stalin's first extensive preparations for the Great Purges.

Professor Scott is aware that different opinions on foreign policy (p. 198) existed within the Communist party. He appears, however, to be unaware of the extent of those differences and of the fact that Stalin was deeply involved. He is certainly correct in pointing out that it was "the appointment of Adolf Hitler that gave the Franco-Soviet rapprochement real drive" (p. 256). But, as indicated above, the statement that "for the first time the Russians became afraid of Germany" (p. 256) is misleading in its simplicity. Saner voices had spoken even before Hitler's ascendancy. Now they emerged from eclipse only to disappear forever.

STEPHEN F. COHEN

NEW YORK CITY

The Fall of the House of Habsburg. By EDWARD CRANKSHAW, New York, The Viking Press, 1963.—xi, 459 pp. $7.50.

The author of this widely read volume refers in the preface to the historiography of his subject as follows: "By dismissing the last phases of this extraordinary institution as being unworthy of serious contemplation we dismiss at the same time a considerable sector of our own past . . ." and he adds, "There has been overflowing sympathy for the various peoples of the Empire, but little, if any, for the rulers who tried to hold them together. . . ." This view might have been arguable in 1920 at the height of the post-revolutionary development. Written in 1963, when whole series of volumes dealing with various aspects of the disintegration of the Habsburg empire and in particular biographies of Francis Joseph have been published in the West, this statement means the crashing of open doors. Perhaps it can be understood by the fact that Mr. Crankshaw is an amateur to the historical profession, as he admits modestly.

Yet, though an amateur, he is also a writer of frequently proven journalistic skill, keen powers of observation, and judgment. On the strength of these highly creditable facts and on the basis of perhaps unnecessarily limited resources, he has written an attractive survey of the decline of the Habsburg empire from the accession of Francis Joseph to 1918. In general it is a very well written, highly personalized account with rather definite views, such as the playing down of the national prob-

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lem as chief cause for the fall of the empire and strong emphasis on the responsibility of Germany and the Western powers from outside and of the Magyars from inside the monarchy. Some of these opinions surely could be challenged to a point, but in essence they are well argued and, above all, they are argued in a way which makes this book never dull.

Unfortunately this aim is accomplished by resort to methods which are frequently subject to criticism, such as undue stress on conjectures on what might have occurred in the minds of Francis Joseph, Bismarck, Schwarzenberg, "instinctively" or "against . . . better instincts" (pp. 303, 304).

More serious is the author's tendency to make use of overstatements which frequently go to extremes. A few examples must suffice. One may justly take issue with Kossuth's intransigence in national questions, but to call him "to an uncanny degree . . . the forerunner of Hitler and Mussolini and all the tyrannous rabble of our own time" (p. 31) is patently absurd. Wide of the mark also seems the observation that the Habsburg rulers beginning with Emperor Francis "totally submitted" to the Church (p. 10). Regardless of their personal piety this simply does not gibe with the facts. Also amazing is the opinion that Count Taaffe, a moderately successful and in a limited sense well intentioned statesman, "did more than any man to help the oppressed" (pp. 271 f.). This reviewer holds no brief for Count Berchtold's policies, but the statement "that he never bothered to understand the memoranda issued over his own name, preferring to sign them automatically, then dash off to the races . . ." (p. 396) is contrary to facts as far as his tenure as minister of foreign affairs is concerned. Mr. Crankshaw, who has perused the *Nachlass* of the Heir Apparent Francis Ferdinand, should have read there the careful memoranda written in long hand, not just signed, by Berchtold. The assertion that Conrad's policy of preventive war against Serbia and Italy would have been fully justifiable in the face of an aggressive encirclement (a truly loose concept) (p. 369) seems to me equally questionable on moral and purely rational grounds.

In his tendency toward extreme and widely conjectural statements Crankshaw resembles A. J. P. Taylor. But while Crankshaw is more impartial than Taylor and certainly, and in my opinion rightly, more kindly disposed toward the monarchy, he is less knowledgeable. This is as unfortunate as it is in many ways unnecessary. The use of simple reference tools would have helped to avoid such mistakes as placing Ferdinand I in the seventeenth century (p. 8); speaking of the curbing of the Jesuit order under Joseph II (p. 10) after it was already dissolved by

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the Pope in 1774; referring to Francis I as emperor of Austria under the name of Francis II (p. 11); and having the Austrian and Hungarian Delegations meet, not only separately, but in different cities as well (p. 240). Mr. Crankshaw would not wittingly have used the derogatory German nationalist terminology and thus would not have referred to the flag of St. Pauls Church, of Weimar, and of Bonn as black-red-yellow instead of black-red-gold (pp. 42, 59). Elementary geographical errors such as the confounding of East Rumelia and "East Rumania" (p. 279) or the assumption that Montenegro, in 1913, was "an enclave in Bosnia-Hercegovina" (p. 375) could have been easily avoided.

Finally an author who looks with much understanding and sympathy at the semi-feudal colorful structure of imperial Austria should be better acquainted with the genealogy of the dynasty (p. 53, 106), should be aware of the differences between specific generals and field marshals, counts and princes, ambassadors and ministers, cardinals and auxiliary bishops (pp. 218, 219, 243, 344, 395, 431). Additional samples of flaws in the various categories adduced in this review could be listed, and all of them may appear picayune to Mr. Crankshaw. Unfortunately, it is impossible to take issue with the certainly more interesting larger issues raised by a perspicacious writer as long as the elementary faults of sometimes less than careful methods remain unchallenged. Nobody regrets this more than a reviewer who has as much regard for Mr. Crankshaw's values as for many of his intelligent and warmhearted conclusions.

ROBERT A. KANN

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

Diplomat Among Warriors. By ROBERT MURPHY. Garden City, N. J., Doubleday & Co., 1964.—x, 470 pp. $6.95.

Talleyrand said that language had been given to men in order to conceal their thoughts. He did not have the opportunity of studying the memoirs with which retired members of the diplomatic service distract their leisure or add to their pensions. They have language all right, in superfluity, and it has been given to them in order to conceal their lack of thoughts. Robert Murphy is high up in this class. His book is agreeably written, like being at sea on a calm day with the waves gently lapping and the sun shining—a book to cure the most hardened insomniac. Mr. Murphy was involved in great events, from the

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liberation of French North Africa onward. He was called on to take important, often controversial decisions. He took them unworried and now explains that he did not notice that there was anything controversial about them. This made him a loyal and efficient servant of the American government. President Roosevelt had policies, usually improvised at the last moment. Mr. Murphy carried them out, fortunately untroubled by the conflicting policies of the State Department.

His first period of importance set the pattern. Mr. Murphy prepared the way for the landings in North Africa. He was among those who recognized Darlan as the French authority. The recognition happened by accident. Roosevelt was determined to keep the future of France open. Darlan was on the spot. The French generals and admirals were unlikely to obey anyone else. This lack of policy was itself a policy. It closed the door against General de Gaulle, if this was unintentional, and thus strengthened de Gaulle's obstinate independence. Italy was treated in much the same way. Churchill had a policy: he wanted to sustain the monarchy. Others had a policy against the monarchy. Mr. Murphy and, for that matter, President Roosevelt had no policy one way or the other. They waited for something to turn up and were lucky that Italian democracy turned up in a sensible, reliable form.

This lack of policy is why Mr. Murphy, and not he alone, got on badly with the Russians. They tried to have a policy, though it rarely worked out successfully. In fact Mr. Murphy was soon attributing to them more policy than they had. He became convinced that they were seeking to spread Communism throughout Europe. He was among those who launched the cold war, which was Soviet policy, or supposed policy, in reverse. He repeats in his book the old lamentations that General Eisenhower did not march to Berlin in 1945. It is difficult to see what good this would have done, except possibly to secure clearer access to Berlin later. After the war Mr. Murphy helped to build up Germany after disaster and turned her into an ally. Again it all happened by accident. The Russians pushed one way; therefore Mr. Murphy pushed the other way. He favored strong courses: sending an armored column through to Berlin in 1948; seeking an all-out victory in Korea. He thinks that it is a waste of time to negotiate with the Russians—"unyielding Muscovites, grasping for every advantage however minute, supported by a military establishment of the first magnitude." He lays down: "Basic Communist policy is never abandoned. Until that system deteriorates or collapses, the United States can deal with it only at arm's length from positions of strength." One must

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accord Mr. Murphy a tribute. He could not have fought the cold war more strenuously even if he had known what he was doing.

A. J. P. TAYLOR

MAGDALEN COLLEGE
OXFORD

The Press and Foreign Policy. By BERNARD C. COHEN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.—ix, 288 pp. $6.00.

From a thorough exploration of the interplay of government and the press in the field of foreign policy, Professor Cohen makes a provocative analysis of the shortcomings of most of the press in this amorphous area. The government comes off no better in its communications performance. But, as a specialist, Professor Cohen is concerned with the inadequacy of the newspaper as a source to keep up with foreign affairs. Of course every specialist, whatever his field, has the same complaint and the obvious necessity to supplement the newspaper with his professional sources.

But Professor Cohen insists that in the critical and arcane field of foreign policy, more effective reporting is essential to more effective involvement by those especially qualified to have an impact on policy. Interestingly, he is more impressed with the inadvertent role of the Washington press corps as intercommunicator between branches and departments of government, where he finds it indispensable to officials, than with its primary role to inform the public on its public business. For the reader who needs to be informed in detail and in depth, he finds most of the press deals all too thinly with foreign policy. This is true enough. He feels it need not be so, and the core thesis of his book describes a corrective.

He says that as only a small part of the public care about foreign policy, it is futile to concentrate on informing a mass readership. He goes further to hold that this effort, through popularization of complex issues, distorts and oversimplifies, so as to have little value. His remedy would be to disregard the mass reader and concentrate on the minority who have a felt need to be informed. (It is an illusion of democracy, he holds, that the electorate determines foreign policy. So it is a waste of time to write down to the reader who prefers sports or comics.) But the trouble with this is that so many of these readers grow up to be congressmen or to write letters to congress against "give-away" programs that only presidents consider essential to foreign policy. To the journalist, Professor Cohen seems to prove too much.

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But leaving out his public philosophy, his criticism and much of his corrective seems to me reasonable, if elementary. First, he would have better trained reporters on foreign affairs. Everybody agrees with that, and the advance in the preparation of reporters in this field is pronounced and continuing. Much of the background interviewing for this book is ten years old. Much has changed, though admittedly not enough. Professor Cohen complains that the tradition of objective reporting, too often reduced to the sterile reporting of undigested surface facts, prevents needed analysis of the news. The newspapers very generally agree with this and now expect interpretive reporting. Of course there are not enough newspapers that deal seriously with the important issues of public affairs, whether foreign or domestic. Professor Cohen finds they generally devote only eight per cent of their news space to foreign policy news. He finds surveys indicate that only eight per cent of readers are interested in this news.

Professor Cohen's key proposal is that newspapers devote a special section to foreign policy news for the specialist reader, as they do to sports, finance, and shipping news. He cites these three. This is, as it happens, approximately the way the New York *Times* handles such news, and since Professor Cohen cites the *Times*' exceptional performance on almost every page, he would presumably settle for this. But one may doubt if this would make him as happy as he thinks. Sports offer precise scores and an open spectacle to report. Financial news has stock quotations, dividends, and net profits. The specialist on the Yankees or AT & T has no problem following the score.

In contrast, the foreign policy reporter has only speeches, press conference answers, and communiques, whose factual content is nothing to hang your hat on. The nub of the news problem lies in the area itself. Diplomacy offers little at any stage that can be taken at face value. It is safer to write foreign policy as history than as partial glimpses and guesses of what seems currently to be going on.

But his specifics aside, Professor Cohen's penetrating criticism of our press performance in Washington, which is our best, is an important, lively, informed contribution, and one of the first from the political side. He supplies also a convenient synthesis of the considerable literature on this from the journalists' view. Since journalism is far from a science and news is largely what one makes it, his systematic exploration is both illuminating to the political scientist and hopefully stimulating to the journalist who thinks about his responsible role, as an increasing number do. He soundly attacks the clichés and conventions of what

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makes news and how to write it, that keeps most of the press corps in lock-step, trudging in packs in well-trodden news grooves; only the rare individual breaking away to discover news in a fresh area and write something new. This is the kind of criticism journalism needs. Although his special concern is the need of the specialist reader, I see no conflict, as he does, between enhancing this important role of the press, and also improving its more general performance, to inform as wide a public as possible about their public affairs. We might hope eventually to involve more than eight per cent. For most of what he discovers about reporting on foreign policy can be said about any other important area of news.

LOUIS M. LYONS

NIEMAN FOUNDATION
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The White House Years, Volume I: *Mandate for Change, 1953–1956*. By DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1963.—xviii, 650 pp. $6.95.

There is less in this book than meets the eye. With its handsome end papers, thirty-two pages of photographs, sixteen appendixes, and 575 pages of narrative by the former President, this first of Dwight Eisenhower's two presidential volumes on the face of it promises a memorable treatment of his first term in the White House. *Mandate for Change* does provide knowledgeable accounts of major policies and incidents from the President's viewpoint, but just as many of the President's decisions seemed the product of bloodless staff groups, so this book bears the earmarks of the committee that produced it under Eisenhower's guidance.

Was everything so bland and tepid in the White House during those years? Was there no passion, triumph, despair—no sweat and tears?

Perhaps there really was not. Perhaps this book gains in authenticity precisely because its serene and winning complacence fairly reflects both the manner in which it was written and the style and vision of the administration it portrays. But there is a deeper reason for its blandness, I think. A leadership that strikes sparks and sets political bonfires reflects a burning conviction about the management of affairs. Despite Allan Nevins' statement, printed on the jacket, that Eisenhower's reasons for his decisions stemmed from a "consistent philosophy of life and government," the book suggests that a consistent philosophy is precisely what he did not have. His was really the philosophy

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of the grand middle, of the golden mean; he felt surest of his foreign and domestic policies when they were attacked by "extremists" on both sides, as though being midway between opposing forces was enough in itself to vindicate him.

Eisenhower's approach to legislative and party politics demonstrates this lack of philosophical conviction and clear-cut purpose. The President said that he wanted to be nonpartisan and nonpolitical—and at the same time he tried to build up the Republican party. He zealously embraced the party cause but also praised the independent voters. He believed in the constitutional provision for separation of President and Congress but also threatened to deny campaign support to Republican congressmen who opposed his bills (he does not make clear whether he followed through on this threat). He urged that one party control both the executive and legislative branches for the sake of better accountability to the people, but notes without comment that he got along better with the Democratically-controlled Congress of 1955-56 than with the Republican-controlled Congress of the preceding two years.

If Eisenhower lacked a central vision and hence a clear political strategy, so did most presidents. But the latter, like Harry Truman and Theodore Roosevelt (at least in his letters), were more willing to reveal the turmoil and confusion resulting from their expediencies and improvisations. Covering his own uncertainties with an air of political togetherness, the former President fails to do justice to the harshness of some of the decisions he made. Only occasionally does he give us a peep through the screen. He mentions that when a highly partisan Republican leader—and a woman at that—criticized the Independent Citizens for Eisenhower, "my temper reached the boiling point." If some poor, unsuspecting woman could elicit such a response, one wonders what went on behind those open, good-natured features when the going was really hard. But this book does not tell us and hence lacks the main quality we expect from a personal history.

JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

Philip Schuyler and the American Revolution in New York, 1773–1777. By DON R. GERLACH. Lincoln, Nebraska, University of Nebraska Press, 1964.—xxi, 358 pp. $6.50.

In a book written a hundred years or so ago and published in

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two volumes in 1872, with the title *The Life and Times of Philip Schuyler,* Benson Lossing, who enjoyed a considerable reputation in his day as the author and editor of popular books on American history, remarked upon what he regarded as the strange neglect which had befallen the subject of his biography. "Of all the prominent men in public life in America during the last half of the eighteenth century," he wrote, "not one so really distinguished for important services as General Schuyler has received so little attention from the essayist, the historian, or the biographer, as he." Lossing was genuinely interested, no doubt, in rescuing him from the fate of oblivion, and his book was, and long remained, the most useful study of the man, with a good deal of attention to his times. Bayard Tuckerman's *Life of General Philip Schuyler, 1733–1804,* published about thirty years after Lossing's biography, is slighter and less serviceable. John Allen Krout's sketch of Schuyler, written for the *Dictionary of American Biography,* though not constructed, of course, on the scale of a "full-length" biography, serves its purposes admirably.

Professor Don Gerlach, an A.M. and Ph.D. of the University of Nebraska and a member of the history department of the University of Akron, was attracted some ten years ago, when he began graduate study in history, to Schuyler's career as a subject deserving of further and fuller investigation for sundry reasons and especially, it would seem, because of the light it might be expected to throw upon the extremely personal character of colonial American politics, particularly in relation to the American Revolution. Whatever else Gerlach may be—and he is much that cannot be detailed in a review of moderate dimensions—he is no hero-worshiper with blinders on. He is, on the contrary, critically minded, as befits an historian, but he never indulges, and be this said to his great credit, in criticism of the belittling type aimed at previous historians. Nothing could be more temperate, fair-minded, and good-natured than his comments (pp. xiv–xv) on Lossing and Tuckerman: that they hardly meet modern standards of scholarship, notably in the matter of balance; that they did not take the trouble to present documentation; that they placed too much trust in family legends and concentrated on Schuyler's military career, "leaving other, and perhaps more important, aspects of his life largely untouched." Neither of these writers examined his economic or political interests in detail or depth, and therefore, it might be added, neither of them could see him "steadily" and see him "whole," as Matthew Arnold, writing perhaps with poetic license, and assuredly with no great attempt at historicality, represented Sophocles as having seen life. To many American contemporaries of

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Schuyler, and perhaps especially to New Yorkers, the times in which they were living seemed sadly, even disastrously, out of joint; and it ought not appear strange to us that men of first-rate intelligence and unblemished reputation were to be found on both sides of the barrier when the days came that were to try their souls. Gerlach's remark that Lossing and Tuckerman "did not appreciate the personal character of provincial politics as an explanation of the Revolution" is not likely to be questioned very seriously; and his statement (p. 20) that "informal interfamily relationships" underlay the political institutions of colonial New York seems to be safely within the bounds of historical truth. Such relationships, it is well known, were not suddenly to be deprived of all political potency by the achievement of American independence. There was, as Carl Becker pointed out in one of his most penetrating flashes of historical perception, a difference between the question of home rule and the question of who should rule at home.

In the formation of interfamily relationships, intermarriage was the principal instrument of policy. Philip Schuyler was the offspring of a Schuyler–Van Cortlandt union, and, though there was no Schuyler manor, his own marriage to "sweet Kitty V. R." (more formally Catherine Van Rensselaer) made him a kind of member-in-law of the manorial aristocracy of the Province of New York. It is, perhaps unfortunately, impossible to acquire any real understanding of political institutions in such a society without considerable knowledge of family relationships among its leading members; and perhaps the most useful single page in this entire volume is a Schuyler genealogical chart showing the evolution of the family from its establishment in this country in the mid-seventeenth century, at what is now the city of Albany, to the fifth generation.

Gerlach called his master's thesis (1956) "Philip Schuyler and the Continental Congress, 1775–1777," and the title of his doctoral dissertation (also unpublished), from which the recently published volume has sprung, is "Philip Schuyler: The Origins of a Conservative Patriot, 1733–1777; A Study in Provincial Politics and the American Revolution in New York." He has evidently regarded the year 1777 as terminal in Schuyler's career, in some respects at least, and such no doubt it was. The campaign that closed with Burgoyne's surrender to Gates at Saratoga in October of that year put an end to Schuyler's military career, and his defeat earlier in the same year for the governorship of New York under its newly established state constitution could hardly have failed to seem a severe if not a fatal blow to whatever political ambitions and hopes he may have cherished. Small

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wonder that Gerlach calls 1777 "a nadir year for Philip Schuyler" (p. 292).

Yet in that year he was in what is commonly thought of as the prime of life, in his mid-forties, with more than twenty-five years ahead of him, and those to be perhaps the most fruitful of his entire life, though they have remained the most neglected. Gerlach's book leaves them in this condition, for in it, as the years specified in its title imply, he makes no attempt to "cover" Schuyler's life this side of the "nadir year," though in his introduction he gives a few rather jejune paragraphs to it. It is truly good news, however, that he is at work on a second volume, in which will be found, it is to be hoped, a thoroughgoing study of later phases of Philip Schuyler's career.

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER

ROCHESTER, NEW YORK

Essay on Apportionment and Representative Government. By ALFRED DE GRAZIA. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.—viii, 180 pp.; cloth, $5.00. Washington, D. C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1963.—xi, 183 pp., paper, $2.00; single copy, $1.00.

Congressional Districting, The Issue of Equal Representation. By ANDREW HACKER. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1963.—xi, 132 pp.; cloth, $3.50; paper, $1.95.

The two books reviewed here are in contrast in several respects. De Grazia's book seems to have originated as a working paper for a brief in an adversary proceeding, namely, the defense of the State of New York in litigation that is still awaiting a decision of the Supreme Court at this writing. The author refers to the book as a "continuation" of his study for the New York Attorney General, made possible by a grant from the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, and the tone of the book as well as some of its significant omissions seem to reflect its origin. But the book is also the product both of long scholarship in the field and of an intensive contemporary research effort that has amassed a considerable amount of new data. It poses sharp issues, faces them directly, and usually gives unequivocal answers. It deserves close study, although it may raise the blood pressure of those political scientists who believe that there is some connection between the according of substantial numerical equality in apportionment arrangements and the equal protection of the laws.

Hacker's book is much closer to the tone of normal academic

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discourse, although equally concerned with issues presently controverted in adversary proceedings. He deals only with the congressional case, whereas de Grazia is concerned mainly with that of the state legislatures. Hacker presents a useful compendium on the present state of congressional districting, together with a resume of the history of the litigation up to his time of writing. He anticipates that the Supreme Court will act on the Georgia congressional case, *Wesberry* v. *Vandiver*, but does not expect the action to be vigorous or immediately effective. He does regard equal representation as "a question of civil rights," and concludes that while progress will be slow, "the goal is unambiguous and the path leading to it is clearly marked" (p. 121).

Probably the most important aspect of de Grazia's work is his defense of the "natural community" as the basis for representation. Where the natural community is used as the basis of representation, the representative can enter into an effective relationship with his constituents; and if the relationship is effective, representation will be adequate even if there is some violation of what is referred to as "numbers magic" (p. 53). His most extreme statement along this line can be found at page 167, where he asserts that as a total community, the New York metropolitan area would be better off "if represented by only ten seats at large in the New York Assembly" than with any number of seats from single-member districts organized on "the equal-populations principle."

The danger of excessive intervention on the part of the courts is one of de Grazia's major preoccupations. This may have been partly a matter of timing. He reacted strongly to the haste and confusion of the litigation that came so rapidly on the heels of *Baker* v. *Carr* and interpreted that litigation as evidence of the self-aggrandizing tendencies of the courts. Yet the fact seems to be that the courts moved as they did because of the necessity to assert that there is a rule of law even in matters affecting the self-interest of the legislator. The strongest expressions of judicial opinion have usually been accompanied by temporizing procedures and great moderation in action.

The converse of de Grazia's preoccupation with the courts is his unwillingness to confront the possibility that equal representation may be an issue of civil rights. Only under the most extreme conditions is he willing to admit that the result of an existing apportionment may be a denial of the equal protection of the laws (p. 159).

It may be true that the advocates of numerical equality have been too much preoccupied with a single criterion. If it is achieved even in principle as a constitutional goal, there will still

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be ample room for the application of additional criteria, some of which may prove equally necessary for the equal protection of the laws. One of the best aspects of the book by Andrew Hacker is his discussion of the problem of gerrymandering. This also would seem to be a distortion of representation that might legitimately be laid down against the standard of equal protection; and, if it is, some of the grosser abuses may be corrected without unduly involving the courts in "the politics of the people." The people, in fact, might be grateful.

PAUL T. DAVID

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

The American Federal Executive: A Study of the Social and Personal Characteristics of the Civilian and Military Leaders of the United States Federal Government. By W. LLOYD WARNER, JR., PAUL P. VAN RIPER, NORMAN H. MARTIN, and ORVIS F. COLLINS. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1963.—xvii, 405 pp. $7.50.

Some ten years ago, Professor W. Lloyd Warner (with James Abegglen) made an investigation of the social class origins, mobility patterns, and career paths of more than 10,000 high-level American corporation leaders. This earlier study, building on a previous one by Taussig and Joslyn, and taken together with other researches on business leaders done at about the same time by William Miller, Mabel Newcomer, C. W. Mills, Bendix and Howton, Gregory and Neu, and Suzanne Keller gave us an excellent picture of who the people were at the top of the American business system and how they got there. One of the most general conclusions from these several studies, which covered a span of nearly a hundred years of American history, was that there is no evidence to show that social mobility among American business leaders has declined over this period. Another conclusion was that while there is considerable inheritance of high position from father to son, there is also an appreciable amount of movement from relatively low to relatively high positions and also a small but important amount of "Horatio Alger" movement, that is, from the very bottom of the society to the very top of the business world.

Now, in the present volume, with a different set of collaborators, Warner has studied the careers of the higher American federal executives, civilian and military, the civilians ranging from Cabinet level to GS level 14 and the military ranging from Colonel (Navy Captain) to General (Admiral). Some 12,929 questionnaires were sent out; sixty-nine per cent of these, which

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were determined to be representative of the total original sample, were returned. These questionnaires collected information on the following subjects: occupational ranks of the fathers; the subjects' own regional origins; mothers' social origins; origins and education of wives; their own amount and specific type of education, their career lines both outside and within government, and their professional values and ideologies. In addition, 257 members of the sample had their personalities investigated both by depth interviews lasting many hours and by a special version of the Thematic Apperception Test, a standard projective psychological test which Warner had used to good advantage previously on his business sample.

It is obvious that the results of all this add up to a great deal of data, some of the findings quite specific and dull, but with certain central findings that make the study as a whole eminently worth while. Since studies of this scope have not been done on previous generations of federal executives, Warner could make comparisons only between the businessmen in his earlier study and these federal executives, and also between some of the components of his present federal executive sample, for example, civilians as against the military. Among the major findings are these: (1) although there are some interesting differences, broadly speaking the business and government executives are more alike than not in their social and economic backgrounds; (2) although both business and federal executives are recruited disproportionately from the middle and higher levels of our society, there is still considerable opportunity for men to rise from very low social rank to high federal positions; (3) there is less occupational inheritance from father to son in the federal than in the business world, except for the case of the higher military executive, where a small but significant proportion are going precisely in their paternal footsteps.

None of these findings probably runs strongly counter to any of our "common sense" expectations. But a few findings do; for example, that more business than federal executives have spent their whole occupational lives moving up through bureaucracies, from the bottom to the top, whereas more of the federal executives have had considerable "independent" experience with graduate study, research, and free professional practice before moving into federal service. Another perhaps unexpected finding is that both business and military executives have more often confined their occupational experience to a relatively few organizations than have civilian federal executives, who show more inter-organization mobility.

In this brief review we can go no farther into the substance

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of the study itself. But I trust enough has been said to indicate that Lloyd Warner has given us another important, solid, sometimes exciting contribution to the study of social stratification in America.

BERNARD BARBER

BARNARD COLLEGE

Politics and Conservation: The Decline of the Alaska Salmon. By RICHARD A. COOLEY. New York, Evanston, and London, Harper and Row, 1963.—xxi, 230 pp. $5.00.

Dr. Cooley's book begins with a handicap from which it soon recovers. Even after an abundance of experience with the Pentagon and other sources of the evolving language, this reviewer quivered, as might a salmon on a troller's hook, when the author of the foreword exposed the reader to "optimize" and "maximize."

We are richly rewarded by Dr. Cooley's research, and by the uses to which he has put it. His book, written from the record—and a long and sorry one it is—is a factual recital of a tragic chapter in American conservation history. Unhappily, some of the chief villains are those who posed—and in some cases still do—as pillars of the conservation movement. For, curiously enough, the Alaska salmon industry, small though it was in comparison with ever so many other industries in the period, worked its way and will to an almost unbelievable extent and degree.

All of this is recounted by Dr. Cooley. What he has to say in this rather brief but illuminating study is drawn from official records and other material going back to the last century. From the start of the salmon industry, as Dr. Cooley demonstrates graphically, the packers had one ambition only—to put as many salmon in cans in any given year as could be caught, whatever the effect over-fishing might have on the runs of future years. They would not be restrained. They would not be restrained by their own economic interests. And they were not restrained by government. It was not until the State of Alaska was created, and for the first time the people of Alaska had the authority to manage their own fishing resources, that a determined effort was begun to rehabilitate the ruinously depleted salmon runs.

Politics and Conservation concerns itself with one of the most wonderful of all living things, the salmon. Even after all these years, and after much research, we really know little about salmon. Born in fresh water, in a river or a lake, the salmon remains in fresh water for a predetermined time, according to

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species. Then it goes out to sea—and we know very, very little of its life there—to grow and mature until the time comes for the homeward journey. This is the journey, the drive, that is particularly fascinating. Possessed of some deep instinct which guides and directs, the salmon swims from wherever it may be in the great Pacific to the stream of nativity, there to spawn and die.

In Alaska as nowhere else man should have been able to provide management so maximum runs might have been able to be maintained in perpetuity. In Alaska there is little or no stream pollution; there are no industries, no dams, to hinder and obstruct in the two thousand or so streams capable of supporting salmon runs. Until statehood, the federal government managed the resource. The contention that a strong central government is better able than a local one to manage a natural resource properly failed lamentably of proof in the Alaska fishery. From start to finish, the federal managers in top policy positions served as handservants of an industry seemingly bent on overfishing to the point of resource extinction.

Dr. Cooley properly tells his story without emotion, without interjecting his personal views. He suggests—and correctly—that the coming of statehood, with abolishment of salmon traps and local management does not in itself guarantee that salmon will be swimming in Alaska streams a century from now. There are other problems too. Dr. Cooley proposes no cures; after all, it is not the function of his book to do so. But he strongly implies that we must revise our concept of a fishery common and free before adequate controls can be provided.

Politics and Conservation should be read. It should be read not only by those interested in the fishery, and particularly salmon, but by everyone who needs to be shown by documented proof that the lofty aims and goals of conservation will be ignored by rapacious men unless the public, alert and insistent, demands otherwise.

E. L. BARTLETT

UNITED STATES SENATE

The Great Rights. Edited by EDMOND CAHN. New York and London, Macmillan, 1963.—vii, 242 pp. $5.95.

An Autobiography of the Supreme Court. Edited by ALAN F. WESTIN. New York, Macmillan, 1963.—xii, 475 pp. $7.50.

Justice Holmes described the peace that reigns at the Supreme Court as the "quiet of a storm center." Recently there has been

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little peace there as winds of controversy have embroiled the judiciary and even threatened its independence. The era of ill-feeling was ushered in by the School Segregation cases, but has persisted and intensified as the Court has probed deeply into the state preserves of criminal procedure and political reapportionment, and extended its influence in such diverse fields as national security and antitrust law. Two main philosophical questions divide the justices. First, disagreement exists as to whether the Court should be "active" in constitutional development, especially when fundamental freedoms are involved, or should defer whenever possible to the legislative and executive branches. Secondly, certain justices tend to view law from what Professor Edmond Cahn calls the "consumer perspective," that is, from the vantage point of the little man looking up, while other justices usually consider the judicial function from what he terms the "imperial perspective," that is, the angle of the orderer of society.

Each in its own way, these two books illuminate the Supreme Court's contemporary role and the charged climate surrounding it. *The Great Rights* contains the first four James Madison Lectures given at New York University School of Law by Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justices Hugo L. Black, William O. Douglas, and William J. Brennan. It also contains an introduction by Professor Cahn, who conceived and organized the lecture series, and a historical essay by Irving Brant, Madison's distinguished biographer. These lectures on the Bill of Rights were established "to enhance the appreciation of civil liberty and strengthen the sense of national purpose," and it is difficult to imagine more appropriate contributors. It is this quartet of "activist" justices who, in 1957, began to turn the Court from extreme deference to the political branches to the present pass, where it accords highest priority to civil liberty.

The lecture by Justice Black, already something of a classic, elaborates his little understood theory of the "absolute" nature of the First Amendment provision that prohibits governmental abridgment of freedom of speech. He stresses the sharp break the Constitution represented from the English system and outlines the considerable history supporting his view that, except for expression perhaps not reached by the First Amendment such as obscenity or perjury, the "government has no jurisdiction." Chief Justice Warren treats a more specific theme, the dangers presented by military power and the course of constitutional litigation generated by the restraints imposed on the military by the Bill of Rights. Justice Douglas' lecture takes a broader perspective. He considers the history of both the

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United States and the emerging nations of Africa and Asia and explores the question whether constitutional barriers can protect a people that loses the will to retain its freedom. His disturbing conclusion is that the American Bill of Rights is a "watered-down version," thanks largely to the "decline of judicial authority." Justice Brennan's essay is particularly timely because it centers on the long-standing conflict over which provisions of the Bill of Rights will be carried over as a limitation on the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, Justice Brennan appears a secular prophet for, speaking in early 1961, he anticipated later Supreme Court decisions that interpret the Fourth Amendment to guarantee state criminal defendants the right to counsel provided for in the Sixth Amendment and prohibit introduction of unlawfully seized evidence in state criminal trials.

An Autobiography of the Supreme Court is a self-portrait of the Court, its development and chief problems, by the justices themselves in thirty-eight well selected speeches, letters, and memoirs from 1790 to 1961. Professor Westin's introduction, "Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw," surveys the history of off-the-bench judicial commentary, some of which embarrassed their authors or the Court. The early commentaries, including selections by Justices John Marshall, John Jay, and Joseph Story, evaluate and defend the Supreme Court, both necessary functions as the young nation adjusted itself to the "undemocratic" character of judicial review. Later articles by the first Justice John Marshall Harlan and Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Charles Evans Hughes reveal the nagging problems that still beset the Court—living with its power to invalidate legislation and keeping the Court abreast of a fast-changing nation. After a section on judicial biographies by their colleagues, several essays on the "Contemporary Court" deal with techniques of adjudication such as statutory interpretation and *stare decisis*, the justices' views on specific constitutional issues, and, once again, the varying attitudes—from Justice Frankfurter to Justice Douglas—toward the power of judicial review. This book, like *The Great Rights*, makes a distinct contribution to the understanding of a unique, controversial, and important institution.

NORMAN DORSEN

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City. By NATHAN GLAZER and

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DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN. Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press and Harvard University Press, 1963.—vii, 360 pp. $5.95.

For nearly two hundred years, Americans have been trying, without conspicuous success, to find a metaphor or a model to describe the process by which diverse ethnic stocks combine to form one people. In recent years, social philosophers have mostly argued that America has fostered a cultural pluralism, but they have not been able to stipulate very persuasively in what areas of life an ethnic group has been free to retain its difference and in what it has had to conform to a national pattern. Historians have generally concentrated on the shocks experienced by native and newcomer alike in the years of first confrontation. And sociologists have usually overestimated the speed with which ethnic differences would disappear. Meanwhile, politicians, parish priests, and social workers—those dealing willy-nilly with the practical complexities of ethnic life—developed rough and ready approximations of what was happening, and what might be expected in the near future.

In the last decade, publicists like Will Herberg and Sam Lubell have taken their cue from these approximations; they have reflected on some specialized sociological studies; and they have inspected the census returns, especially those dealing with housing, education, income, and national origin. Almost without exception they have concluded that ethnic differences have proved remarkably persistent. A group soon loses its familiarity with a foreign tongue, and, a little later, any controlling sense of national origin. But it retains fundamental patterns of affirmation and rejection, giving them expression in "religious choice," taboos on intermarriage, residential segregation, and—less neatly—in political behavior.

This is the genre to which *Beyond the Melting Pot* belongs. Glazer and Moynihan develop no general theory of ethnic interaction; their account lacks the sense of a changing New York City that informed Handlin's *The Newcomers;* their comparisons between ethnic groups are sometimes too easy; and they offer no real guide to what the future holds. Still, they are on sound ground in believing that New York offers decisive proof that the melting-pot has not melted—at least not as most Americans once assumed it would. And their essays on the several ethnic groups are both consistently interesting and uniformly instructive. They certainly avoid the sentimentalism of regarding every manifestation of ethnic uniqueness as good in itself. Instead, taking for granted that identification with a group is inevitable for most individuals, they ask the reasonable question how far each ethnic group has helped its members serve the public interest. How

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much has it helped them build a prosperous city economy? How much has it disposed them to assume responsibility for governing? How much has it encouraged them to care for the helpless, to advance the life of intellect and high culture, or to attack racial discrimination? By these criteria the Jews score much the best; in seeking grounds for criticism Glazer is reduced to suggesting that Jews do not have good reason to continue behaving as well as they have.

Partisans of other ethnic groups will have less difficulty in sensing the edge in the authors' candid evaluation. New York's Negroes, they argue, are crippled by the lack of a strong family life that might internalize drives for education and upward mobility; as a result, they have proved less alacritous, than were the Jews and Japanese, to exploit the opportunities offered them when historic prejudices began to crumble. The Italians, on the other hand, are seen as maintaining family loyalties to the exclusion of a proper responsibility for society in general. The Puerto Ricans seem too little removed, in either space or time, from their land of origin to have developed the panoply of ethnic institutions that have guided other immigrants into a fuller participation in American life. And Daniel Moynihan's memoir of the longer Irish experience bluntly describes the tribalism they inculcated into American political life and the anti-intellectualism they helped foster in the Catholic Church.

The authors' determination to render balanced judgments is especially noteworthy. Most writers on ethnic themes who have ventured to make any evaluation at all have tended to be nervously exculpatory, and to locate all social difficulties in the larger society or in the simple fact of pluralism, rather than in what they call the "contributions" of ethnic groups. Because *Beyond the Melting Pot* is both catholic in interest and forthright in opinion, it is unfortunate that the authors are not more comprehensive. Their book is imaginative rather than deeply imagined, suggestive rather than wholly persuasive. Lacking a clear notion of ethnic interaction, Glazer and Moynihan have nevertheless done scholars a service by reminding them of perspectives and facts to which they have so long been largely oblivious.

ROBERT D. CROSS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought. By MARK H. HALLER. New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1963.—vii, 264 pp. $6.00.

This is an excellent book, describing in detail and with ample

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documentation the sad story of the travesty and misuse of an important branch of science to bolster ultra-conservative political ideologies. That a sound biological, genetic endowment is the foundation of physical and mental health of every human being can hardly be questioned; eugenics is basically nothing more than a concern for the maintenance or improvement of this endowment. Eugenics arose as a logical, indeed a necessary, outgrowth of Darwin's theory of evolutionary origin of mankind, on one side, and of studies on genetics, on the other. It was, however, perverted to a point that, in the words of the author of the book under review,

> From the press came books that, on a biological basis, rejected democracy and much of the American tradition upon which democracy was based. Increasingly it became clear, however, that the scientific basis for such doctrines was at best dubious, at worst contradicted by the evidence. Eugenics thereby earned a reputation that a responsible leadership would, in the future, find difficult to overcome.

And yet, "Today, when rapid advances are being made in all fields of genetic research, a cautious, sober, and scientific eugenics is once more struggling for attention."

Quite properly, although the book deals with eugenics in America, the two introductory chapters sketch the European antecedents of the movement. The third and fourth chapters deal with the beginnings of eugenics in America, prior to the stage when the rise of Mendelian genetics made it tempting for eugenists to claim that their movement was merely a rigorous application of well established scientific findings to the human species. The following six chapters are the core of the book; they show that

> On the whole, those whose political views were harshly reactionary and racist were the more willing to accept extreme hereditarian views; those with greater sympathy for reform and a democratic heritage, found most to criticize in the research and interpretations that led to extremism. . . . While eugenics at first had a broad impact on American thought, after World War I, it spoke increasingly for men of the right.

The concluding two chapters describe the eclipse and possible resurgence of the eugenical movement.

> When racism lost its scientific standing in the 1930's and the Nazis showed what use could be made of race prejudice, then a recoil against the racism of the 1920's became the major factor in bringing a repudiation of eugenics and destroying the emphasis on heredity that had characterized much of American thought in the

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previous two decades. [However] . . . while eugenists generally recognize that their movement currently has only minor influence and importance, they look forward to the day when man can, by bringing his genetic future under control, do much to make human life healthier and happier.

The book is a product of sound scholarship. The author has taken pains to become familiar with an enormous mass of primary sources covering at least three quarters of a century. The footnotes containing the literature references occupy forty-five pages. He is perfectly at home in the aspects of biology pertinent to eugenics. He presents the facts without a trace of partisanship; his reserve is only occasionally touched with subtle humor. The book answers the need which has been felt for some years for a history of eugenics and of its entanglements with political and social movements in America. It can and should be read with equal interest and profit by both social and natural scientists; it sets many things straight, and may clear the way for a sound and humanistic eugenical movement.

THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY

THE ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE

Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution. Edited by DUDLEY SEERS, with the collaboration of Andrés Bianchi, Richard Jolly, and Max Nolff. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1964.—xiii, 432 pp. $7.50.

This book is the result of a few weeks research in Cuba in August-September 1962 by a team of two English economists, Dudley Seers and Richard Jolly, and two Chilean economists, Andrés Bianchi and Max Nolff. The group was organized and headed by Mr. Seers. The writing was done at the end of 1962, though the book was not published until the beginning of 1964. The time factor explains much about the book's virtues and vices. In a country such as Cuba, without a critical press or a political opposition, the lag between the first official reports and the later, more realistic "self-criticism" is often a matter of months, even years. Thus, to find out what really happened in Cuba in 1962, or even in 1961 and 1960, it has been necessary to wait until the Cuban leaders themselves were forced to discuss their problems with greater candor in order to attempt to do something about them. This is especially true in as much as, Mr. Seers admits, statistics under the Castro regime "may have become even worse" in 1960 and early 1961 then in pre-Castro Cuba (p. 49). Yet this book is willy-nilly based in large part on

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admittedly dubious official statistics or on projections, predictions, and goals that have proven to be even more distantly related to reality. The material, therefore, was already inadequate in terms of what came to be known by the time the book was published. Serious students will want to pursue every phase of the subject further on the basis of later data, though they will find useful preliminary information and leads here.

Thus the section on agriculture by Andrés Bianchi, the best contribution in the book, clearly recognizes and partially analyzes the decline that set in by 1961, but underestimates the depth of the crisis. The single largest section on education by Richard Jolly, a curious choice for this subject since he needed to work through interpreters, is top-heavy with quantitative statistics and short on qualitative evaluations. Mr. Jolly expresses some doubts about the practical efficacy of the much-publicized 1961 campaign which allegedly reduced illiteracy to the vanishing point; he hardly prepares the reader for Minister of Industries Guevara's speech of March 14, 1964, which revealed that there were so many illiterates left that it was necessary for the ministry to prohibit their employment in any of its units. Max Nolff's section on industry is far shorter and weaker than the preceding two. Its concluding note, that "the prospect for industrial development in Cuba is decidedly promising," has already been repudiated by the Cuban leaders themselves, at least for the next few years, during which they have made clear they intend to sacrifice their original goals of "accelerated industrialization" and "diversified agriculture" in favor of more and more old-fashioned sugar.

Unfortunately, the opening chapter which attempts to sum up the past, present, and future of Cuba by the editor, Dudley Seers, is the most unbalanced and misleading. Though all the authors seem to be friendly to the Castro regime, Mr. Seers is tendentious to the point of foolhardiness. In order to extenuate the Castro regime's productive record, he argues that "almost any degree of disorganization would have been preferable to the complete failure in Cuba in earlier years" (p. 53). On this basis, the Castro regime could do no wrong. Yet Andrés Bianchi later admits that the total agricultural production of Cuba in 1962–63 fell below pre-revolutionary levels (p. 156), and the same was undoubtedly true for those years in industrial production. Mr. Seers' view of the earlier years is expressed in this remarkable pronouncement: "Cuba in the 35 years from 1923 to 1958 showed little progress" (p. 13). From 1923 to 1958, illiteracy declined from about forty per cent to twenty-one per cent by way of a total school system, not a superficial one-shot propaganda-ridden

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"campaign" by teen-agers; the per capita income rose from $232 to $430, the latter the third highest in Latin America. It would be far more appropriate to say that the progress was considerable but uneven (as shown by the non-agricultural per capita income of an estimated $1,600 in a country with a non-agricultural majority of gainfully employed). Ironically, the Castro regime is suffering because it started from too high a general economic level, which it has failed to maintain, rather than from a level so low that it could not fail to shine by comparison.

That a pro-Castro tendency does not necessarily mean absence of objectivity has recently been demonstrated by the French agronomist, René Dumont, an agricultural adviser to Cuba, whose book, *Cuba: Socialisme et Développement* (Paris, 1964), is a far more rewarding and, incidentally, devastating account of Castro's "economic and social revolution." The Cabot Foundation of Boston, which financed Mr. Seers' group, must at least be given credit for a gesture of extraordinary tolerance.

THEODORE DRAPER
THE HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Power and Stability in Nigeria: The Politics of Decolonization. By HENRY L. BRETTON. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—xii, 208 pp. $6.00.

The Nigerian Political Scene. Edited by ROBERT O. TILLMAN and TAYLOR COLE. Durham, No. Carolina, Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1962.—xii, 340 pp. $10.00.

I note, gratefully, that the library of books about Nigeria is growing more rapidly than that dealing with most other African countries. Nigeria is the country in Africa which is most populous and most varied in socio-political traditions. If the torrent of African surveys now reaching us is to be converted in the future into a stream of greater power and clarity, it would also be good to have a touchstone for judging what may be required for speaking knowledgeably about an African country. Nigeria, moreover, already requires re-examination. When it gained independence in 1960, it was greeted almost everywhere as a weighty example of how democratic federalism could work successfully on a new continent. By now, skepticism has grown apace, both within Nigeria and outside.

Bretton's work reflects these new doubts. Interviews in Nigeria during the late fifties and in 1962 led him to the conclusion that Nigerian dedication to the legal and political frame-

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work established in consultation with colonial officials may be "extremely superficial." The main reason is that the established federal distribution of power inhibits any effective political action to cope at the same time with corruption and inefficiency and with growing pressures for fundamental changes in the structure of society, power, and economy. Much of the book, with the help of useful concepts, abstracts conclusions which are often convincing, from data which are, however, insufficiently elaborated. Only those who know Nigeria more thoroughly than Bretton pictures here many fully appreciate the merit of Bretton's analysis.

There are more useful details and (since most of its essays were completed in early 1961) more optimism to be found in the compilation of ten authors and twelve essays on *The Nigerian Political Scene.* Once one desists from wondering why 327 pages of material derived for the most part from essays already published elsewhere should cost ten dollars, one may be struck by several particularly valuable contributions. The problems of economic development undergo careful analyses in the contributions of J. J. Spengler on population movements, F. Harbison on human resources, and A. Callaway on school leaves. Harbison, as the most sanguine of the three, declares that "of all the newly emerging African nations, Nigeria's prospects for successful economic and political development are probably the best," but concludes that success is primarily a political question. These political fortunes are assessed by Cole, whose careful and soberly hopeful papers regarding constitution, federalism, and bureaucracy repay reading now in the light of growing instability in Nigeria. In these and the more impressionistic paper on the future of democracy by P. Herring, does a particularly attractive aspect of the American spirit enter unexamined? Do we, when in doubt, characteristically end in optimism and not in doubt? G. L. Cowan on foreign policy and F. X. Sutton on authoritarianism, however, concentrate on useful material that raises questions about the continuity of present Nigerian orientations.

MANFRED HALPERN

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

'Mau Mau' Detainee. By JOSIAH MWANGI KARIUKI. London and Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1963.—xxiv, 188 pp. $4.75.

The title of this volume develops expectations which remain

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largely unfulfilled since this book deals mainly with the author's experiences as a detainee during the Mau Mau emergency in Kenya and only peripherally with the question of Mau Mau. As a personal study of the Kenya detention camps, the book adds to the literature on this subject which is cited in a bibliography prepared by Miss Margery Perham who encouraged the author to prepare this memoir.

The author entered the detention camp system in late October 1953 and passed through fourteen detention camps until his ultimate release in February 1960. This experience, plus his seemingly inexhaustible ability to write protest letters to British M.P.s and get them smuggled out of the camps, provided him with the opportunity to obtain a broad view of the detention system and to write with a considerable degree of authority. Much of the story concerns the horrors of camp administration, but the book is especially valuable in the description of the "pipeline"—the procedure established by the British to rehabilitate the detainees. Kariuki points out that the British turned over the rehabilitation process at some camps to the Moral Re-Armament people. He also believes that the "pipeline" was basically unsuccessful since he, and others, confessed to a variety of oaths and crimes while being beaten only to retract their confessions later.

Kariuki is least satisfying in his discussion of Mau Mau and of the movement which developed around it. The author states that he never was a member of Mau Mau but admits to having taken two oaths, the "Oath of Unity," which stressed the unity of the African people of Kenya, and the *Batuni*, a "stronger" oath which gave the author a sense of having "become a true Kikuyu." In both cases, the author does not indicate that he took the oaths willingly—there is a strange sense of having been accidentally present—but does not repudiate the oaths.

This is not, therefore, a systematic study of the Mau Mau, but its value to the students of revolution lies in the description of dissatisfaction, the reasons therefore, and the sketchy outlines of the movement that was formed. In this respect, the book will facilitate later studies—hopefully still to come—of Mau Mau.

One final note should be made regarding the contradiction always present in the revolt against colonial domination in British Africa. The author, continually albeit unconsciously, indicates his belief in the ultimate justice of the British. In spite of beatings and other punishments at the instance of the British, he never lost confidence in the need to smuggle messages out of the camps to other Britishers, mainly British Labourites and Labour M.P.s. The fact that he continually sought to com-

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municate to these people indicates that the author believed that some justice existed in the colonial system even while he was undergoing immediate physical violence at the instance of colonialism.

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The Military in the Middle East: Problems in Society and Government. Edited by SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER. Columbus, Ohio, Ohio State University Press, 1963.—138 pp. $4.75.

This collection of papers presented at a conference by a distinguished group of area specialists is informative, balanced, and, in their brevity, representative of the state of our knowledge. The historical sketches of Iraq (M. Khadduri), Syria (G. H. Torrey), Egypt (G. Kirk) give us a sense of the multiple factors contributing to the entry of the army in politics: the lack of legitimacy and real support for the semi-democratic regimes, the ambivalence and tensions within the army, the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They fail, however, to give us a clear idea why all the other contenders for power (like the bureaucracy, the parties, business groups, even the often-decried oligarchs) should be so weak or ineffective, frequently facing an army internally divided in factions and without a clear program (especially in the Syrian case), possessing only weapons. Perhaps the focus on the army rather than on the social disorganization, lack of integration and weaknesses of civilian institutions, accounts for the limitation. On the other side we never get a very real image of what different military regimes actually do, particularly in the case of Egypt, nor of how the military relate with co-opted politicians, civil servants, technicians, or intellectuals in the various phases of indirect, direct, dual, or quasi-civilian rule (to use S. E. Finer's types in *The Man on Horseback*). We get even less of an idea of the operation at various levels and stages of the parties created by the military regimes (in the U.A.R. and Syria). As one of the authors (Kirk) admits, the data to answer these basic questions are not available. The papers are most successful in presenting the circumstances under which the military intervene. D. Rustow presents a number of hypotheses or generalizations accounting for the prevalence of military regimes: the Islamic and Ottoman traditions, the experiences with Western military rule, the post-independence tensions, the frustrations of military defeat for which the politicians are blamed,

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the growing involvement in internal affairs when governments faced with unrest have to rely on the army, the internal rifts within the military juntas, and the conscript versus the voluntary character of the armed forces. In both Rustow's and Fisher's chapters we find an interesting emphasis on the "civilianization" of the officers who entered politics in Turkey, following the example of Ataturk. It would have been interesting to see this problem explored in the case of Egypt: are there tendencies in that direction and if not why not? Many of the data presented should be of interest to the student of military-civil relations, for example, the role of former military attachés reminds this reader of the career of Peron and many other military men in politics. The information that Fisher gives us about the complex military politics in Turkey since 1960 is especially welcome, even though we would wish to know more about the factors—social, institutional, generational, and so forth—accounting for the different conceptions of the role of the army and the different demands presented to the politicians by various groups within the armed forces. The chapter on Israel by Hurewitz shows how different the role of the army can be in the context of a different ideological and institutional system, but also how important the formal constitutional arrangements are in a modern democratic society under stress in defining the relationship between civil and military authorities.

In summary, this is a very useful book, but the questions raised and the somewhat divergent evaluations of such military-dominated polities (in the contributions of Kirk and Campbell, for example), suggest the need for much more thorough research on each of them and their performance in many specific areas. Their evaluation may require the cooperation of political scientists, sociologists, and economists. This collection of introductory essays should stimulate further and more systematic comparative research on a timely topic.

JUAN J. LINZ

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Law and Organization in World Society. By KENNETH S. CARLSTON. Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1962.—xii, 356 pp. $6.50.

As the author states in his foreword, this is a work of "interdisciplinary exploration" in the social sciences. It is a sequel to his *Law and Structure of Social Action* (1956) in which he attempted to synthesize the findings of various social science

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disciplines as the base for exploration of a number of aspects of law and legal theory. In the work under review, the author seeks to concretize his previous findings by reformulation of his general theory and by applying it to an actual problem of human affairs. The problem which he has chosen is that of the impact of nationalization on concession agreements.

After an introduction in which the concept of nationalization is analyzed, the author proceeds to a factual inquiry into the character and function of concession agreements in the national and international economies. This is followed by a study of the importance of minerals in the world economy and of the conditions under which nationalization has been resorted to by the underdeveloped states. Chapters V and VI and the first part of Chapter VII present, in a series of principles and propositions, a statement of "a theory of law and organization in the world society." Then follows an effort to apply the theory as formulated to the specific facts of the concession problem, the essential economic and social aspects of which have been described in the earlier chapters.

Professor Carlston's method of dealing with his subject is logical and scientifically sound. The reader is left in no doubt as to the basic assumptions of his thinking and the system of values that he accepts. His factual statements and analysis are adequate to his purpose. One is left with the impression that he has established his case. One wonders, however, whether the excessive formalization of his presentation does not somewhat weaken the impact on the reader. This is particularly true of the chapters setting forth principles and propositions, some in the form of established truths and some in the form of prescriptions for action. His comment on these, by way of elaboration, is quite uneven in length and in depth of analysis, and sometimes is quite diversionary for the reader. A somewhat more integrated, less formalistic, and less redundant presentation of this important part of the book would possibly have served his purpose equally well and been much easier for the reader.

Since the work deals to a large extent with the concession problem, the reader naturally is curious to learn where the author's rather imposing structure of argument leads him. His major conclusion is stated on pages 283–84:

> The international law norm governing a premature termination by a state of a concession agreement with an alien effected by an act of nationalization is that such action will entail responsibility to the state of which the alien is a national to make prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.

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He observes that this norm found its genesis in a somewhat simpler and less developed world than now exists, but possesses even greater justification in today's world of greater complexity and interdependence. This conclusion is not at variance with the commonly held view of international lawyers in the West. It is doubtful if this effort to provide the conclusion with a more highly structured supporting argument and a more objective scientific basis will convince many of those, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, who will give different weights than the author to various elements of the problem.

LELAND M. GOODRICH

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Discord and Collaboration. By ARNOLD WOLFERS. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962.—xvii, 283 pp. $6.00.

> In exercising the global responsibilities concomitant with its vast power while maintaining its traditional commitment to ideal principle, the United States has had to deal with international problems of great political and moral complexity. Accordingly, the systematic study of international relations has assumed the greatest vitality and importance, and to that study these essays by Arnold Wolfers represent a most welcome contribution (p. vii).

No better summation of this book could be given than this appraisal in Reinhold Niebuhr's foreword.

A large number of these essays are concerned with a discussion of the theoretical bases of an activity the study of which is surrounded by inherent difficulties. Like political science in general, international relations do not lend themselves to the use of those procedures that have proved the greatest asset of the experimental sciences. In practice one is driven to fall back on such loose props as general experience, knowledge of human nature, introspection, even mere reasonableness, an indefinable yet fundamental asset. Little wonder that one school of thought has eschewed theorizing altogether, preferring the empirical approach, promotion of the national interest—whatever this may precisely mean—rejecting the possibility of any connection between the conduct of foreign relations and ethics.

The empirical approach has had much appeal in the British milieu, one of whose characteristics is often said to be the pragmatic. Yet it is also in this same milieu, more broadly the English-speaking, that the moralistic approach has best prospered. The results have been sometimes confusing, as when

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British supporters of the League of Nations found themselves led to accept the French view—that the League was a body possessed of law enforcing power—a view which, in the French case, was in large measure dictated by highly realistic and narrower considerations of French security alone.

Professor Wolfers devotes much attention to the contrast between the realist and the idealist schools of thought, to that between the traditionalist and the collectivist (in the sense of collective security) schools, exemplified in divergent views of the League, for example. Seeking to resolve the seeming dilemma he suggests "an approach to international politics that differs from that both of the idealist and the realist school by the emphasis it places on policy goals and the functional relationship existing between these goals and the quest for power" (p. 99).

While much of the book is concerned with theory, some of the essays deal with more immediate and concrete situations, the Korean War, for example, the implications of which are brought out with clarity and sharpness. So long as we are dealing with a world of sovereign states the debate is bound to continue. However great its limitations, one can only welcome such a book as a contribution to the understanding of the terms and issues of the debate.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE

Trade Blocs and Common Markets. By SIDNEY DELL. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1963.—xviii, 384 pp. $5.95.

Mr. Sidney Dell has written a comprehensive report on the state of common market schemes everywhere and on postwar changes in world trade groupings generally. He leads us swiftly through the "sixes and sevens" of Europe, the role of GATT, the trade problems of the underdeveloped countries, Latin and Central American integration efforts, the jungle of African unification projects, the workings of COMECON, and the issue of East-West trade.

He is skeptical about the benefits of European integration which, he fears, will transfer increasing power to business interests while weakening the countervailing powers of labor and member governments, and he is unimpressed by the supposed advantages of larger markets, intensified competition, and greater "dynamism." He questions the "facile assumption" that increases in trade among advanced countries will yield substantial economic benefits, and he is impatient with the conflicting political motives and aspirations behind the Rome Treaty.

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Of other common market schemes he speaks with greater enthusiasm. That trade, not aid, must be a primary consideration in the relationship between rich and poor countries is his point of departure. He castigates what others have termed the "imperialism of free trade" and condemns the reluctance of the advanced countries to admit manufactures from new competitors. Partly in consequence of this reluctance the underdeveloped countries have more to gain from regional protection of infant industry and partial integration than advanced ones. "It is simply not true that free trade and greater competition have much to contribute to the economic growth of underdeveloped countries" (p. 215). The principal task is to increase the efficiency of protection which offers the only possibility of employing the surplus labor he considers characteristic of underdeveloped countries. Economic regionalism, some measure of joint industrial planning, and international aid in support of such regional schemes would supply markets of the required size while preventing the cumulative impoverishment of the weak partner in free trade. The GATT doctrine of non-discrimination consequently comes under heavy attack for the barriers it raises to partial regional integration.

Economic inequality is an obstacle to economic association and has of course often been intensified by it. Rich countries thus fear the obligations they would assume and the poor ones expect the more advanced to impede their own development and to reap all benefits. Mr. Dell's book is especially valuable for its analysis of the precariousness and conflicts of interest that afflict all common market groupings. It is salutary to be reminded that in Central America the economic power of El Salvador is a source of fear, in East Africa, that of Uganda.

Underdeveloped countries do not, then, form a homogeneous bloc, and the criterion that their needs should be overriding is not an unequivocal one. It is therefore surprising to find Mr. Dell such a harsh critic of the EEC countries' discrimination in favor of tropical products from their former dependencies. Among non-associated producers in Africa and Latin America many do of course "consider it unacceptable and improper that they should, in effect, be threatened with discrimination unless they are prepared to come to terms with the EEC and associate themselves with it." Similar resentment has been voiced in advanced countries. Mr. Dell does not deny that the associate members might benefit but drops dark hints about setting the clock back and reviving colonial policies. He quotes President Nkrumah's description of the EEC as "the greatest danger to Africa today," and says that "for our present purposes it is

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sufficient to note that a large majority of the underdeveloped countries believe, whether rightly or wrongly, that the Treaty of Rome constitutes an attack upon them." But surely it is not sufficient to take at face value insensate and belligerent statements deriving not from the presumed victims of European neocolonialism but from those excluded from its benefits.

The discourse of international trade policy is not that of disinterested scholarship, and one is sometimes hard put to it to say whether Mr. Dell cites presidents, cabinet ministers, and newspaper correspondents for their sagacity or for illustrative purposes. As for his own voice, he is too good an economist to miss obvious opportunities for economic analysis, but he speaks with much conviction on points which, theoretically and historically, are moot or controversial. In his call for a new international economic order he is as much of an economic moralist as Cordell Hull, reproaching the rich nations for their pursuit of short-sighted self-interest. Statistical information is needlessly short, and nothing is said about commodity problems or international liquidity. But as an exploratory survey of the worldwide search for new patterns of trade relations, Mr. Dell's book is indispensable, and as a lively neo-mercantilist tract for our times, in the tradition from List to Prebisch, it will not fail to influence that search.

GORAN OHLIN

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Politics and Economics: Papers in Political Economy. By LORD ROBBINS. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1963.—ix, 231 pp. $6.00.

Perhaps no man's writings so well exhibit the growth in breadth of the dominant school of economic thought in the last thirty years as do those of Baron Robbins. He originally made his reputation with *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (1932) which presented the case for limiting the scope of economic science to what was generally called value and distribution, or more popularly, value theory. But with the passing years, especially since World War II, Lord Robbins has been conspicuous among those who have given respectability to a broader view of theory and especially to the notion of a "theory of economic policy." In *Politics and Economics* he has brought together a variety of unpublished essays which gives further evidence of his serious grappling with the subject of economic policy.

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The opening essay, "On the Relations between Politics and Economics," which gives the title to the book, states in a forthright fashion that the theory of economic policy must depend partly upon political judgments and valuations, that while the world is governed by ideas, "these ideas are not only the ideas of economists, but also the ideas of philosophers"; in fact, generally "it is the conjunction of the two which can be so powerful." His address on "Freedom and Order" is notable for its pointed criticism of the once popular, extreme laissez-faire systems of Frédéric Bastiat and Herbert Spencer, in which the functions of the state are limited to those of a night watchman. On the contrary Lord Robbins sees the desirable system of economic freedom" as an evolving system . . . continually adapting itself or being adapted to new conditions and new knowledge, whose only main general criterion is that it tends towards freedom rather than away from it." He defends England's comprehensive social security program against its critics, but he is aware of defects. In his delightful address, "Art and the State," he takes what Americans would consider an advanced position in supporting "public patronage of the arts, some general encouragement of high excellence in culture—in the visual arts, in music, and in the theatre."

The last three essays which deal with the more technical realm of monetary policy contains some sharp criticism of the apologists of "creeping inflation," and also a strong and comprehensive defense of monetary policy as a major, if not the major, instrument for curbing inflation. But one of his arguments in behalf of the latter is not so obvious as he claims; namely, that "the supply of money . . . is most generally susceptible to control."

All the essays bear witness to the author's forward looking approach to the pressing economic problems of the day.

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Generalization in the Writing of History: A Report of the Committee on Historical Analysis of the Social Science Research Council. Edited by LOUIS GOTTSCHALK. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1963.—xiii, 255 pp. $5.00.

As Weber foresaw and Bloch intended, the line between history and the (other) social sciences becomes increasingly indistinct. The eleven practicing historians contributing to this volume differ on several matters but they agree for the most part on two: (1) historical writing inevitably contains generalizations,

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but (2) historians do not usually make them explicit. Generalizations are used because, at the least, events must be selected for study, terms must be used to portray them, and accounts must order details in meaningful sequences. But the necessary generalizations are all too often merely implied, whereas they should be openly employed. It may be good art to leave one's general concepts and propositions implicit, but it is not good history. Thus the once current contrast between the art of history and the sciences of man gives way.

But what can take its place, the distinction between the historical sciences and the behavioral sciences? Not very successfully. For as these essays attest, the methodological issues in historical analysis are far from unique to that discipline. Few historians may be interested in building theories, or in testing others' theories, but they must use them. And in consequence the kinds of problems they encounter in their studies are like those encountered by any student who uses ordinary logic in his arguments, follows the canons of empirical inquiry in his researches, and tries to account in a disciplined manner for the occurrences and sequences of concrete human events. The political analyst, the sociologist doing applied research, the practicing psychologist, the trained ethnographer, the business economist—all would find familiar the matters discussed in these papers. And by the same token, they are all likely to find the essays of interest.

The book is divided into three parts. The first contains articles on special fields or concepts and the second on the broad topic of the title, generalizations in historical writing. Part III, by Martin Klein, brings up to date the bibliography on historiography and philosophy of history found in the Social Science Research Council Bulletin 54 (1946).

Of the seven papers in Part I, two are written by Ancient historians (Chester G. Starr and M. I. Finley), two by Chinese historians (Arthur F. Wright and Derk Bodde), and three by Modern historians (Robert R. Palmer, Walter P. Metzger, and Thomas C. Cochran). The first four recount the kinds of generalizations made and the reasons for making them within each author's special field. As Finley states explicitly, however, their subject matter "is methodological—the nature and problem of generalizations—not historical" (p. 19), and while the sociologist of medicine, the psychologist of consumer behavior, or the anthropologist of law would undoubtedly give different examples of the points made, he would, I think, make the same kinds of points. Palmer's essay is of a different nature. Evidently intent upon avoiding the fate of the centipede who thought too deeply

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about his movements, he has written a disarming account of the generalizations he was conscious of employing in his study of late eighteenth-century revolutions (*The Age of the Democratic Revolution*). (In response to the criticism that his statements on the relation between ideas and social structure are ambiguous, Palmer replies, "Perhaps they are. I do not know. I have not settled this relationship in my own mind. I expect to die without having settled it. As for 'supernaturalism' . . ." [p. 75].) Metzger's and Cochran's papers fall in still another category. The first, a particularly thoughtful discussion of "national character," develops in some detail two different conceptions of "character" and then suggests various ways of ascertaining whether and to what extent a "nation . . . creates an important crucible of character" (p. 96). Cochran's essay, a much briefer piece, describes the concept "social role" and some of the uses it may have in historical studies.

In the first of the four essays in Part II Gottschalk, who also contributes a Foreword and a Summary, distinguishes six kinds of historians according to the level of generalization they customarily employ. The first consists of "those who make generalizations only if they are unaware that they are doing so and try to eliminate the ones of which they are aware," and the last "those who propound philosophies that are intended to provide cosmic understanding of the course of human events past and to come" (p. 113). In between come those who make highly limited generalizations; those who generalize to antecedent, concurrent, or subsequent events; those who generalize to specific other times or places; and those who generalize to indefinite times or places. Next comes an amiable piece by Roy F. Nichols on the four stages through which generalizations about an important event seem to pass, a thesis which he illustrates with statements made about the American Civil War. In the third essay in this part, William O. Aydelotte first argues that "in a strict sense all generalizations are statistical" (p. 145), and then discusses three topics with that as his theme: whether disagreement among historians on the feasibility of generalization may not result merely from "ambiguity in stating the problem" (p. 147) (this may well be the case—for nowhere even in this book is "the problem" clearly stated); what role theory should play; and whether and to what extent quantitative procedures can be used. Like Finley, but unlike, say, Starr or Palmer, David M. Potter is clearly on the side of those who want a more rigorous use of theoretical generalizations in historical writing:

> . . . the historian really cannot abstain from generalization and

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> cannot escape theory. The choice before him is not between a "factual" and a "theoretical" approach but between, on the one hand, theoretical assumptions which have been recognized and, so far as possible, made rational and explicit and, on the other, unrecognized, half-hidden assumptions which remain unordered and chaotic (pp. 186–87).

The SSRC Committee on Historical Analysis, the editor's Foreward tells us, was from the start "anxious to avoid any imputation that it was trying to oblige historians to become social scientists" (p. viii). It has not, I fear, been overly successful.

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BOOK NOTES

In 1898 Sidney and Beatrice Webb paid a one-hundred-day visit (March 30 to July 8) to the United States, a visit which is reported in *Beatrice Webb's American Diary: 1898* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1963; xv, 181 pp., $4.50) edited by David A. Shannon. The Webbs were forty, had been married six years, and had already published together their *History of Trade Unionism* (1894) and *Industrial Democracy* (1897). Before settling down to their planned study of English local government, they had decided on a trip around the world; the United States was the first segment of that journey. The governmental problems of American cities were thus their focus of inquiry. For this purpose, they visited Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago, Denver, Salt Lake City, San Francisco—with side trips also to several universities: Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Princeton, Cornell. There was little time for sustained research; the Webbs were tourists as well as inquirers, relying heavily upon conversations with officials and scholars and upon their powers of quick observation. As a consequence, the views they held upon arrival on March 30 had been rather fully confirmed when they departed from San Francisco July 8. They saw little to praise—in city governments, the national government, or the universities. They met few persons whom they could admire—Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson being among the rare exceptions—but about the American people they were inclined to be generous,

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especially in notes added "on the Pacific" as they were en route to Honolulu. As the editor notes in a highly perceptive Introduction, the Webbs "learned a great deal about the United States but next to nothing from it." Their criterion of judgment was an insular one: if institutions, methods, or persons differed from the English model, they were described scornfully. They came poorly prepared for their inquiry, and their methods were superficial. When their assumptions were being confirmed, they were often gullible; when their prior notions were being challenged, they were unperceptive. Lacking the empathy of Tocqueville or Bryce for the American scene, they left no wiser than they came. In fact the *American Diary* tells the reader more about the Webbs than about America.—WALLACE S. SAYRE, Columbia University.

The authors of a small book on nuclear war and ways to prevent it—*Hostage America, Human Aspects of a Nuclear Attack and a Program of Prevention* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1963; xiii, 167 pp., $3.95)—Robert A. Dentler and Phillips Cutright, have examined in detail not how many Americans would die in a two thousand megaton attack on seventy urban areas chosen by the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization as the most likely to be attacked, but *who* would die. Their findings are extremely interesting; ninety-three per cent of the Jewish population in the United States, sixty-five per cent of the Catholic population, and thirty-three per cent of the Protestant population would die. Similar statistics show that the United States coming out of a nuclear attack would be a predominantly conservative nation, and a nation deprived of its most essential needs in terms of medical care and other services required by a civilized modern state. An additional study of the effects of a twenty thousand megaton attack help to bring out in unequivocal terms the true meaning of modern warfare to the individual reading the book. The second and third chapters of the book discuss the aftermath of the attack and the so-called recovery. The reviewer knows of no other book in which the realities of nuclear war are made so vivid and clear to the uninitiated reader in so short a treatment. He therefore feels that, even if some of the quantitative statements made by the authors may be challenged by the nuclear strategist, the book serves its pupose with exceptional efficiency.

The last chapter of the book presents a "Nuclear Neutralization Pact" in which the United States and the Soviet Union would agree to confine possession of weapons and delivery systems to themselves, and to limit voluntarily their capability to two thousand megatons of deliverable weapons to be used as re-

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prisal against prior use. Moreover the pact would allow inspection against the development of an ultimate defensive system as well as to check that neither side would go beyond the agreed reprisal capacity. The final steps in the approach to peace by the authors would limit the NATO nations to conventional weapons, recognize Communist China, use complete candor about the full range of effects of nuclear testing and thermonuclear warfare, and require the abandonment of civil defense programs on the part of the United States with demands for reciprocation by the Soviet Union.

The various points of the pact are logically debated. Unfortunately there seems to exist little chance that these ideas may become acceptable to the major powers in the near future, both because of inherent difficulties in their realization and because of continuous changes in the political situation. The book is to be recommended to the layman in nuclear matters as a primer on the effects of thermonuclear war on the individual citizens of the United States.—MARIO G. SALVADORI, Columbia University.

Léon Blum was the kind of politician whose career and personality are likely to tempt the biographer. Two brief but illuminating essays (by Colette Audry and James Joll) appeared during the decade after his death; now they are followed by two full-length biographies. The first volume of Gilbert Ziebura's projected two-volume study was published in Berlin last year; on its heels comes Louise Elliott Dalby's *Léon Blum: Evolution of a Socialist* (New York and London, Thomas Yoseloff, 1963; 447 pp., $6.00). Professor Dalby's version, brief and unpretentious, is based almost entirely on printed sources, and particularly on Blum's own published writings. Almost half of the book is devoted to the pre-1914 years, when Blum's activities were more literary than political. Professor Dalby suggests, however, that Blum was one of the principal artisans of French Socialist doctrine in that era, and even advances the thesis that Blum may have shaped Jaurès' thinking rather than the other way round. Blum's political career between the wars is surveyed rather than analyzed in minute detail. The exact nature of his role in rebuilding a mass party after the 1920 split remains rather unclear; and the crucial Popular Front period is condensed, curiously enough, into only twenty pages. Professor Dalby's sober and straightforward account will be serviceable to many general readers, but it is not likely to be the last word on so complex and significant a figure as Léon Blum.—GORDON WRIGHT, Stanford University.

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